CHINESE OFFICIAL ON DPRK, AF/PAK, SNED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000973 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/13/2034 TAGS: PREL PARM UNSC PTER KN KS JA AF PK CH SUBJECT: CHINESE OFFICIAL ON DPRK, AF/PAK, SNED Classified By: Acting Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A senior MFA official claimed the UNSC's Presidential Statement responding to the DPRK's missile launch as a win for Sino-U.S. cooperation and said China would play up the fact that it was not a resolution in discussions with the North Koreans on the need to rejoin the Six-Party Talks. China is critical of Japan's focus on its "narrow interests" with regard to the Korean Peninsula, and also reluctant to let Seoul prevent the establishment of a U.S.-China-Japan trilateral mechanism. On Afghanistan-Pakistan, China is looking forward to Special Representative Richard Holbrooke's visit, and "will contribute" at the April 17th Donors' Conference in Tokyo. China is concerned that U.S. requests for assistance on the security front in South Asia are not matched by willingness to help with China's Uighur problem, a stance criticized as a "double standard." The United States should be willing to work on China's "extremist problem" while China assists with U.S. security priorities in Afghanistan-Pakistan; this is the meaning of "comprehensive" in the context of the Sino-U.S. relationship. State Councilor Dai Bingguo, who will address these issues with the Secretary in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, wants to focus on big-picture, strategic issues and avoid "concrete problems" in the dialogue. End Summary. CHINA FIGHTING TO KEEP DPRK ON BOARD FOR 6PT -------------- ¶2. (C) During a lunch with the Charge and visiting EAP/CM Director David Shear, new MFA Director General for Policy Planning Le Yucheng commented on the successful result of U.S.-China consultation on the appropriate format and wording for a UN Security Council Presidential Statement (PRST) on the North Korean missile launch. Le said that coming to agreement on the PRST was only the first step; it would be a difficult task to explain to the DPRK the decision to support a PRST. There would be "some period of stagnation" in the Six-Party Talks (6PT),he predicted, but the DPRK had not decided to abandon them altogether. China wanted to work to restore the 6PT, but the United States had to do some things as well, such as opening bilateral dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington. The decision to go forward with a PRST was a common effort and a common success. Le said China would be emphasizing to the DPRK that China and the United States worked hard together to avoid a UN Security Council resolution. Domestic politics in North Korea would play a role in how the North Koreans reacted, but actions in the UNSC would also be very important. With that in mind, we needed to be very careful in the UNSC. ¶3. (C) The United States and China both had interests with regard to North Korea, Le continued. For China, the overriding concern was regional stability. The positive aspect of Sino-U.S. cooperation on North Korea was that the United States and China could "see the big picture and act accordingly." We could not solve this problem by acting "according to one or another country's narrow interests." Japan might have strong feelings about this issue, but the United States and China needed to be prudent and realistic, without regards to "strong feelings." Shear noted that, had a North Korean ballistic missile passed over Chinese territory, China might have found itself expressing its own "strong feelings." KJI SUCCESSION PLANNING: WE CAN'T, BUT TRY THINK TANKS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Le noted that the Kim Jong-Il succession issue was "very sensitive" and not something the MFA could talk about formally with other countries without risking a seriously negative reaction from the DPRK. Think tanks, on the other hand, were "another thing" and were interested in the issue. PLANS TO RECEIVE SRAP HOLBROOKE WARMLY -------------- ¶5. (C) Le said it was unfortunate that Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke's counterpart in the Foreign Ministry, would be out of Beijing attending the Bo'ao Forum during SRAP Holbrooke's April 15-16 visit. Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue and FM Yang Jiechi would meet him instead, Le said. BEIJING 00000973 002 OF 003 At the Tokyo Donors' Conference April 17, the Chinese Ambassador to Japan would represent China. Because Pakistan was an important neighboring country, and because stability in that region was paramount for China's national security, "China will make a contribution" at the conference. CHINESE PROBLEM WITH AFGHANISTAN ACTION: SECURITY -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Shear noted that the United States and China shared interests in the stability of Afghanistan and that China should consider supporting the U.S. request to have non-lethal troop supplies transit China; should strengthen its economic assistance to Afghanistan; and, should add to its counternarcotics assistance programs. Le said that China was in principle ready to support an increased Chinese role in Afghanistan's development, but at the moment the security situation was making that very difficult. China recognized the importance of Afghanistan and Afghanistan's connection to China's stability problems in Xinjiang, but the government could not risk seeing Chinese workers and civilians taken hostage. The United States needed to focus seriously on attacking poverty, the real root cause of terrorism in South Asia, he said. LE: "COMPREHENSIVE" MEANS QUID PRO QUO -------------- ¶7. (C) Le said that there was an increasingly popular line of argument in China accusing the United States of using a double standard in its expectations for security cooperation from other countries. The United States seemed to care about fighting extremism and terrorism only when the target of the extremists was the United States. Other groups, such as some Uighur groups in the United States, were also extremists but were unmolested because they did not threaten American national security. A strategy that took a comprehensive view of the situation, and which understood that fundamentalists who threatened China and fundamentalists who threatened the United States were connected parts of a single problem, would find welcome in China. The United States demanded "cooperation" on one issue, such as fighting extremists in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and then used "domestic politics" as an excuse to justify harboring dangerous Uighurs in the United States. This was not "comprehensive" cooperation, Le said. SNED: DAI A BIG THINKER WHO WANTS TO AVOID THE WEEDS -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Le noted that he had begun his MFA career in 1986 in the Soviet Union Department, under the wing of then-Director General Dai Bingguo. Now he was working for Dai again on the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Le noted that the U.S. dates proposed for the dialogue (July 13-14) would not work for Dai, and said the Chinese would be proposing dates later in July. ¶9. (C) Dai was looking forward to discussing strategic issues with Secretary Clinton, Le said. Dai preferred to focus on "strategic" rather than concrete issues. He wanted to discuss "major, philosophical issues" such as how both sides saw the world, how we saw the world evolving, how we saw the evolution of the U.S.-China relationship and what we could do to assure that we would always be able to prevent conflict between the United States and China. "Leaders should not waste time on small, concrete action," Le recommended. "They should be talking about serious strategic topics." Dai was particularly interested in looking at global architecture and its future, Le said, specifically mentioning the G-8, the G-20 and the G-8 plus 5. Le shot down the idea of a "G-2," stating flatly that China and the United States were not on the same level militarily, economically, or in any other arena and thus could not be seen as equal partners for action or responsibility in addressing global issues. Le urged the United States to take a close look at Chinese statements on its own foreign policy. "When we say 'win-win, harmonious world' and similar things, we are not simply using propaganda," he said. "This is the language we use to express China's foreign policy and that we are trying to put into practice." WE'RE LISTENING TO YOUR TONE. LISTEN TO OURS. -------------- - BEIJING 00000973 003 OF 003 ¶10. (C) Le said Dai, and other Chinese policymakers, as well as the Chinese people, had been favorably impressed by changes in the tone of American foreign policy. Speeches by the President and Vice President noting the United States' sense of responsibility, its focus on international consensus and the need to listen before acting had all had an impact on China's opinion toward the United States. This translated into policy success as well, he said, pointing to the example of the peaceful resolution of the Impeccable situation, particularly when compared to the EP-3 incident in 2001. MOVING FORWARD ON A U.S.-JAPAN-CHINA TRILATERAL -------------- -- ¶11. (C) Le suggested that "the time is mature" for a trilateral U.S.-China-Japan meeting. "Regional events demand it," Le said. Le acknowledged that the ROK would be very concerned about such a meeting, but argued that "the issues of importance to the United States, Japan and China are too important to let Seoul dictate our response to them." He suggested that we launch the trilateral talks in a multilateral forum, perhaps by having Assistant Foreign Minister-level officials "meet informally in the corridors, or at breakfast." This would allow the beginning of such a meeting without it being too conspicuous. The agenda should be focused on Asia-Pacific issues, of which there were plenty to fill up a meeting, he said. REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE: EAS, SCO -------------- ¶12. (C) Le reiterated the Chinese stance that they did not want to "push the United States out" of Asia, and said the United States should have a role in East Asian regional architecture structures such as the East Asia Summit (EAS). "If the United States is not included, any East Asian architecture structure is incomplete," he said. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was an important tool for Chinese diplomacy, Le said. China used this mechanism to communicate with Central Asian countries in a way that was not threatening to the countries themselves or perceived by Russia as a hostile effort to expand China's influence. In this way, China could use diplomacy to counter extremism and fundamentalism in that region, which was China's basic national interest. (Note: Le said he had been involved in the effort to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.) WEINSTEIN