PRC/DPRK: POST-LAUNCH ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINESE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000952 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2034 TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP KN KS CH SUBJECT: PRC/DPRK: POST-LAUNCH ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINESE Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Ben Moeling. Reason s 1.4 (b/d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) The Chinese are telling the P-3 countries, Japan and the ROK the same thing about the DPRK's missile launch: it might have been a satellite launch (technical data are ambiguous) and therefore we cannot conclude that it was a UNSCR violation, pass another resolution or apply additional or enhanced sanctions. Russia and China agree on this position, and on the general principle that we should be encouraging positive behavior by the DPRK rather than risking isolating North Korea further. A Russian Embassy source said the Chinese had more influence on the North Koreans than they admitted to. The Japanese and ROK embassies said that contact with the Chinese on this issue had been at the ministerial level, and the ROK and Japanese embassies had not been able to meet with MFA contacts to discuss the launch. The Chinese media, meanwhile, has hewed close to the official line in describing the launch, repeating language on the right of peaceful use of outer space. End Summary. Not Necessarily a UNSCR Violation, Says China -------------- ¶2. (C) Acting PolMinCouns, French Political Counselor Erkki Maillard and British First Secretary Gareth Ward jointly delivered a demarche to MFA International Organizations and Conferences Department, UN Division Director Yang Tao on the evening of April 7. P-3 members stressed that North Korea's launch of a Taepo-Dong 2 on April 5 was a violation of UNSC Resolutions. Maillard and Ward noted that anything short of a resolution condemning the launch would be inadequate and would send the message that the UNSC was ineffective. This, possibly, would encourage other countries who would perceive that the UNSC would not punish violations of UNSC resolutions. Maillard added that the failure of the international community to respond strongly in this case could cause Japan to rethink its national security strategy with implications for regional peace and stability. 3.(C) UNSC P-5 members were "facing difficulties" resolving differences on how to respond to the North Korean launch, responded Yang. China believes that we need to maintain the Six-Party Talks, maintain peace and stability in Northeast Asia, and maintain the authority of the UNSC and the unity of the P-5. Regarding the various draft resolutions that had been circulated, China had three primary concerns: i) Format: China would like to see a press statement, not a resolution. China would be flexible on a presidential statement with "acceptable" content. ii) Sanctions: "Enhancing exiting sanctions" or some similar formulation would cause problems on the Chinese side, as mention of sanctions in any way would harm the Six-Party Talks; iii) Violation Language: China did not believe the launch was a clear violation of 1718. China understood the P-3 points about the connections and links between missiles and space launch rockets, but the nature of such launches was different. If the statement were to say "clear violation," China could not support it. ¶4. (C) According to Yang, China felt that the UNSC should take "proportionate" action. "Technical differences" remained in the positions of the P-5 countries, but speed was important and the discussions should not be delayed through needless argument. China hoped for a low-key, quick reaction by Council members. French Counselor Maillard asked Yang to clarify the points on which China had said it needed to do additional investigation before characterizing the launch. Yang said that such information at this point would not be useful, since "arguing over legal definitions and terms would take such a long time." The Council members should recognize that this had become an issue to view from a political and security perspective, not a legal one. To argue over technical legal details would waste time and not achieve results, said Yang. China Understates its Influence over DPRK, Russia Says BEIJING 00000952 002 OF 003 -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) Acting PolMinCouns met April 9 with Russian Political Counselor Sergey Yakimets. Yakimets said that the Russian Embassy in Beijing consulted "quite regularly" with the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on North Korean issues. China had influence over North Korea, Yakimets said, because China represented international legitimacy for the DPRK and also because China provided a large portion of North Korea's imports. China downplays this influence, Yakimets observed. ¶6. (C) The Russian Embassy spoke with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs several times immediately after the launch, but as of Tuesday, April 7, the Chinese MFA told the Russian Embassy they preferred that further consultations on the issue of the launch be handled through both countries' UN offices in New York. Yakimets said that in the estimation of the Russian Embassy, the decisions on this issue were being made "above the foreign ministry's head" but not at the Politburo Standing Committee level; the Russians assumed that State Councilor Dai Bingguo was in charge. ¶7. (C) The Chinese and Russian positions on the issue of the launch were similar, Yakimets said. Both agreed that the technical data from the launch were "ambiguous" and could point to a peaceful satellite launch. Russia and China did not want to see "debate on this issue which lasted a long time and achieved nothing," he said. Russia also agreed that a UNSC resolution would be a mistake. A resolution would "push North Korea back into its hole" at a time when we should be using incentives to encourage the DPRK to behave better. North Korea needed positive reasons to cooperate, such as a security guarantee, political legitimacy and economic assistance. He said that the Russians and Chinese agreed that if North Korea had these things, "it would not need missiles and bombs." In addition, Yakimets said, Russia and China agreed that the DPRK's actions in following international protocols for formal notification in advance of the launch of a rocket were positive steps that should be encouraged. "In a way, it showed the North Koreans can follow diplomatic rules," he said. Japan to China: Support a Resolution -------------- ¶8. (C) Japanese Foreign Minister Hirofumi Naksone has had two phone conversations with PRC Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, urging China's support for a UNSC resolution condemning the launch, according to Japanese Embassy First Secretary Katsutoshi Takeda. Yang told Nakasone that China had demanded that North Korea not escalate tensions in the region, but also urged relevant parties to be cautious and "have an appropriate reaction" to the DPRK launch, reported Takeda. Yang had no comment regarding China's position on supporting a resolution, said Takeda. ROK to China: Support a Resolution -------------- ¶9. (C) ROK Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan has also spoken with PRC FM Yang twice regarding the launch. Yu also urged China to adopt a new UNSC resolution, said Lee Heon, Counselor at the ROK Embassy in Beijing. FM Yang's message to FM Yu was the same that the MFA gave after the P-3 demarche April 7: China preferred a press statement, not a resolution, but was willing to show flexibility on a presidential statement if the content was appropriate. It would be appropriate, said Yang, "to settle the situation quickly," according to Lee. On a separate note, ROK FM Yu recently dined with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID) Director Wang Jiarui in Seoul. Wang was a member of CCP Standing Committee Member Li Changchun's delegation that visited South Korea April 4-7. During the April 6 dinner, reported Lee, FM Yu pressed Wang and the Chinese Ambassador to Seoul to support a resolution. ¶10. (C) The ROK Embassy attempted to schedule a meeting for their Ambassador to meet with PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei, but was rebuffed by the MFA, said Lee. They were told that since ROK-China discussions were taking place at the ministerial level, there was no need to have additional meetings regarding the launch. The ROK Embassy has also BEIJING 00000952 003 OF 003 requested an emergency appointment with CCID Director Wang Jiarui, but Lee was pessimistic that ROK Ambassador to Beijing Shin Jun-seung would get an appointment. Media Reaction -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Chinese media have presented straightforward coverage of the DPRK "satellite test" and have largely hewed to China's official position. Several Chinese commentators have echoed comments made by MFA spokesperson Jiang Yu during the April 7 regularly scheduled press briefing: that a satellite launch is different from a missile launch, each country has the right to the peaceful use of outer space, relevant parties should exercise caution and restraint, and actions in the UN Security Council should be appropriate. WEINSTEIN