Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BEIJING517
2009-02-27 09:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Beijing
Cable title:
PRC LEADERS KEEN TO FORGE CLOSE TIES WITH U.S.; HU
how-toVZCZCXRO4494 OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC DE RUEHBJ #0517/01 0580948 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 270948Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2565 INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000517
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: PRC LEADERS KEEN TO FORGE CLOSE TIES WITH U.S.; HU
JINTAO SEEKS TAIWAN BREAKTHROUGH AS HIS LEGACY
REF: A. BEIJING 145
B. 07 BEIJING 6673
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 000517
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: PRC LEADERS KEEN TO FORGE CLOSE TIES WITH U.S.; HU
JINTAO SEEKS TAIWAN BREAKTHROUGH AS HIS LEGACY
REF: A. BEIJING 145
B. 07 BEIJING 6673
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The PRC leadership is determined to forge close ties with the new U.S. Administration, viewing relations with Washington as the key to China´s engagement with the world, according to an Embassy contact with access to the Chinese leadership. Though China has long viewed its relationship with the United States as its most important, a "shift" took place following the August 2008 Olympics, when Chinese leaders realized that good relations with Washington "saved" the Beijing Games and "brought the rest of the world to China." This same contact asserted that President Hu Jintao is actively pursuing a "breakthrough" on Taiwan as his primary attempt at establishing a "legacy." As early as 2006, Hu reportedly formed a "study team," which is still active, to research a "new way forward" on Taiwan. The lack of a response so far from Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou to Hu´s six-point proposal of December 31, however, is a concern to China´s leaders, our contact asserted. End Summary.
U.S. RELATIONS "THE KEY" TO THE REST OF THE WORLD
-------------- --------------
2. (C) China is keen to pursue close relations with the new U.S. administration, according to [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN]. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] told POLOFF on February 19 that PRC leaders believed, based on the Olympics experience, that the rest of the world would largely continue to look to the United States to determine how to deal with a rising China. Thus, relations with Washington were "the key" to China´s engagement with the rest of the world. According to "multiple sources" within Zhongnanhai, according to [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN], this new emphasis on better relations with the United States had originated "straight from the top" (meaning from President Hu Jintao) and not from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The phrase that "everyone" was talking about in Zhongnanhai, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] claimed, was "getting relations right with the United States means getting relations right with the entire world." (Note: In Chinese, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] said the phrase is, "zhua zhu meiguo, jiu zhua zhu quan shijie.")
3. (C) The PRC leadership´s determination to forge closer ties with the United States stemmed from the "lessons" China had learned from the August 2008 Olympic Games, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] asserted. Though China had long viewed its relationship with the United States as its most important, following the August 2008 Olympics, Chinese leaders realized that good relations with Washington had "saved" the Beijing Games and "brought the rest of the world to China." Then-President Bush´s early decision to attend the Olympics and refusal to politicize the Games, even after the March 2008 unrest in Tibet, had given Hu Jintao and the Chinese people "great face" and stood in stark contrast to the "wavering" and "grandstanding" of leaders like French President Sarkozy. Most importantly, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] argued, it had been the U.S. position that eventually "prevailed," with the rest of the world "following the U.S. lead" and deciding to attend the Games. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] commented that the days of Beijing´s relying primarily on relations with the Third World, or the UN, were "long gone," [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] averred, declaring, "It´s all about the United States now."
HU JINTAO PURSUING TAIWAN "BREAKTHROUGH" AS HIS "LEGACY"
-------------- --------------
4. (C) Turning to China´s cross-Strait policy, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] claimed that President Hu Jintao was actively pursuing a "breakthrough" on Taiwan as his primary attempt at establishing a "legacy." Just as former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had agreement on the reversion of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty as part of his legacy, Hu wanted to "do something big" on Taiwan. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] dismissed Hu Jintao´s signature domestic policy, the Scientific Development Concept (SDC),as "rubbish" (gou pi),reiterating that, in his view, a breakthrough on Taiwan would be far more important than anything Hu might accomplish through continuing to push the Scientific Development Concept. (Comment: This is the second Embassy source to claim that Hu is aiming for his Taiwan policy, and not the Scientific Development Concept, to be his primary legacy -- see ref A.)
5. (C) For several years, Hu Jintao had had in mind a breakthrough on Taiwan, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] asserted. As early as 2006, Hu had formed a "study team," which was still active, of leading Chinese scholars and other experts to research a "new way forward" on Taiwan. The group´s goal was to find a path that lay somewhere between the "one country, two systems" approach that remained unacceptable to Taiwan and anything that smacked of "special state-to-state relations" that remained anathema to the Mainland. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] said he had "heard" that Dean of the Tsinghua University Law School Wang Zhengmin was one member of this study group.
6.. (C) Hu Jintao´s best-known speeches on cross-Strait relations had grown out of this desire to achieve a breakthrough and the work of this study group, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] averred, including Hu´s offer of a "peace agreement" during his keynote address to the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 (ref B) and his "six-point" proposal in his December 31, 2008 speech (ref A). Currently, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] claimed, the Chinese leadership´s greatest concern regarding this hoped-for "breakthrough" was the lack of a substantive response from Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou to Hu´s December 31 speech.
PICCUTA
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2034
TAGS: PREL PGOV CH TW
SUBJECT: PRC LEADERS KEEN TO FORGE CLOSE TIES WITH U.S.; HU
JINTAO SEEKS TAIWAN BREAKTHROUGH AS HIS LEGACY
REF: A. BEIJING 145
B. 07 BEIJING 6673
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
Summary
--------------
1. (C) The PRC leadership is determined to forge close ties with the new U.S. Administration, viewing relations with Washington as the key to China´s engagement with the world, according to an Embassy contact with access to the Chinese leadership. Though China has long viewed its relationship with the United States as its most important, a "shift" took place following the August 2008 Olympics, when Chinese leaders realized that good relations with Washington "saved" the Beijing Games and "brought the rest of the world to China." This same contact asserted that President Hu Jintao is actively pursuing a "breakthrough" on Taiwan as his primary attempt at establishing a "legacy." As early as 2006, Hu reportedly formed a "study team," which is still active, to research a "new way forward" on Taiwan. The lack of a response so far from Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou to Hu´s six-point proposal of December 31, however, is a concern to China´s leaders, our contact asserted. End Summary.
U.S. RELATIONS "THE KEY" TO THE REST OF THE WORLD
-------------- --------------
2. (C) China is keen to pursue close relations with the new U.S. administration, according to [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN]. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] told POLOFF on February 19 that PRC leaders believed, based on the Olympics experience, that the rest of the world would largely continue to look to the United States to determine how to deal with a rising China. Thus, relations with Washington were "the key" to China´s engagement with the rest of the world. According to "multiple sources" within Zhongnanhai, according to [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN], this new emphasis on better relations with the United States had originated "straight from the top" (meaning from President Hu Jintao) and not from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The phrase that "everyone" was talking about in Zhongnanhai, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] claimed, was "getting relations right with the United States means getting relations right with the entire world." (Note: In Chinese, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] said the phrase is, "zhua zhu meiguo, jiu zhua zhu quan shijie.")
3. (C) The PRC leadership´s determination to forge closer ties with the United States stemmed from the "lessons" China had learned from the August 2008 Olympic Games, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] asserted. Though China had long viewed its relationship with the United States as its most important, following the August 2008 Olympics, Chinese leaders realized that good relations with Washington had "saved" the Beijing Games and "brought the rest of the world to China." Then-President Bush´s early decision to attend the Olympics and refusal to politicize the Games, even after the March 2008 unrest in Tibet, had given Hu Jintao and the Chinese people "great face" and stood in stark contrast to the "wavering" and "grandstanding" of leaders like French President Sarkozy. Most importantly, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] argued, it had been the U.S. position that eventually "prevailed," with the rest of the world "following the U.S. lead" and deciding to attend the Games. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] commented that the days of Beijing´s relying primarily on relations with the Third World, or the UN, were "long gone," [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] averred, declaring, "It´s all about the United States now."
HU JINTAO PURSUING TAIWAN "BREAKTHROUGH" AS HIS "LEGACY"
-------------- --------------
4. (C) Turning to China´s cross-Strait policy, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] claimed that President Hu Jintao was actively pursuing a "breakthrough" on Taiwan as his primary attempt at establishing a "legacy." Just as former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping had agreement on the reversion of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty as part of his legacy, Hu wanted to "do something big" on Taiwan. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] dismissed Hu Jintao´s signature domestic policy, the Scientific Development Concept (SDC),as "rubbish" (gou pi),reiterating that, in his view, a breakthrough on Taiwan would be far more important than anything Hu might accomplish through continuing to push the Scientific Development Concept. (Comment: This is the second Embassy source to claim that Hu is aiming for his Taiwan policy, and not the Scientific Development Concept, to be his primary legacy -- see ref A.)
5. (C) For several years, Hu Jintao had had in mind a breakthrough on Taiwan, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] asserted. As early as 2006, Hu had formed a "study team," which was still active, of leading Chinese scholars and other experts to research a "new way forward" on Taiwan. The group´s goal was to find a path that lay somewhere between the "one country, two systems" approach that remained unacceptable to Taiwan and anything that smacked of "special state-to-state relations" that remained anathema to the Mainland. [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] said he had "heard" that Dean of the Tsinghua University Law School Wang Zhengmin was one member of this study group.
6.. (C) Hu Jintao´s best-known speeches on cross-Strait relations had grown out of this desire to achieve a breakthrough and the work of this study group, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] averred, including Hu´s offer of a "peace agreement" during his keynote address to the 17th Party Congress in October 2007 (ref B) and his "six-point" proposal in his December 31, 2008 speech (ref A). Currently, [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN] claimed, the Chinese leadership´s greatest concern regarding this hoped-for "breakthrough" was the lack of a substantive response from Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou to Hu´s December 31 speech.
PICCUTA