U.S.-CHINA EXCHANGE RATE STABLE, NO CHANGE OF

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 000354 SIPDIS STATE FOR E/YON, EAP, EAP/CM, EEB STATE PASS USTR TREASURY FOR OASIA/DOHNER/WINSHIP USDOC FOR ITA/MACQUEEN NSC FOR LOI E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2029 TAGS: EFIN ECON ETRD PREL CH SUBJECT: U.S.-CHINA EXCHANGE RATE STABLE, NO CHANGE OF POLICY REF: A. 08 BEIJING 4481 ¶B. BERLIN 0137 Classified By: Economic Minister-Counselor Robert Luke; Reasons 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Summary. After three years of steady appreciation, the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has been relatively stable against the USD since July 2008; since January 6, the RMB effectively has been pegged to the USD. In recent weeks senior Chinese leaders, including Premier Wen Jiabao and People's Bank of China (PBOC) Governor Zhou Xiaochuan, have stated publicly that there has been no significant change in their exchange rate policy and that the current stability will continue in the near term. Other relevant contacts have confirmed this message to us directly, while also asserting that reform of the exchange rate mechanism will continue. See comments in paragraphs 7-10. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) After three years of more or less steady appreciation, the RMB has been relatively stable against the USD since July 2008, although on a trade-weighted basis the RMB appreciated 12 percent in 2008. Since January 6, 2009, the RMB effectively has been pegged to the USD. Cumulative RMB appreciation against the USD since the Chinese Government officially ended its previous peg policy on July 20, 2005 has reached 21.1 percent. A one-week period of slight depreciation in early December 2008 briefly generated speculation that policy had changed (ref a),but since then volatility has been slight. No Fundamental Change -------------- ¶3. (SBU) The Chinese Government publicly insists there has been no fundamental change in its exchange rate policy. On January 29, after meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Berlin, Premier Wen Jiabao reiterated the Chinese mantra of keeping the RMB exchange rate at a "balanced and reasonable level." In a February 3 media interview, PBOC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan used similar language to confirm that the PBOC would maintain the RMB-USD exchange rate at a rational and balanced level, from which there should not be any large deviations. In addition, he noted that the international financial crisis was one of the major factors when considering China's exchange rate policy and the policy may be different from that in normal times. ¶4. (C) Other relevant official contacts have given a similar message on the Chinese Government's exchange rate policy. On January 16, Deputy Administrator Wang Xiaoyi of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) told Fin MinCoun that the Chinese Government will continue reform of the exchange rate mechanism. He added that any weakening of the USD and subsequent depreciation of the RMB on a trade-weighted basis would increase POLITICAL pressure on China to allow the RMB to appreciate. ¶5. (C) On January 20, National Economic Research Institute (NERI) head Fan Gang, who is a member of the People's Bank of China (PBOC) Monetary Policy Committee, told Fin MinCoun and Econoff that the RMB is likely to remain broadly stable against the USD in the near term. Fan added that China is likely to tolerate significant volatility in its trade-weighted exchange rate, if due to fluctuations in the U.S. dollar against other currencies. Fan stressed that Chinese leaders do not believe the exchange rate can play an important counter-cyclical role, as the decline in exports has been due mainly to weak external demand, and any increase in external competitiveness from a depreciation of the exchange is unlikely to boost exports meaningfully. With little to gain from depreciation, Fan said Chinese leaders do not believe it is worth the risks of antagonizing major trading partners. ¶6. (C) On January 21, Director General Xu Lin of the Fiscal and Financial Affairs Department at the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) told Econ MinCoun and Fin MinCoun that the government likely would keep the RMB stable against the USD, with limited volatility, in the near term. Xu stressed that the financial crisis has made clear that China needs to accelerate efforts to reorient its economy towards domestic demand-led growth, as it can no longer rely BEIJING 00000354 002 OF 003 on external demand. Echoing Fan, Xu said increasing price competitiveness through depreciation would have little impact on exports due to weak external demand. With limited benefits, Xu said there is no point in risking trade relations with China's trading partners by depreciating. Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) We agree with most market analysts that the RMB is likely to remain relatively stable against the USD in the near term. While it could appreciate marginally, it is unlikely to resume the pace of appreciation against the U.S. dollar which occurred during the first half of 2008. While it may also depreciate slightly at times, both to maintain two-way risk for short-term foreign currency traders and show political support for the export lobby, large or sustained depreciation remains unlikely. However, given the millions of workers who have been laid off from the export sector, our Chinese interlocutors have stressed that substantial appreciation against the U.S. dollar is not politically feasible at this time (though appreciation on a real or trade-weighted basis is possible, as the POLITICAL focus remains on the nominal bilateral RMB-USD exchange rate). ¶8. (C) Comment, continued. The sharp contraction in demand in China's trading partners appears to have strengthened the consensus on the need to promote domestic demand-led growth. For the most part, Chinese interlocutors appreciate that when the global economy recovers, the structure of global demand will not return to its pre-crisis state. Thus, as the government designs its counter-cyclical economic policies, officials appear focused on how best to cushion what will be a sharp cyclical downturn. At the same time, they need to respond to POLITICAL pressure and demonstrate support for adversely affected sectors and workers, while at the same time maintaining progress in rebalancing and restructuring the economy. Most Chinese economic and financial officials understand that RMB depreciation would not provide any meaningful benefit to their export industries that are struggling against sharply depressed demand in all major markets, and that a real appreciation is needed to channel new investment away from an exporter sector that likely has lost some markets forever. A stable RMB vis--vis the US dollar, along with small increases in VAT rebates for exporters, appears to be an attempt by the authorities to balance their desire to avoid antagonizing the export lobby and major trading partners and also avoid encouraging workers and firms to remain in ultimately unviable sectors. While officials may be concerned that a sharp depreciation could induce large-scale and disorderly capital outflows, as some market analysts speculate, they have not expressed this as a major concern (SAFE's Wang said they welcomed capital outflows as long as they are orderly as through formal channels). ¶9. (C) Comment, continued. All of the above notwithstanding, the near-term policy of relative stability of the RMB vis--vis the USD could be changed by either sharp and sustained movements of the U.S. dollar against other currencies, or if deflation appears larger and more entrenched than anticipated. Just as inflation in 2007 helped China's leaders achieve a consensus in support of more accelerated appreciation, concerns about sustained deflation could increase support for RMB depreciation (even if deflation is due mainly to supply factors and thus raises real incomes). ¶10. (C) Comment, continued. Whether allegations that China's currency is undervalued or that "imbalances" caused the financial crisis, the Chinese are hypersensitive and react sharply to such public comments primarily because they want to head off any move to lay blame for the global economic slowdown at their doorstep. While this is important to them in protecting their international image, it is critical in terms of the domestic audience. China knows it faces a tough year ahead, especially with rising unemployment. The government's standard line is that the government is doing all it can to deal with the crisis brought to China by U.S. mismanagement of its economy. The Chinese play the crisis like an earthquake or an act of nature, i.e., something the government did not cause and cannot control, but something on which the government can come to the rescue. This, they BEIJING 00000354 003 OF 003 hope, will deflect away from the leadership any unhappiness over job losses and economic hardship. PICCUTA