PRC: SKEPTICAL REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 003288

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2029
TAGS: PREL PARM PTER NATO MARR EAID CH PK AF
SUBJECT: PRC: SKEPTICAL REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S
ANNOUNCEMENT ON AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson for reasons
1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Official PRC reaction to the President's
announcement of the way ahead on Afghanistan and Pakistan has
been limited to a cautious statement by the MFA press
spokesman at a regularly scheduled press conference December

3. Party-run media outlets expressed skepticism about the
President's plan and suggested that it was unlikely to
achieve its desired result. South Asia experts at
government-affiliated think tanks argued that the President's
announcement of a timetable for redeploying troops would
embolden the Taliban and erode Pakistan's willingness to
confront domestic extremists. One expert suggested that the
U.S. should focus on improving Afghanistan's education
system, expanding employment opportunities and re-balancing
the ethnic composition of the Afghan Army in order to avoid
future ethnic conflict. Another expert opined that regional
actors had begun envisioning South Asian regional relations
following a U.S. military exit, and suggested that the U.S.
and China should work together to develop a broad strategic
consensus among key actors on regional relations following a
U.S. military departure. END SUMMARY.

Cautious Official Reaction to President's Announcement
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2. (SBU) MFA Spokesperson Qin Gang stated at the regularly
scheduled Foreign Ministry press briefing on December 3 that
China hoped the international community would contribute to
establishing peace and stability in South Asia while fully
respecting those countries' independence, sovereignty and
territorial integrity. When asked to comment on President
Obama's December 1 announcement of a way forward in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, Qin responded that China hoped to
sustain the momentum of the dialogue with the United States
on these regional issues. The U.S.-China joint statement
issued during President Obama's November visit highlighted
efforts by both sides to establish peace and stability in
Afghanistan, Qin concluded. PRC officials have not made
additional comments on the President's announcement.

Negative Media Reaction to President's Announcement
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3. (U) PRC newspapers were generally negative in their
assessment of the President's speech. The mass circulation
international affairs newspaper Global Times (which, though
published by the official People's Daily, does not
necessarily reflect the Party's official viewpoint) opined on
December 3 that President Obama's announcement had generated
more criticism than support, while also reporting that
Afghans were apathetic about the U.S. troop increase. The
article reported that the Taliban would fight to the end,
while also commenting that U.S. domestic support for the war
had declined, in part due to its cost. The Xinhua Daily
Telegraph reported December 3 that U.S. difficulties were
directly tied to over-reliance on the military. The
International Herald Leader, a paper published by the Xinhua
News Agency, reported December 3 that President Obama could
only pray that the situation in Afghanistan would improve in
the next year. The English-language edition of Global Times
on December 8 suggested that if the U.S. demonstrated
sufficient sensitivity to questions that China considered as
bearing upon its core interests, including Taiwan, then China
possessed almost unlimited resources and capability to help
stabilize the situation in Afghanistan.

PRC South Asia Experts Question President's Plan
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4. (C) During a December 3 meeting with PolOff,
MFA-affiliated China Institute of International Studies
(CIIS) South Asia scholar Rong Ying questioned how a mission
that the U.S. failed to complete over the past eight years
could be achieved over the next 18 months with the infusion
of 30,000 troops and several hundred civilians. Rong
explained that many Chinese analysts viewed the President's
announcement as an exit strategy and predicted that regional
actors -- notably Pakistan, India and the Afghan Taliban --
would hedge until the "announced U.S. withdrawal."


5. (C) Ministry of State Security-affiliated Chinese
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
South Asia scholar Hu Shisheng predicted to POLOFF December 2
that the announced force withdrawal starting in July 2011
would have two effects: 1) to bolster the confidence of the
Afghan Taliban, who would wait out the U.S. presence; and 2)

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to sap the will of the Pakistan Army to confront domestic
extremists, given that the Pakistan Army would find too
daunting the challenge of dealing with extremists on its own
after the U.S. departure. Afghan EmbOff Mirwais Nab on
December 3 recounted to EmbOffs being told by PRC South Asia
scholars that the negative undercurrent in Beijing to the
President's announcement stemmed in part from PRC concern
that the increased U.S. military presence in Afghanistan
would push the Afghan Taliban and other extremist forces from
Afghanistan into Pakistan, Central Asia and potentially
western China.


6. (C) Not all PRC analysis of the President's announcement
was negative. Chen Yurong, an expert on Russia and Central
Asia at CIIS, told POLOFF December 3 that the President's
announcement was the only viable choice. She reacted
positively to the President's emphasis on gaining the support
of the local population, while cautioning that implementation
would be very challenging. She expressed doubt at the
viability of timetables for redeployment.

PRC Experts Offer Advice for Way Ahead
--------------


7. (C) CICIR's Hu suggested that the U.S. and its partners
should focus on education, employment and the composition of
the Afghan Army in order to prevent the outbreak of ethnic
conflict in Afghanistan. Hu suggested that the U.S. request
that neighboring countries, including China, build schools
and colleges throughout Afghanistan as a means of diluting
the influence of extremists. To increase job opportunities
for Afghans, Hu asserted, the U.S. should assist Afghanistan
in restoring traditional agricultural and handicraft sectors.
On the ethnic composition of the Afghan Army, Hu warned that
the disproportionate number of Tajiks in uniform could lead
other ethnic minorities in Afghanistan to conclude that their
interests were being neglected, which could spark ethnic
conflict in the absence of U.S. intervention. Hu recommended
that U.S. experts invite Chinese counterparts to conduct
joint field studies in Afghanistan to identify areas where
China had a comparative advantage and could offer concrete
development support to U.S. and coalition efforts.


8. (C) CIIS' Rong stated that every regional actor was
starting to envision South Asia following the U.S. military
departure from Afghanistan, and each actor had its own vision
for regional relations. Rong explained that regional
players, including China, still harbored suspicions about the
United States' strategic intentions in South Asia. Rong
cited U.S. encouragement of India to contribute to
Afghanistan's reconstruction as an example. India's
assistance had directly impacted Pakistan's sense of
security, Rong explained, not just because Pakistan viewed
Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth, but also because
India's involvement in Afghanistan had stirred ethnic and
religious tensions in Afghanistan that had reverberated
throughout Pakistan. Given the interlocking nature of
relations in South Asia and the fact that the U.S. and China
were major powers in Asia, Rong argued, we should foster a
broad strategic consensus among key actors on what regional
relations should look like following a U.S. military
departure.
HUNTSMAN