COMPETING PERCEPTIONS OF PRC ACTIVITIES IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 003287

SIPDIS

EAP/CM FOR BRIAN ANDREWS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2029
TAGS: AF CH EAID MARR NATO PARM PK PREL PTER
SUBJECT: COMPETING PERCEPTIONS OF PRC ACTIVITIES IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson for reasons
1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: PRC contacts define Chinese interests in
Afghanistan within the context of China's international
image, security requirements, commercial goals and bilateral
relationships with key countries. Afghan Embassy contacts
here lament the PRC's narrow focus on projects in Afghanistan
that profit Chinese companies. Our Pakistani Embassy
contact, by contrast, emphasized increasing PRC interest in
the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan and believes
Chinese investment in Afghanistan will bring Afghanistan and
Pakistan closer together. Our Afghan Embassy contacts
suggested that the U.S. and Afghanistan coordinate requests
for PRC assistance in Afghanistan in order to underscore to
PRC officials that Afghanistan views U.S. requests as its own
development priority. PRC reluctance to play a larger role
in the Friends of Democratic Pakistan stems in part from an
unwillingness to set a precedent for multilateral
coordination of PRC bilateral assistance, according to our
Pakistan Embassy contact. END SUMMARY.

Factors Shaping PRC Policy on Afghanistan
--------------


2. (C) MFA-affiliated China Institute of International
Studies (CIIS) South Asia scholar Rong Ying told POLOFF
December 3 that China weighed four factors in determining its
policy on Afghanistan: 1) China wanted its assistance to
Afghanistan to bolster its image in the Muslim world; 2)
China worried that Afghanistan's inability to control all of
its territory created space for anti-China groups to
congregate and train; 3) China viewed Afghanistan as a future
crossroads for energy pipelines and transportation
infrastructure corridors to Central Asia, India and the
Middle East and wanted to accelerate progress toward this
outcome; and 4) China did not want its involvement in
Afghanistan to impact negatively its bilateral relationships
with key states, notably the United States, Pakistan and
India.

PRC Perception of Security Environment in Af/Pak
-------------- ---


3. (C) Ministry of State Security-affiliated China
Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
South Asia scholar Hu Shisheng outlined for POLOFF on
December 2 four indicators that the security environment in
Afghanistan and Pakistan was deteriorating, with potentially
negative consequences for China's own security: 1) the
numbers of Afghan Taliban fighters had steadily increased
annually, from roughly 7,000 in 2006 to over 25,000 now; 2)
the Afghan Army had not figured out how to retain soldiers,
as demonstrated by its 25-percent attrition rate; 3) the
Afghan Taliban was now providing sanctuary to members of the
Pakistan Taliban in Nuristan Province, which suggested that
the relationship between the two groups was growing closer;
and 4) Uighur fighters that were previously concentrated in
South Waziristan had dispersed following the Pakistan Army's
clear-and-hold operation there in October. Hu explained that
the PRC had been attempting to build an information network
within South Waziristan from the village level up to locate
and track suspected fighters, but had encountered difficulty
identifying human sources that were reliable. Hu explained
that Pakistan's responsiveness to Chinese requests for
assistance in locating alleged Uighur fighters was
inconsistent. Pakistan had handed over to China "a couple"
of the 22 suspected Uighur fighters that China had demanded
in 2007, according to Hu, but lately had not provided any
useful information.

PRC Just Wants to Make Money in Afghanistan
--------------


4. (C) Afghan EmbOffs expressed frustration over China's
relatively limited assistance, complaining that Chinese
officials offered little beyond vague promises of assistance
"within China's capacity" and insisted on "mutually
beneficial" projects that would profit Chinese companies.
"China just wants to make money in Afghanistan, nothing
more," according to Afghan EmbOff Ahmad Najmpoor on December

3. Afghan EmbOff Mirwais Nab added that China would be
careful to keep its assistance projects separate from other
donors in order to avoid being seen working side by side with
U.S. and NATO forces. Pakistan Embassy Counselor Shafqat Ali
Khan separately told PolOffs December 4 that although there
had not been any tangible shift in Chinese assistance

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activities in South Asia in recent years, PRC authorities had
shown "escalating interest" in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Khan surmised that PRC authorities were still determining how
best to respond to the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Divergent Views on PRC Investment at Aynak Copper Mine
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Afghan EmbOff Mirwais Nab complained that the PRC was
not providing any financial assistance or training to support
the roughly 1,600 Afghan National Police guarding China's
investment at the Aynak copper mine. UK EmbOff Martin Duffy
told EmbOffs December 7 that the PRC already had one company
of de-commissioned People's Armed Police (PAP) providing
security in the vicinity of Aynak, and noted that the British
were pressing China to increase security assistance and
provide in-country training for Afghan security personnel,
but that the Chinese had thus far rebuffed UK requests.
Pakistani Embassy's Khan expressed optimism that China's
investment at the Aynak copper mine would lead to greater
Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation, given that all of the
extracted copper would transit Pakistan.

Afghan EmbOffs Suggest Coordinating Requests to PRC
-------------- --------------


6. (C) The United States and Afghanistan should coordinate
their requests for Chinese assistance in Afghanistan,
according to Afghan EmbOff Nab. Coordinating requests would
allow Afghanistan to double-track U.S. asks through its
bilateral channel with China and demonstrate that Afghanistan
viewed U.S. requests as its own development priority, Nab
said. He identified agriculture as a priority area where
China could do more to improve irrigation systems and invest
in expanding agricultural production, particularly of fruit
products in the relatively stable northern provinces. Nab
demonstrated a detailed understanding of the contents of
Deputy SRAP Feldman's November 11 working-level consultations
with MFA Asian Affairs Department DDG Sun Weidong, at one
point explaining that PRC officials were pleased with the
U.S. delegation's focus on development assistance vice
military programs.

PRC Reluctance to Host Friends of Democratic Pakistan
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Pakistan EmbOff Khan stated that most preparations for
Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FoDP) ministerial meetings
were handled in Islamabad, and that the Pakistani Embassy's
role was limited to delivering updates and invitations to the
MFA. Khan did not give any indication that Beijing would
host a round of the FoDP, and suggested that the PRC's
relatively modest participation in the FoDP stemmed from its
unwillingness to set a precedent for multilateral
coordination of its bilateral assistance. CIIS' Rong
separately explained that China was reluctant to host a FoDP
ministerial because it did not want to convene an
international meeting that would apply pressure on Pakistan.
HUNTSMAN