PRC SCHOLAR ON IRAN, RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA, SCO,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003252 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/04/2034 TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN ENRG EWWT EPET MARR CH AF IR RS, ZK SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLAR ON IRAN, RUSSIA, CENTRAL ASIA, SCO, AFGHANISTAN, XINJIANG Classified By: POLITICAL Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A well-connected scholar of Russian and Central Asian studies argued that China would not alter its basic position on the Iran nuclear issue in response to an apparent Russian shift in approach, because PRC leadership understands that Russia's change is in tone only, Russia's underlying interests in Iran have not changed, and Russia "would never abandon" Iran. The academic claimed that the global financial crisis has focused the attention of the leadership in Moscow on developing new energy markets to Russia's east, although she expressed concern over the continuing potential for Sino-Russian trade friction given Russian dissatisfaction with the structure of bilateral trade. She reported that PLA contacts are increasingly satisfied by technical advances by Chinese domestic arms manufacturers and do not view Russian arms sales as very important in PLA plans to modernize. On the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),the scholar claimed that recent security incidents, especially the July ethnic violence in Xinjiang, have brought security issues to the fore within the organization, and have lead to a "new chapter" in security cooperation among member states, including a significant increase in intelligence sharing. SCO states remain concerned about the situation in Afghanistan, she said, but the SCO working group on Afghanistan found it difficult to offer new ideas given the ongoing POLITICAL fragility in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) PolOff met December 3 with Chen Yurong, Director of the Center for SCO Studies at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International Studies (CIIS),to discuss China's RELATIONS with Russia and Central Asia as well as recent developments in the SCO. Chen is an influential and well-connected academic who returned from travel to Russia in early December, where she met with academics and government officials in Moscow. Russia Shift Unlikely to PRC Change Position on Iran -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Asked whether China was considering modifying its policy on the Iran nuclear issue in light of a possible shift in the Russian position, Chen asserted that China did not yet perceive any meaningful Russian policy change on the issue. 
She argued that Russia's position on Iran might change in tone but was unlikely to change in substance, given the deep economic ties between the two countries and solid bilateral political relations. Russian support for Iran would not change for the foreseeable future, and thus any shift in Russian policy would remain at the surface level. Given that the PRC leadership was aware of this reality, Chen predicted, the PRC would not significantly alter its position either and instead continue to emphasize its long-standing position on the issue for the foreseeable future. She acknowledged that Russian rhetoric on the Iran nuclear issue had changed in recent weeks, which she attributed to the more positive tone from the U.S. toward Russia, but stressed that Russia "would never abandon" Iran. Sino-Russian Energy Cooperation Blossoming Out of Crisis -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Chen highlighted the improved atmosphere between the PRC and Russia this year in energy cooperation. She argued that the global financial crisis and China's recovery had demonstrated to Russia China's primary importance as a market for Russia's energy exports, especially after the precipitous drop in petroleum prices. Russian leadership increasingly understood, she claimed, the need to further develop markets to Russia's east as a viable alternative to dependence on European markets, pointing in particular to the agreement to complete the East Siberian pipeline into Heilongjiang. She predicted additional Sino-Russia energy deals in 2010, and said that energy cooperation remained Beijing's top priority in its bilateral RELATIONS with Moscow. Concerns over Possible Trade Friction Remain -------------- ¶5. (C) Chen expressed concern about the possibility of trade friction stemming from the unbalanced trade structure between BEIJING 00003252 002 OF 003 China and Russia, but stressed that the Russian government had to address the issue. She emphasized that Russia's lack of competitiveness in value-added goods was due to structural issues within Russia. Chen said she believed that Prime Minister Putin was aware of the need for economic reform to allow Russia to move away from dependence on extractive industries, but did not predict any improvements in the short term. Arms Sales No Longer a Major Factor -------------- ¶6. (C) Chen argued that PRC military buyers had largely replaced Russian-made goods with domestically produced equipment due to rapid increases in quality in the Chinese arms, but claimed that the downward trend in military sales from Russia to the PRC would not impact overall bilateral relations. She recalled a conversation several years ago with PLA contacts who had complained about the quality of China's domestic arms industry. In contrast, she said, the same contacts now told her that they were now so impressed with the quality of Chinese-made arms that they no longer viewed Russian arms as important to their military procurement. In fact, her PLA contacts were increasingly complaining about the quality of Russian-made arms China had previously purchased. SCO: Economic Progress, but Security Takes to the Fore -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) On recent developments in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),Chen said that while economic cooperation had proceeded steadily in the last year, cooperation on security had reached a new level of importance to member states. She noted that many "security incidents" in SCO member states in the last year had underscored the need for deepened security cooperation, and that the SCO framework was vital for shared efforts to fight terrorism, the narcotics trade, and trans-national criminal groups. She reported that law enforcement and security cooperation among SCO members had continued to deepen in the past year, including a significant increase in intelligence sharing. Chen stressed that the PRC viewed the SCO as an essential element in its fight against extremist elements, adding that the PRC and other SCO members recognized that bilateral channels were insufficient for handing member nations' security threats. Xinjiang Violence Leads to "New Chapter" for SCO -------------- --- ¶8. (C) Chen argued that PRC's need to coordinate with Central Asian neighbors in responding to the July 5 riots in Xinjiang had opened a "new chapter" in security cooperation in the SCO. SCO members recognized that the Uighur threat in China was also potentially destabilizing in the Central Asian countries that have ethnic links to Xinjiang, Chen claimed, and no SCO member wanted to be seen as a base for terrorist operations that affected other members. Chen stated that SCO member states' sense of urgency about possible terrorist threats had been higher in July than during the 2008 Beijing Olympics and had driven the SCO's rapid generation of the July 11 statement in support of the PRC response to the violence in Xinjiang. She added that a key message from Beijing to other SCO members was that the threat from trans-national extremists could be managed if the SCO members addressed the threat collectively. Chen said the SCO was a key tool for the PRC to reach out to ethnic Uighur groups in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan, to counter "rumors" from Xinjiang of Uighurs being killed by security forces and ethnic Han Chinese. She stressed that Moscow shared the sense of threat among other SCO members from Muslim extremists. SCO on Afghanistan -------------- ¶9. (C) Chen claimed that SCO deliberations had been forced to include discussion of Afghanistan, given its proximity and potential as a destabilizing force in the region, but added that the efforts of the SCO working group on Afghanistan remained limited. It was difficult for Central Asian countries to take on such a difficult task when the POLITICAL situation in Afghanistan remained extremely fragile. SCO BEIJING 00003252 003 OF 003 member states wanted to stay involved on the issue, and the March 2009 meeting in Moscow on Afghanistan had been a positive sign and evidence that the Afghanistan security issue remained important for SCO members despite their inability at present to address the issue directly. Chen also argued that the NATO-led nature of the coalition force in Afghanistan did not pose a barrier to the SCO taking a more active role there given the SCO was not intended to be a military alliance. HUNTSMAN