CHINESE WATCHING U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 003226 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM; ISN PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2029 TAGS: PREL MNUC PGOV MARR CH SUBJECT: CHINESE WATCHING U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW CLOSELY Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: The PRC hopes the ongoing U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) will foster significant disarmament as a reflection of President Obama's "Prague vision" of a nuclear weapons-free world, which in turn would "positively" impact China's nuclear policy, several academics told POLOFF in recent meetings. Beyond the question of disarmament, scholars highlighted several NPR-related issues that could influence the direction of China's strategic nuclear policy, including: whether China was specifically listed in the NPR as a potential target country; the scope and nature of U.S. plans for missile defense in Asia; continuation or cessation of submarine surveillance in China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ); and any changes to the U.S. extended deterrence policy in Asia. Several scholars encouraged active engagement by the U.S. with China through official and non-official mechanisms to provide reassurances in areas such as missile defense. End summary. NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: SKEPTICISM AND HOPE -------------- ¶2. (C) POLOFF met with several Chinese academics and think tank scholars in recent weeks to discuss Chinese perceptions of U.S. nuclear strategy and their views of the ongoing U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The scholars unanimously criticized current U.S. nuclear strategy, using such pejoratives as "outdated" and "reflective of a Cold War mentality." Deputy Chairman of the China Foundation for International Studies (CFIS) retired PLA Major General Pan Zhenqiang argued that current U.S. nuclear strategy was "harmful" because the U.S. "continued to perceive nuclear weapons as a useful tool." Tsinghua University professor Li Bin was skeptical that the United States would change its nuclear posture, predicting that since "the military is running the show," the NPR would continue to focus on maintaining "nuclear coercion." ¶3. (C) Some experts, however, considered changes in U.S. policy possible. MSS-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) Assistant President Yang Mingjie said that if the NPR "focused on disarmament" by "maintaining deterrence while allowing significant reductions," it would force China to reconsider its nuclear policies. Yang predicted that such a change in U.S. posture would cause China to feel increased pressure to be transparent about its nuclear arsenal, influence China to slow or stop modernization of its nuclear arsenal through enactment of mechanisms such as the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT),and increase China's regional nonproliferation cooperation "on all fronts," such as with Burma and Pakistan. MISSILE DEFENSE IN ASIA: REALLY A NORTH KOREA ISSUE? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) While it "might be rational" for the U.S. to continue development of missile defense (MD) capability in Asia given recent North Korean actions, CFIS Deputy Chairman Pan said, overall U.S. MD policy remained "worrisome." Pan maintained that China still questioned the purpose and mandate of MD. Calling MD the "single most important issue that negatively impacts Sino-U.S. nuclear stability," PRC National Defense University scholar Senior Colonel Yao Yunzhu told POLOFF that the "common view" in China was that MD was intended to "contain" China rather than being aimed just at rogue states. CICIR's Yang said he hoped the United States would say something reassuring about missile defense in the NPR or similar policy document that would "increase mutual understanding," about MD. Yang suggested that a declaration making clear that China would not be included in missile defense system radar tracking systems would be a helpful statement. NDU Senior Colonel Yao opined that while "rhetoric on missile defense does not matter, actual missile defense capability is key." Therefore, the U.S. should provide practical assurances, institute cooperative mechanisms and share technology to assure China that MD was BEIJING 00003226 002 OF 002 not aimed at it, said Yao. OTHER THREATS TO PRC NUCLEAR STRATEGY -------------- ¶5. (C) Beyond missile defense, the scholars expressed concern about several "threats" to China that they hoped the NPR would address in ways that reassured the PRC about the continued viability of its nuclear deterrence. These included: research and development of "new nuclear weapons," the enhancement and use of space radar systems, and continued "aggressive" surveillance of Chinese submarines in China's EEZ. DON'T MAKE US A TARGET -------------- ¶6. (C) Several scholars criticized the listing of China as "one of seven potential targets for nuclear attack" in the most recent (2002) NPR, saying that that clause in the NPR had led to a "natural, negative reaction" from China. NDU Senior Colonel Yao said the U.S. policy fostered "doubt, concern and hostility" within the PRC, and that the PRC hoped that portion of the NPR would be removed. Yao explained that the listing of China as a potential target country of a U.S. nuclear strike was a major reason why China was currently unwilling to have a second round of the U.S.-PRC Strategic Nuclear Dialogue, despite it being a "useful mechanism" that "should be resumed." NUCLEAR UMBRELLA -------------- ¶7. (C) NDU Senior Colonel Yao asserted that U.S. provision of extended deterrence to countries such as Japan and the ROK was "not primarily a nonproliferation policy but rather a means to strengthen alliances." Instead of fostering regional nonproliferation cooperation in Asia, she argued, extended deterrence had a "negative influence on both the cross-Strait and northeast Asian security situation" by "fostering proliferation behavior such as nuclear weapons development in North Korea." Yao said she hoped the treatment of extended deterrence in the NPR would recognize this "negative influence" and be adjusted accordingly. DON'T EXPECT US TO CHANGE MUCH YET -------------- ¶8. (C) All of the Chinese scholar contacts asserted that no matter what the outcome of the NPR might be, it was premature to expect significant changes in China's nuclear posture. CICIR Institute of Security and Strategic Studies professor Xiao Bin argued that China needed to maintain a "non-transparent posture" about its nuclear arsenal "in order to keep a viable deterrence" given the relatively small size of China's nuclear arsenal compared to those of Russia and the United States. China would "decide when to join" the international nuclear disarmament process and become more transparent based on the level of progress in the U.S.-Russia disarmament process, NDU Senior Colonel Yao added. SUGGESTIONS FOR U.S. ENGAGEMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Several scholars encouraged active engagement by the U.S. with China through both official and non-official (e.g., Track 1.5) mechanisms to clarify policies in possible areas of friction, such as missile defense and submarine surveillance. By "providing reassurances" that the U.S. was "serious" about disarmament and not a nuclear threat to China, CFIS Deputy Chairman Pan predicted that China would have "more and more in common with the U.S." on nuclear policy and be more willing to "go along with many of the U.S. government's suggestions." HUNTSMAN