SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY BURNS' TRIP TO CHINA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 003172

SIPDIS

FOR UNDERSECRETARY BURNS FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2029
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR MNUC PARM PHUM CH AF PK IR
KN, TW
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR UNDERSECRETARY BURNS' TRIP TO CHINA

Classified By: Ambassador Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Undersecretary Burns, the President's November 15-18
visit to Beijing and Shanghai advanced the conversation with
the Chinese on issues of high priority to the United States,
particularly global economic recovery, North Korea, Iran and
Afghanistan, climate change and proliferation. Your visit
will reinforce key points on political and security issues
and build on the defining theme the President has set out:
America welcomes a strong, prosperous and China playing a
greater role in the world, and we want to work with China to
face the challenges of the 21st century. We hope that China,
in turn, will take advantage of your visit to make concrete
its pledges to cooperate with us on Iran, North Korea,
Afghanistan/Pakistan, nonproliferation and other political
and security issues.

DPRK, Iran, AF/PAK and Nonpro
--------------


2. (C) The Six-Party Talks represent the best current example
of U.S.-China cooperation to resolve a difficult regional
security issue. We have consistently urged the Chinese to
push Pyongyang harder to give up its nuclear weapons program
and return to the negotiating table. The Chinese, in turn,
have expressed support for direct U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks
as a way to return to the Six-Party Talks process. (Special
Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth will
be in Pyongyang while you are here and will visit Beijing
immediately afterward.) While helpful on this issue, the
Chinese remain unwilling to discuss with us contingencies in
case of a North Korean collapse.


3. (C) On Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, our challenge is to
demonstrate to China that our national interests similarly
overlap. We agree on the importance of regional stability,
effective governance and addressing the rise of extremism.
The Chinese share many of our concerns about Iran's nuclear
program and have been impressed by our willingness to engage
in dialogue with Tehran. We have stressed to the Chinese
that Iran is a core national security issue for the United
States; our next task is to convince them to take follow-up
steps either to implement an IAEA-Iran agreement or apply
more pressure on a recalcitrant Tehran. We see this as an
important test of China's willingness to stand with us, but
so far Beijing remains unconvinced of the urgency of the
matter and expresses preference for "dialogue" with Iran
while resisting mention of the enforcement aspect of the
dual-track P5-plus-1 process. This is despite detailed
consultations in October at high levels on the Chinese side
with visiting NSC Senior Director for the Central Region
Dennis Ross, who framed the situation, and its urgency, in
stark terms.


4. (C) Afghanistan and Pakistan may be another area for
collaboration, but the PRC faces conflicting objectives.
China wishes to ensure radical Islamic states do not emerge
in Afghanistan and Pakistan and that neither becomes a
terrorist training ground for acts against China. The PRC
also hopes, however, to prevent a long-term U.S. troop
presence to China's west, and does not want to have to
compete with the United States for influence in the region.
Until China makes a strategic decision to throw its weight
behind Western efforts to improve development and stability
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, it will hedge in its
interactions with the United States, proceed cautiously on
assistance in reconstruction in Afghanistan, and continue to
provide its assistance to Pakistan through opaque bilateral
channels.


5. (C) We have emphasized to the Chinese that the United
States has no desire to establish a long-term military
presence in the region and seeks to cooperate with China on
Afghanistan and Pakistan to advance our shared interest in
stability in South Asia. We have urged the Chinese to
increase and to coordinate with us on their economic
assistance to Pakistan, particularly in the energy sector,
and also to encourage Islamabad to confront its domestic
extremists. The PRC has agreed in principle to increase
bilateral efforts to improve development and stability in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, but has not yet moved from talk to
action.


6. (C) U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policies,

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including the resumption of the START talks, the USG's
commitment to the CTBT, and the ultimate goal of a nuclear
weapons-free world as outlined in the President's Prague
speech have caused the Chinese to reexamine arms control and
nonproliferation. We are still working to win President Hu's
commitment to attend next year's Nuclear Security Summit,
which we hope to use to build new ways to work together on
nonproliferation. Improvement in military-to-military ties
is another area where cooperation is less productive than we
would like and often is derailed as a scapegoat for frictions
elsewhere in the relationship, such as arms sales to Taiwan.

Human Rights
--------------


7. (C) Recent news in China on the human rights front has not
been encouraging, with multiple high-profile arrests and
convictions of Chinese dissidents and activists, as well as
harassment of civil society groups such as human rights
lawyers and house churches. During the President's trip,
both sides agreed to hold the next round of our human rights
dialogue early in 2010. It would be good if, in your
meetings, you could underscore the importance of human rights
to the U.S. government and the American people. We want to
explore ways to quietly promote the rule of law, respect for
the culture and religious beliefs of all citizens, and the
rights of individuals to express opinions and ideas. China's
increased persecution of human rights and civil society
activists, however, makes it difficult for the U.S. to
maintain a low-profile stance on this issue.

Chinese Concerns and Areas of Friction
--------------


8. (C) Of late, senior Chinese officials have raised China's
"core interests" in meetings with Americans, specifically
Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, and U.S. military surveillance
operations in China's exclusive economic zone. PRC leaders
remain critical of statements that the President will meet
with the Dalai Lama, and they are concerned about a possible
Taiwan arms sale announcement. To date, our responses to
Chinese complaints have been firm and consistent: our arms
sales to Taiwan are in accordance with our One China Policy
and the Taiwan Relations Act, and are conducive to
cross-Strait stability; our support for human rights and
human dignity is what defines who we are as Americans; we
recognize that Tibet and Xinjiang are parts of the PRC, but
the government should address the grievances of the Tibetan
and Uighur peoples and engage in dialogue with the
representatives of the Dalai Lama; U.S. officials meet with
the Dalai Lama in his capacity as an internationally revered
spiritual leader; our EEZ operations are conducted in
international waters and are permitted under international
law. When you are confronted with these issues, we suggest
you underscore that, at the 30-year mark of our formal
bilateral relationship, it is notable not that we have
disagreements, but rather that we can deal with them without
jeopardizing bilateral, regional and global peace and
prosperity.
HUNTSMAN