TRACK-1.5 CHINA-U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 003097 C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED SENSITIVE CAPTION SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR ISN, EAP, EAP/CM PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL PGOV MARR MNUC MASS CH SUBJECT: TRACK-1.5 CHINA-U.S. STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DIALOGUE BEIJING 00003097 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In recent bilateral track-1.5 discussions on strategic nuclear issues, several themes emerged, particularly with respect to PRC concerns regarding the direction of U.S. nuclear strategy and policy: (1) China wants "strategic reassurance" from the United States that ballistic missile defense, militarization of outer space, and conventional weapon precision strike capabilities will not be pursued or deployed in a way that affects China's retaliatory strike capability; (2) In the Chinese view, the PRC nuclear strategic situation and strategy are appropriately transparent given China's "No First Use" (NFU) policy and relatively smaller nuclear stockpile, but pressure to be more transparent will increase as the U.S. and Russia decrease their nuclear stockpiles; and (3) many Chinese scholars see the U.S. policy of extended deterrence as "Cold War thinking" not in alignment with President Obama's vision of a nuclear weapons-free world. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) The fourth round of the track-1.5 China-U.S. Strategic Nuclear Dialogue took place in Beijing November 2-3 under sponsorship of the MND/PLA-affiliated China Foundation for International Strategic Studies (CFISS),the Pacific Forum CSIS, the Institute for Defense Analyses and the RAND Corporation. Leading Chinese and American scholars and government officials in the disarmament and nonproliferation fields participated (see para 12 for participation list). NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW: WHAT CHINA HOPES TO SEE -------------- -- ¶3. (SBU) Chinese scholars regularly referred to the ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) in the United States as a litmus test of the "seriousness" of President Obama's call for a nuclear weapons-free world. The Chinese said that they hoped there would be no mention of "targeting China" in the document. Additionally, they would look for indications and reassurances that ballistic missile defense in the Pacific would be limited to targeting North Korea. Several Chinese participants called for a public statement by the United States "accepting a mutual state of vulnerability." U.S. scholars responded that though such a state existed, and would continue to exist, no U.S. leader would be willing to endorse such a public statement. NO FIRST USE: WE LIKE IT, YOU SHOULD TOO -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Several Chinese participants extolled the "virtues" of the No First Use (NFU) policy and called on the United States to adopt the doctrine. Some Chinese indicated the belief that the NFU was supported by traditional U.S. allies in Asia. CFISS' Zhang Tuosheng asked how the United States would respond to "Japan's desire" for the United States to adopt an NFU policy. Center for Strategic and International Security Studies Senior Advisor Linton Brooks responded that there had been no such formal request by Japan and that many in Japan actually opposed NFU because of its possible effect on the deterrence value of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. TRANSPARENCY IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER -------------- ¶5. (SBU) U.S. and PRC scholars called for greater transparency on the part of the other. Arms Control and Disarmament Association Secretary General Li Hong asserted that no country could be fully transparent about nuclear issues and that each country would be more or less transparent about particular aspects of its policy (e.g., numbers, technologies, etc.) based on the nuclear strategy being employed. National Defense University Strategic Studies Director General Zhu Chenghu suggested that the United States was more transparent about nuclear capabilities and less so about intentions, while China was the opposite. Several U.S. participants called on China to demonstrate greater transparency about nuclear capabilities, emphasizing that doing so would be necessary for China to become a full participant in future arms control talks with the United States and Russia. EXTENDED DETERRENCE: NOT IN ASIA PLEASE -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Several U.S. participants were surprised by the fervor and frequency of Chinese criticism of the U.S. policy BEIJING 00003097 002.2 OF 003 of extended deterrence. Several PRC participants claimed that the policy was the major cause of proliferation and the main reason North Korea had decided to pursue nuclear weapons. Academy of Military Sciences Senior Colonel Yao Yunzhu asserted that extended deterrence was "a legacy of Cold War thinking," had "no nonproliferation effect," and mainly served to "maintain alliances." Chinese participants also claimed extended deterrence was in conflict with President Obama's "Prague vision" of a nuclear weapons-free world. ¶7. (SBU) Calling the extended deterrence policy a pillar of U.S. and international security policy, ISN Office of Strategic Transition Director Robert Gromoll asked whether Chinese participants were asking for a worldwide revamping of the extended deterrence policy, or only a regional reworking. Yao Yunzhu clarified that China would like to have: (1) removal of the nuclear portion of extended deterrence within Asia; and (2) assurances from the United States that the nuclear umbrella did not extend to Taiwan. She maintained that the policy was "antagonistic and adversarial" and "should be rejected if the United States was serious about a nuclear weapons-free world." MISSILE DEFENSE AND MUTUAL VULNERABILITY -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Chinese participants expressed firm opposition to missile defense. China Academy of Engineering Physics Arms Control Research Division Director Sun Xiangli said that the continued development of U.S. ballistic missile defense systems could lead to increases in the quantity of China's ballistic missiles and "development of countermeasures," though it was at this point "premature to make those decisions." Former President of the China Academy of Engineering Physics Hu Side said China needed "reassurances" about the scale of the U.S. planned missile defense network and the technology that would be used for missile defense in Asia so that China could be "confident of its counterattack capabilities." ¶9. (SBU) President of Pacific Forum CSIS Ralph Cossa told the Chinese that China's lack of transparency made it difficult to address China's arguments, adding that some in the U.S. were convinced that U.S. missile defense planning would have no effect on China's opaque nuclear posture. CSISS' Brooks asserted that most experts agreed that "ballistic missile defense would not work against a large opponent," so the United States "might as well get the political and practical benefits" of a dialogue with China on missile defense. SPACE, EEZ SURVEILLANCE AND PRECISION STRIKES -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Chinese scholars outlined three other areas of concern that influenced China's current nuclear strategic policy: (1) the potential militarization of space; (2) U.S. military surveillance in China's exclusive economic zone (EEZ); and (3) the potential use of conventional weapons to make preemptive precision strikes against nuclear forces. AMS Senior Colonel Yao maintained that "joint assurances" under which "China and the United States would agree not to use conventional weapons against each other's nuclear assets" would allow Chinese academics "to stop discussing whether to abandon NFU." ¶11. (SBU) Several Chinese argued that U.S. military surveillance activity in China's EEZ was aimed at negating China's SLBM survivability, thereby harming China's retaliatory strike capability. Various American scholars asserted that U.S. activities were in accordance with international law, with one noting that Russian vessels had operated in the U.S. EEZ for decades without complaint by the United States. PARTICIPANT LISTS -------------- ¶12. (U) Chinese Participants: Chen Zhiya, Secretary General, China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies Chen Zhou, Research Fellow, Academy of Military Science of PLA Cheng Jingye, Director General, Department of Arms Control BEIJING 00003097 003.2 OF 003 and Disarmament, MFA Fan Jishe, Research Fellow, Institute of American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Guan Youfei, Deputy Chief, Foreign Affairs Office, MND Hu Side, Former President, China Academy of Engineering Physics Hu Yumin, Senior Research Fellow, China Institute for International and Strategic Studies Li Bin, Director of the Arms Control Program, Tsinghua University Li Hong, Secretary General, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association Lu Dehong, Director and Research Fellow, China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies Niu Qiang, Secretary General, Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament Sun Haiyang, Professor, Second Artillery Commanding College Sun Xiangli, Director, Arms Control Research Division, China Academy of Engineering Physics Teng Jianqun, Deputy Secretary General, China Arms Control and Disarmament Association Wu Jun, Deputy Director, Center for Strategic Studies, China Academy of Engineering Physics Xu Weidi, Senior Researcher, Institute of Strategic Studies, National Defense University Yao Yunzhu, Senior Research Fellow, Academy of Military Sciences, PLA Yang Mingjie, Vice President, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations Zhu Chenghu, Director General, Strategic Studies Department, National Defense University U.S. Participants: Larry Welch, Delegation Head, Institute for Defense Analyses Linton Brooks, Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and International Security Studies Cynthia Carras, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS Abraham Denmark, Fellow, Center for a New American Security Lewis Dunn, Senior Vice President, Science Applications International Corporation Bates Gill, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Robert Gromoll, Director, Office of Strategic Transition, ISN, Department of State David Hamon, Deputy Director for Research and Studies, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Eric Heginbotham, Political Scientist, RAND Corporation Michael Kiefer, Director, Asia Portfolio, Defense Threat Reduction Agency Christopher Twomey, Director, Center for Contemporary Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School HUNTSMAN