PRC/AFGHANISTAN/IRAN: SHARED U.S.-PRC INTERESTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 003072 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2034 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER NATO MARR EAID CH PK AF IR MNUC SUBJECT: PRC/AFGHANISTAN/IRAN: SHARED U.S.-PRC INTERESTS SHOULD DRIVE COORDINATED ACTION Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Shared interests in South Asia should prompt closer U.S.-China coordination in the region, according to an official of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison Department (CCID). In a November 3 meeting with PolOffs, the official said that geographic proximity makes China more vulnerable than the United States to the flow of narcotics and spread of instability from South Asia. On Afghanistan, the CCID official expressed doubt about the efficacy of U.S. efforts given "strong support" for the Taliban among Afghans. Our contact claimed that Iran has significant and growing economic influence inside Afghanistan. On the Iran nuclear issue, the official claimed Iran is willing to cooperate with the P5-plus-1, but he acknowledged Tehran's non-transparent nuclear intentions. The Chinese do not enjoy direct access to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the "ultimate decision-maker on the nuclear issue," the official said, but there are channels in place to ensure that the Supreme Leader understands China's position on Iran's nuclear program. END SUMMARY. Parallel Strategic Interests in Afghanistan -------------- ¶2. (C) Wu Baocai, Director of the CCID Third Bureau, which covers West Asia and North Africa, told PolOffs during a wide-ranging, three-and-one-half-hour conversation November 3 that the United States and China had parallel strategic interests in stability, counter-terror efforts, drug interdiction and a regional balance of power in South Asia. In recognition of these shared interests, Wu stated, he would instruct relevant ministries to increase bilateral coordination. He noted, however, that he did not have authority to direct Chinese "independent, profit-driven" state-owned enterprises. Wu said he supported the U.S. proposal for bilateral working-level consultations on Afghanistan and Pakistan. (Note: The U.S and PRC will hold bilateral working-level consultations in Beijing November 11.) PRC Concerns re Instability in South Asia -------------- ¶3. (C) Wu asserted that instability in South Asia had a larger and more direct impact on China than it did on the United States given the region's geographic proximity. The flow of narcotics from South Asia into western China and to the training of East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM) fighters in Pakistan were two examples of the negative effects on China of instability and lawlessness in Afghanistan and Pakistan. China sought increased bilateral coordination in dealing with threats emanating from South Asia, according to Wu. (Note: China's Anti-Smuggling Bureau on November 2 informally notified the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration that it had seized shipments of heroin originating from Pakistan on September 2 and again on October 11 totaling almost 1,000 kilograms from cargo containers in the Guangdong ports of Shenzhen and Huang Pu. The seizures were made possible by information that the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration had earlier shared with PRC authorities.) PRC Questions U.S. Resolve to Defeat Taliban -------------- ¶4. (C) Wu claimed that the Taliban enjoyed a base of support in Afghanistan because the Taliban's fundamental goals of driving out foreign troops and promoting peaceful reconciliation within Afghanistan enjoyed popular support. A lack of improvement in Afghans' life expectancy and quality of life since the Taliban were driven out of power in 2001 also explained the Taliban's base of support, according to Wu. Under these circumstances, it would be impossible for the United States to eliminate the Taliban. PolOffs challenged Wu's assertion that the Taliban promoted peaceful reconciliation. PolOffs stressed that a Taliban reassertion of control over Afghanistan was an unacceptable outcome for the United States. Iranian Influence in Afghanistan -------------- ¶5. (C) Iran exerted significant political, economic and religious influence in Afghanistan, according to Wu. Iran and Afghanistan's shared Shia roots gave Iran religious influence that it parlayed into significant political BEIJING 00003072 002 OF 002 influence. Since Iran's relationship with Afghan President Karzai was "not bad," Wu predicted Iran's influence would not diminish during President Karzai's second term. Iran had invested heavily in Afghanistan, particularly in the west and northwest. Iran was dominant in Herat, where a large portion of Afghanistan's power was provided by Iranian power plants. Wu suggested that planned enhancements to Iran-Afghanistan rail and road connectivity would increase Iran's economic influence in Afghanistan. Iranian Nuclear Program -------------- ¶6. (C) Wu repeated standard talking points stressing China's opposition to Iran's development of nuclear weapons. Wu displayed keen interest in Israel's perspective on the issue and asked whether the United States would instruct Israel to stand down any plans to strike Iran's nuclear facilities and whether Israel would listen. Wu assessed that Iran was willing to cooperate with the P5-plus-1 and was engaging sincerely in current talks, but also acknowledged that Iran's intentions and actions were not transparent. Wu claimed that Iran had invited the Chinese side "as a friend" to inspect any nuclear site in the country to allay any concerns. (Note: This reported invitation took place before the revelation in September of a nuclear facility at Qom.) Wu claimed that the Chinese had responded that the Iranians needed to make their nuclear activities transparent to the international community as a trust-building measure. Iranian Decision-Making -------------- ¶7. (C) Wu said that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei was the ultimate decision-maker on Iran's nuclear program, not President Ahmadinejad. Wu denied that Chinese leaders had access to Khamenei during visits to Iran, but said that the Supreme Leader's advisors maintained regular contact with the Chinese side. Thus, Beijing felt assured that Khamenei understood the Chinese position on Iran's nuclear program. HUNTSMAN