CHARTER 08: IMPACT LIMITED, BUT "MOVEMENT" DRAWS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 000303 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2034 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL CH SUBJECT: CHARTER 08: IMPACT LIMITED, BUT "MOVEMENT" DRAWS PARTY IRE REF: A. 08 BEIJING 4670 ¶B. 08 BEIJING 4493 ¶C. BEIJING 285 ¶D. SHANGHAI 67 AND PREVIOUS Classified By: Political Internal Unit Chief Dan Kritenbrink. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). SUMMARY -------------- ¶1. (C) While the "Charter 08" pro-democracy manifesto is unlikely to push the Communist Party to engage in real political reform anytime soon, the Charter nevertheless represents a budding "movement" that worries China's leaders, as demonstrated by the detention of lead Charter drafter Liu Xiaobo, according to two signers of the document. MFA officials are privately portraying the Charter as a serious affront to the Communist Party and PRC Government, even as official public commentary on the document remains limited. By contrast, academic and journalist contacts who did not sign the Charter generally downplay its significance, asserting that most Chinese have not heard of the Charter and that even pro-reform intellectuals do not necessarily agree with the "radical" and "pro-Western" plan it supposedly outlines. Official censorship of the document appears to have been a partial success: many Embassy contacts have no knowledge of Charter 08, and the text is difficult, but not impossible, to access via the Internet in China. End Summary. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶2. (C) On December 9, 2008, one day prior to International Human Rights Day, a group of 303 Chinese intellectuals and activists released Charter 08, a call for the establishment of constitutional democracy, respect for human rights and an end to the Communist Party's monopoly on political power (ref B). As of January 22, more than 8,100 Chinese have reportedly signed the Charter. In the two months since the Charter's release, PolOffs have asked a range of Beijing-based contacts, both signers and non- signers of the document, for their assessment of the Charter's impact. CHARTER WAS YEARS IN THE MAKING -------------- ¶3. (C) Guo Yushan (protect),President of the Transition Institute think tank and a Charter 08 signer, told PolOff December 17 that the Charter had been in the planning stages "for years." Guo said organization of the document was all done "underground" (di xia) and that the organizing group avoided any large meetings that would draw the attention of the state security apparatus. The main challenge of drafting the document, Guo explained, was that "everyone wanted to include their pet issue" in the manuscript, which became ungainly long with over 40 recommendations that were eventually paired down to ¶19. Dissident scholar Liu Junning (protect),another Charter signer and founder of the independent think tank the Cathay Institute for Public Affairs, told PolOff December 13 the Charter 08 document had been in the works for "nearly two years." "BEST SCENARIO": LIU XIAOBO RELEASE AFTER JUNE 4? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Both Liu and Guo confirmed that dissident writer Liu Xiaobo, who was detained just before the Charter's release (ref A),played a central role in organizing and drafting Charter 08. Liu Junning said he believes the Chinese leadership is "very angry" over the release of Charter 08 and will likely punish Liu Xiaobo "severely" in order to "make an example" of him. Guo said the "best case scenario" would be for authorities to hold Liu until after the 20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square crackdown on June 4 and then release him without trial. Neither Guo nor Liu, however, said that they had encountered any trouble or been interviewed by state security agents as a result of their participation in Charter 08. (Note: There are, however, multiple accounts of other Charter 08 signers having been harassed, including many who have received "visits" from Public Security BEIJING 00000303 002 OF 005 Bureau officials (refs B and D).) Guo predicted that all signers will nevertheless face a media boycott, meaning journalists at central-level print, television and radio outlets would likely be barred from quoting or interviewing Charter signers or publishing their articles. (Note: Radio Free Asia reported December 24 that the Communist Party Propaganda Department had indeed ordered a media ban on anyone associated with the Charter.) ¶5. (C) Guo asserted to PolOff that Charter 08 was making a "big impact" in China and the harsh treatment given to Liu Xiaobo shows the Communist Party is "worried." The leadership considers the Charter especially sensitive because of the upcoming Tiananmen crackdown anniversary and the "overall atmosphere of deteriorating economic conditions," which raises the potential for social unrest. Authorities, Guo added, are also embarrassed that high-profile Chinese intellectuals overseas, such as Princeton University historian Yu Yin-shih and Yale Finance Professor Chen Zhiwu, have publicly supported the Charter. CHARTER SIGNIFICANT AS A "MOVEMENT" -------------- ¶6. (C) Both Guo Yushan and Liu Junning said the "movement" behind Charter 08 is more important than the contents of the actual document itself. China's rulers are concerned that the signers now represent a "real opposition force" in fact, if not in name, Guo said. Guo nevertheless emphasized that he and the other core signatories have "no intention" of creating any kind of "formal group," which would only invite a Government crackdown. Echoing Guo's comments, Liu said the organization of the Charter was just as significant, if not more so, than the paper's recommendations. There is "no way" the Government will accept any of the Charter's proposals or engage in "real" political reform, Liu declared. Rather, Liu stressed, the goal of the Charter was to start a "movement" that would be able to garner support for political reform "over the long term." (Note: Another Charter 08 signatory, Zhang Dajun, made a similar comment to the Charge on December 9, arguing that one objective of the document is to launch a "social movement" (ref B).) LITTLE OFFICIAL REACTION TO CHARTER 08 -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson has limited public commentary on Charter 08 and the detention of Liu Xiaobo to standard PRC talking points that Liu's case will be handled "in accordance with law" and that other countries should not "interfere in China's internal affairs." In recent private diplomatic meetings, however, MFA officials have portrayed Charter 08 as a serious affront to the Party and Government. According to Sean Winnett (protect), Second Secretary at the UK Embassy in Beijing, British officials raised Charter 08 and Liu Xiaobo's detention during the January 12 UK-China human rights dialogue. According to Winnett, Shen Yongxiang, Deputy Director General of the MFA Department of International Organizations and Conferences and Special Representative for Human Rights, told the UK delegation that China was punishing Liu Xiaobo because Charter 08 was intended to challenge the authority of the CCP. Shen, however, reportedly assured the British that other signers would be spared punishment because most of them "did not know what they were doing." On February 4, in response to PolOff's reiteration of U.S. Government concern over Liu's detention, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Human Rights Office official Zhu Yanwei commented that Charter 08 is a "serious threat to China." (Comment: These remarks appear to reflect MFA officials' efforts to justify the Government's harsh treatment of Liu Xiaobo and do not necessarily indicate true alarm on the part of China's top leaders over Charter 08.) ¶8. (C) Wang Wen (protect),journalist at the People's Daily-affiliated newspaper Global Times, told PolOff January 12 there was "serious concern" among the Chinese leadership about Charter 08. Wang said he had been tasked with writing an "internal report" about Charter 08 and said he would seek a follow-up meeting with PolOff to discuss USG views, especially those of the new administration, regarding the document. BEIJING 00000303 003 OF 005 (Note: It is well-known that journalists working for central-level PRC publications such as Global Times are periodically charged with writing reports to be circulated only among high-level leaders.) NON-SIGNATORIES DOWNPLAY CHARTER'S SIGNIFICANCE -------------- -- ¶9. (C) Academic contacts not affiliated with Charter 08 have generally downplayed the Charter's significance. Average Chinese, many contacts noted, know nothing about the Charter and, even if the document was widely circulated, there is little desire among the public or leadership for "radical" political reform. Hong Dayong (protect),Sociology Professor and Director of Academic Affairs at Renmin University, said on January 16 the Charter is merely a recent example of an "ongoing intellectual debate," dating back to the May 4th Movement (of 1919) and before, over the extent China should adopt foreign political models. Hong, who has held leadership positions in Renmin University's Communist Party Committee, observed that the number of Charter 08 signers, even if more numerous than for past open letters, still represent only "a few people," and the Charter has no "mass influence." If anything, Hong argued, the global financial crisis has reduced, not increased, Charter 08's impact because the poor economy only makes average Chinese focus even more closely on living standards. "There is no great 'thirst for freedom'" among ordinary Chinese people, Hong claimed, arguing that "people just want a better life." "TOO RADICAL, TOO FAST" -------------- ¶10. (C) While not completely dismissive of Charter 08, Legal Daily (Fazhi Ribao) editor Chang Shaoyang (protect) told PolOff January 29 that it is difficult to gauge its impact because the "vast majority" of Chinese have "no idea the Charter even exists." Furthermore, the Charter has hardly galvanized China's pro-democracy intellectuals. According to Chang, many reform-minded scholars believe the Charter is "too radical" and attempts to move China forward "too fast," which only invites a conservative backlash by the leadership. Chang also cautioned against exaggerating comparisons between Charter 08 and the former Czechoslovakia's "Charter 77." Chang argued that there was a great deal of "nationalist sentiment" behind Charter 77, given that Eastern Europe at that time was subject to domination by an outside power (the Soviet Union),something completely lacking in the case of China and Charter 08. Also, in contrast to the Soviet Bloc, many Chinese believe the PRC has already made "significant progress" in political reform, especially when compared to the "nightmare" of the Cultural Revolution era. These changes may be incremental and slow, but China is nevertheless "heading in the right direction." All of this, Chang concluded, means Charter 08 simply does not have the same resonance that Charter 77 achieved. ¶11. (C) Zhao Hong (protect),editor-in-chief of the reformist journal Tribune of Social Sciences (shehui kexue luntan),also described a mixed reaction to the Charter among pro-reform intellectuals. While a "majority" of intellectuals agree with the Charter's call for reform, most are not publicly supporting it, in part because they fear punishment. Moreover, even if many intellectuals concur with the Charter's broad argument for democratic change, there is a "significant split" among intellectuals over the path such reform should take, Zhao said. Many intellectuals see the Charter 08 group as overly "pro- Western." (Note: Per ref C, however, there are reportedly at least some Charter 08 drafters who were also inspired by Taiwan's democracy movement.) Thus, many pro-reform scholars are critical of the Charter and either want to find a "more traditional Chinese" way forward or seek a "socialist" path, which for most, Zhao said, means a move toward European democratic socialism, not necessarily a return to Marxism. Echoing the comments of Hong Dayong above, Zhao concluded that the debate over the Charter and arguments about a "Western" or "more Chinese" reform path demonstrate that China "still has reached no conclusion" to its century-long struggle to "overcome its imperial past." BEIJING 00000303 004 OF 005 "ANTI-CNN" YOUTH "HATE" LIU XIAOBO -------------- ¶12. (C) Among PolOffs' contacts, Renmin University Professor Jin Canrong (protect) was the most critical of the Charter. Jin dismissed the Charter as being primarily a "Liu Xiaobo problem." Professor Jin said he "knows Liu Xiaobo well," having made Liu's acquaintance in 1989 when Jin was the "leader" of graduate students at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and organized their participation in the Tiananmen demonstrations. Even then, Liu was "much too radical," Jin averred. Liu and the other "leaders" of Charter 08 are "typical Chinese intellectuals" who believe they can speak on behalf of, and know what is best for, the Chinese people. In reality, Liu is "hopelessly out of touch" and does not understand Chinese youth and the rise of populist sentiment among them. Young Chinese today, who were part of the "anti-CNN" movement following the March 2008 Tibet riots, "hate" intellectuals and elites like Liu Xiaobo who try to speak for them. Moreover, Jin claimed, many of those who signed Charter 08 were "discredited" in 2004 when over 200 intellectuals signed an open letter supporting the U.S. invasion of Iraq, causing them to "lose credibility" for their "extreme pro-Western" views. ¶13. (C) While Jin argued that most Chinese scholars are paying little attention to the Charter and have chosen to largely remain silent about it, he said Chinese academics do not want to see Liu and other signers punished. If the Government decides to sentence Liu Xiaobo to prison, as opposed to just detaining him for a few months, then the Chinese intellectual community is likely to show greater support for him, Jin stated. ¶14. (C) Indeed, several academic contacts who did not sign Charter 08 expressed concern for the safety of their colleagues who did. China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL) Professor Yang Yusheng (protect) said issuing the document was a "very political act" for which its signers would have to "pay a price." Yang, however, said he took comfort in the fact that Peking University had recently rehired legal scholar and Charter 08 signer He Weifang. He, a close friend of Yang's who regularly signs his name to open letters supporting human rights, resigned from Peking University at the end of 2008 in preparation of joining the faculty at Zhejiang University's Guanghua Law School. According to press accounts later confirmed by Embassy contacts, He Weifang was prevented from taking up his new position at Zhejiang University due to "high-level" political pressure emanating from at least the Zhejiang Provincial Communist Party Committee. Despite his being prevented from taking the Zhejiang job, the fact that Peking University agreed to take He Weifang back, even after he had signed Charter 08, is a hopeful sign that the Party will not be overly harsh on Charter 08 signers, as well as an indication that the Party is not "overly concerned" about the document's influence, Yang said. CHARTER O'WHAT? -------------- ¶15. (C) Based on informal polling of Beijing contacts, official censorship efforts appear to have been at least partially successful in limiting public knowledge of Charter 08. While most high-level academics with whom PolOffs have spoken said they had heard of or read the Charter, many other normally well-informed contacts claimed no knowledge of the document. Li Xiaoping (protect),a senior producer at China Central Television's international channel (CCTV-9) and a former visiting scholar at The Brookings Institution, told PolOff January 20 that she had "not heard of" Charter 08 and asked PolOff to e- mail her a copy. Huang Lin (protect),an account manager at Fleishman-Hillard's corporate communications practice in Beijing (and a graduate of a Hong Kong university) likewise drew a blank when asked for her thoughts on the Charter. The topic of Charter 08 also came up during a January 16 banquet at China University of Political Science and Law (CUPL), at which CUPL Vice President Zhang Guilin and Professor Wang Rong both professed ignorance of the document. (Note: Zhang appeared uncomfortable with BEIJING 00000303 005 OF 005 the topic, which may indicate that Zhang was aware of the Charter but simply felt discussion of it in front of others was too sensitive.) ¶16. (C) The text of Charter 08 is available to Internet users inside China, though finding it can be difficult. Using a computer behind China's Internet firewall, and without any special software to defeat censorship, PolOff on February 5 was able to access Chinese and English-language versions of the Charter. China-based search engines, however, including Baidu and the Mainland China version of Google, censored any reference to Charter 08 written in Chinese charters. Many Internet users are therefore using alternate spellings of Charter 08 (including the romanized "08 xian zhang") to avoid censorship. Nearly all blog entries on China-based websites mentioning the Charter using Chinese characters were inaccessible to PolOff. During this web search, PolOff was able to pull up only one press article (from Taiwan's Central News Agency) mentioning the Charter. PICCUTA