CHINESE SPECIAL ENVOY TALKS IRAN, MIDDLE EAST WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 003001 SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA PICCUTA E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2029 TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC OVIP ENRG PGOV CH IR IS SUBJECT: CHINESE SPECIAL ENVOY TALKS IRAN, MIDDLE EAST WITH AMBASSADOR ROSS Classified By: Deputy Political Section Chief Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In an October 26 meeting with PRC Special Envoy to the Middle East Wu Sike, Senior Director for the Central Region Dennis Ross underscored the high priority that the United States placed on the pursuit of peace in the Middle East and on resolution of the Iran nuclear issue. Both sides agreed that the United States and China shared a common interest in peace and stability in the Middle East, and also in ensuring that Iran did not produce or possess nuclear weapons. Ambassador Ross emphasized the interrelated nature of the Middle East peace process and Iran's nuclear activities. Ambassador Ross explained that the United States was developing terms of reference for the Middle East peace process intended to give all parties confidence in the negotiation process and, following resumption of negotiations, the United States was prepared to provide bridging proposals to move the talks forward should they prove necessary. On Iran's nuclear program, Ambassador Ross asserted that, along with its right to a civilian nuclear program, Iran also had responsibilities and obligations. It also had a need to reassure the international community of the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities. Wu stated that mistrust impeded progress in the Middle East peQe process and proposedQhe establishment of a forum for Middle East Special Envoys to coordinate actions. On Iran, Wu applauded President Obama's willingness to engage Iran without preconditions and encouraged the United States to approach Iran in a manner that demonstrated respect, showed patience and avoided the appearance of threats. Wu proposed that the United States and China establish regular contact on Middle East issues. End Summary. U.S.: Priority on Middle East Peace -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador Dennis Ross, NSC Senior Director for the Central Region, met with PRC Special Envoy to the Middle East Wu Sike in Beijing on October 26 for an 85-minute discussion of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the Iran nuclear program. Ambassador Ross explained that the Israel-Palestine conflict was propelled by its own internal logic. Even though it was easier for parties involved to perpetuate the conflict than solve it, Ambassador Ross stated that he was not pessimistic because there was a desire on both sides to end the conflict. The current challenge was to move from the current position to a point where success was possible. President Obama made a clear decision to make the pursuit of Middle East peace a high priority, as demonstrated by his appointment of George Mitchell as Special Envoy on the second day of his administration. Ambassador Ross stated that the United States and China shared a common interest in peace and stability in the Middle East, a region characterized more by conflict than conflict resolution. PRC: Progress Hampered by Lack of Trust -------------- ¶3. (C) Wu agreed that the United States and China shared similar objectives in the Middle East, specifically peace and stability. Recalling his thirty years of work on the Middle East, Wu stated that it was "high time to end the suffering of people in the Arab world and in Israel." Solving the Middle East conflict, a conflict that impacted the entire world, would be conducive to the peace and development of the world, Wu suggested. ¶4. (C) President Obama's rapid appointment of George Mitchell as Special Envoy and the President's June 4 speech in Cairo provided hope for a region long suffering from conflict, according to Wu. Wu recounted that he had visited nearly every country in the Middle East during his two trips to the region since being appointed as PRC Special Envoy, and that from those visits he assessed that there was increased hope in the region for the resumption of peace negotiations. Wu also cautioned that significant challenges still lay ahead, namely in addressing the mistrust between Israeli and Palestinian people and the uncertainty that each side held about the other's commitment to peace. The Palestinians found it difficult to reconcile with what they perceived to be a right-wing Israeli government. The Israelis viewed Palestinian President Abbas as weak and therefore unlikely and/or unable to serve as a partner in achieving peace. Wu BEIJING 00003001 002 OF 005 explained that he drew from Premier Wen's aphorism - which Wen used in the context of the global financial crisis - that "confidence was more valuable than gold" in stressing to both sides (and also to the media) the importance of building confidence that the conflict could be resolved through mediation. Confidence was a prerequisite to the resumption of peace talks, according to Wu, who added that Israel, Palestine and the international community all had a responsibility to build confidence. China would like to use its good relations with Israel and Palestine to help each side build trust in the other. ¶5. (C) Israel and Palestine were looking forward to President Obama's plan for how to resolve the conflict, according to Wu. Wu stated that the United States could play a unique role in the Middle East, and also that the United States had an important responsibility in the region. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Ross stated that each side lacked confidence as well as faith in the other. The Palestinians feared that the peace process would be a trap, and that the Israeli government would not be ready to conclude the conflict. The Israelis believed President Abbas was too weak to make decisions necessary to advance the peace process, said Ambassador Ross. U.S.: Israel, Palestine Both Need Arab Support -------------- - ¶7. (C) Ambassador Ross highlighted three ironies of the present situation in the Middle East. First, both the Palestinians and the Israelis, for separate reasons needed support from Arab countries to advance the peace process. President Abbas needed Arab countries to provide political cover for him take steps to begin the peace process. Conversely, if the Israelis determined that President Abbas was too weak to advance the peace process, Israel needed assurance from the Arab world that the potential exists for peace. As such, it was essential to find a way to bring the Arab world more in to the peace process, according to Ambassador Ross. U.S.: Israel, Palestine Disagree on Basis for Talks -------------- -------------- ¶8. (C) Second, although Israel and Palestine both wanted to end the conflict, each side had a different view of the way ahead. The Palestinians would like to signal at the outset of the negotiations the final outcome of the process. The Israelis would instead prefer to establish a basis for talks at the outset of negotiations without identifying the final outcome of the process. The United States was therefore focused on developing terms of reference that would give each side confidence in the process. The United States supported setting up negotiations that would produce an outcome, not an outcome that would produce negotiations. The U.S. role in future negotiations, Ambassador Ross explained, would be to serve as an active partner with both sides and to provide bridging proposals as necessary to move the negotiations forward. That was different than laying out a plan as a prelude to talks. U.S.: Broad Regional Agreement on Iran Threat -------------- ¶9. (C) The consensus among Israel, Palestine and the Arab world that Iran was a threat to their interests served as the third irony of the present situation, according to Ambassador Ross. President Abbas was struggling against Iran's efforts through proxies to weaken the Palestinian Authority. Israel viewed Iran's nuclear program as a threat to its survival. Nearly all of the Gulf states felt that Iran was directly trying to subvert them, according to Ambassador Ross. The net effect was that the United States was trying to work in two parallel paths to promote Arab-Israeli peace and to change Iranian behavior. These actions were based on the understanding that, as players in the region felt more secure, they would be more likely to take steps toward peace and as peace became more likely, Iran would lose its ability to play the Palestinian card and keep Arab states on the defensive. U.S.: Approach on Iran -------------- BEIJING 00003001 003 OF 005 ¶10. (C) The United States sought a new approach with Iran based on President Obama's willingness to deal with Iran without preconditions, according to Ambassador Ross. Ambassador Ross had devoted considerable time explaining the new approach to Arab and Israeli counterparts who were both deeply suspicious of Iran and fearful that Iran could exploit engagement. He recounted one meeting where the Israeli and UAE Ambassadors jointly emphasized their common concerns about the new United States approach. Ambassador Ross had underscored that engagement with Iran was not an end in itself, but rather a means to an end. U.S.: With Rights Come Responsibilities -------------- ¶11. (C) The United States acknowledged that Iran had the right to civilian nuclear power, just as it had the right to have its status in the region respected and its interests taken into account, according to Ambassador Ross. Ambassador Ross emphasized, however, that Iran also had a responsibility to reassure the international community of the peaceful nature of its nuclear activities, as well as a responsibility not to threaten its neighbors. The United States sought to lay out a clear set of choices for Iran, and felt it was essential for Iran to understand that it had to make a choice about its future. It could not have, for example, an unconstrained nuclear program and pay no price for it. ¶12. (C) Ambassador Ross stated that it was important for Iran to understand the advantages to be gained by fulfilling its responsibilities and underscored that the United States was sincere in its willingness to go down that path. At the same time, Ambassador Ross stressed, Iran must also understand the consequences for failing to meet its responsibilities regarding its nuclear program and its behavior in the region. U.S.: Arab-Israeli Peace Process, Iran Interrelated -------------- -------------- ¶13. (C) Both the Arab-Israeli peace process and Iran were closely related, Ambassador Ross observed. U.S. efforts were focused on building confidence among, and within, groups of Arabs and Israelis. Ambassador Ross noted the difficulty of advancing the peace process if Iran were in a position to subvert it. Iran cuts across every issue in the region, and if the Iran nuclear issue were resolved, the likelihood of promoting stability in the region would go up dramatically, Ambassador Ross stated. Given the shared U.S.-Chinese interests in the region, Ambassador Ross suggested that the U.S. and China should continue to coordinate closely. PRC: Arab Involvement in Peace Process -------------- ¶14. (C) Wu agreed that the international community needed Arab countries' active partnership to advance the peace process, and assessed from his visit to the region that Egypt and other Arab countries would be willing actively to promote the peace process. Wu explained that the status of Palestine was a core issue for Arab countries, and suggested that an Israeli freeze on new settlements would create a better atmosphere for the peace process. Wu emphasized the importance of consolidating achievements at every round of peace negotiations, and cautioned that the parties could not afford always to go back to square one. Wu recalled the positive outcomes from the Annapolis conference in 2007 that Foreign Minister Yang attended, including the acceptance of the two-state plan, and noted that Foreign Minister Yang had reiterated in his two trips to the region this year that parties must remain committed to agreements reached at Annapolis. ¶15. (C) Recalling his time as an attache and interpreter for China's Ambassador to Egypt during the Israel-Egypt peace negotiations, Wu stressed that political leaders must have vision and confidence. Wu recounted that Egypt was isolated by the rest of the Arab world following its negotiations with Israel, and that China worked to persuade Arab countries that Egypt had made the right choice, a choice that history has proven to have been correct, according to Wu. PRC: Approach to Iran Nuclear Program -------------- BEIJING 00003001 004 OF 005 ¶16. (C) Wu noted that Iran was often the invisible participant in discussions on the Middle East, and expressed support for President Obama's "vision and decisiveness" in reaching out to Iran. Wu described telling Iranian officials during his early August visit to Tehran that Iran had a responsibility as a major country in the region to build trust and display good neighborliness, both because it was the right thing to do and also because it was in Iran's interests. On Iran's nuclear program, Wu agreed that with rights came responsibilities. Iran had the right to develop civilian nuclear energy, but did not have the right to produce or possess nuclear weapons, a position agreed upon by the international community. Wu stated that he was gradually more optimistic that the P5-plus-1 mechanism could produce results. ¶17. (C) Given its ancient civilization and high self-esteem, Wu suggested that approaches to Iran that demonstrated respect, showed patience and avoided the appearance of being threatening would have the most effect. Wu recounted that his August meetings in Tehran with government officials and experts at research organizations had left him with the impression that voices within Iran in favor of change were growing stronger. As long as the international community upheld its principled position and continued negotiations, Wu predicted that it would have success in getting Iran to accept its responsibilities to the international community. PRC: Need for Better International Coordination on Middle East -------------- -------------- ¶18. (C) Wu noted that he had traveled to Moscow and separately met with former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair to exchange views on how the international community could better coordinate efforts in the region. Given the number of countries that had Middle East envoys, Wu proposed the establishment of a forum for special envoys to coordinate actions. Wu reported that Tony Blair was supportive of his proposal and suggested that Quartet in Jerusalem could meet on this issue. Wu also inquired about the U.S. position on Russia's and France's proposal to convene an international conference on the Middle East. U.S.: Moving the Peace Process Forward -------------- ¶19. (C) Ambassador Ross concurred in the importance of consolidating gains from previous peace negotiations, noting that President Obama had made the same point in his address to the United Nations General Assembly. On Israeli settlements, Ambassador Ross stated that there had been progress. The limit on settlements that Special Envoy Mitchell had been discussing with the Israeli government, if implemented, would be unprecedented for either a Likud or Labor government, Ambassador Ross highlighted, adding that the international community should not make the perfect the enemy of the good. Ambassador Ross stated that political pressure had forced President Abbas to insist on a complete settlement freeze, which Ambassador Ross felt underscored the need for Arab countries and the international community to lend President Abbas their support if he returned to negotiations. U.S.: Position on Proposed International Conferences -------------- -------------- ¶20. (C) Ambassador Ross said he would discuss Wu's proposal for a forum for Middle East special envoys with Special Envoy Mitchell and explained that the United States was sympathetic to the Russian and French proposal for a conference on the Middle East as long as it occurred at an appropriate time. A conference that fit into and supported a negotiation process could be very useful. U.S.: Iran Should Reciprocate Respect -------------- ¶21. (C) Ambassador Ross acknowledged that an approach to Iran that conveyed respect for Iran's history and culture would have a higher likelihood of success, and noted that the United States had sought to convey through its public posture, and certainly through President Obama's public statements, such respect. At the same time, Ambassador Ross BEIJING 00003001 005 OF 005 stated, Iran should treat the United States seriously and live up to commitments it has made to the international community. Iran committed at the October 1 P5-plus-1 plus Iran Political Directors meeting to another Political Directors meeting before the end of October and agreed to work out the agenda in advance of the meeting. However, when the preparatory meeting occurred on October 22, Iran's delegation was not prepared to discuss Iran's nuclear program. The P5-plus-1 mechanism was established to address Iran's nuclear program; it would not be sustainable if Iran remained unprepared to engage on its nuclear program, Ambassador Ross warned. The United States was prepared to engage with Iran respectfully, but would not take part in a process that was not real. The United States could be patient with Iran so long as it abided by its commitments. For example, follow-through actions by Iran on its commitments involving the Tehran Research Reactor would be helpful and would buy time for diplomacy, still the process must be real. Ambassador Ross stated that Israel and Saudi Arabia would not believe that the P5-plus-1 process was leading anywhere if their suspicions about the process were confirmed by Iranian actions. U.S.: International Community Must Stay Together -------------- --- ¶22. (C) Ambassador Ross underscored that if the international community stayed closely coordinated it would increase the probability of success. Iran could not be allowed to believe they can divide the international community or that the dual track of incentives and consequences was just a single track without any tangible consequences. Ambassador Ross concluded that the United States would engage Iran in a serious and respectful manner, and emphasized that Iran should reciprocate. ¶23. (C) Wu agreed that patience did not mean inaction or weakness, and stated that the international community must achieve its nuclear non-proliferation goal. Wu then asked whether the United States had a specific peace plan for the Middle East, and if so, when it would be made public. Ambassador Ross responded that such an action could have the unintended consequence of preempting instead of supporting a negotiation process and reiterated that the United States was focused on establishing terms of reference for negotiations, and if negotiations ensue, would be an active participant, providing bridging proposals as appropriate. PRC: Proposal for Regular Contact on Middle East Issues -------------- -------------- ¶24. (C) Wu concluded that China supported all efforts conducive to advancing the negotiation process and achieving peace, and offered that China was prepared to establish regular contact with the United States on Middle East issues. Ambassador Ross expressed support for continued bilateral coordination of efforts and stated he would be pleased to maintain regular contact. ¶25. (U) Ambassador Ross cleared this cable. HUNTSMAN