DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER HE YAFEI, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009

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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6589
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TAGS: OVIP (STEINBERG, JAMES B.),PREL, PARM, PGOV, ECON, 
ETRA, MNUC, MARR, CH, JP, KN, KS, IR 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG'S MEETING WITH VICE 
FOREIGN MINISTER HE YAFEI, SEPTEMBER 29, 2009 
 
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons

/>establish its seriousness in addressing the nuclear issue.

On process objectives, the Deputy Secretary noted that the

nuclear issue would need to remain the primary subject in

follow-up experts meetings, although other agenda topics were

possible.



3. (S) VFM He Yafei said he could not attend the October 1

talks and would send an MFA Director General-level official.

Based on Chinese communications with Iran, VFM He said, he

thought it would be difficult for Iran to refuse talks, since

entering into dialogue was the only way to diffuse tensions.

He was less certain about the prospect of Tehran giving up

its nuclear program. VFM He asserted that because the

weapons program was "not quite there yet" and the facilities

were all dual-use in nature, Iran's assertions that the

program was for peaceful use were "50-percent true." The

key, according to VFM He, was monitoring and supervision,

while establishing benchmarks that Iran should not cross.



4. (S) VFM He suggested that the first objective of the

October 1 meeting with Iran should be to keep the dialogue

alive. He asked that the United States not reject Iranian

attempts to broaden the conversation or create the impression

that the talks were not making progress. Noting that

President Obama had told President Hu Jintao that resolving

the Iran situation was a pressing U.S. interest, VFM He asked

how long the United States would remain patient in the face

of limited progress. He expressed hope that "domestic

political pressure" would not lead the United States to seek

new UN Security Council sanctions.



5. (S) The Deputy Secretary stated that domestic political

factors were not driving our approach to Iran, but rather a



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conviction -- shared by Britain and France -- of the need to

resolve the Iranian nuclear problem. The nuclear issue

needed to be discussed up front in talks; the process could

not stay alive without Iran committing to some

confidence-building measures. Monitoring and supervision

were not adequate, as the North Korean case had demonstrated.



POTUS Visit

--------------



6. (C) VFM He asked that the upcoming POTUS visit reflect the

balanced, comprehensive nature of the relationship, including

economic, security, cultural, economic and people-to-people

ties. A joint statement should not be too detailed and

should instead mirror the status of two of the world's most

important leaders. That said, the statement had to address,

in a positive way, both countries' "core" interests. VFM He

expressed worry that the early-December Copenhagen climate

change meetings could overshadow the POTUS visit, and

recommended that China and the United States focus during the

visit on our respective national commitments in the realm of

climate change.



7. (C) VFM He raised his proposal for a "humanities" MOU that

would cover people-to-people, cultural, and science and

technology exchanges, saying he hoped to make this one of the

"gems" of the visit. He suggested that the presidents sign

the clean energy and environmental protection MOU.



G-20

--------------



8. (C) VFM He thanked President Obama for his leadership in

institutionalizing the G-20, which had created a

"comfortable" platform for countries like China and India to

play a larger role. He explained that there had been some

domestic criticism of President Hu's participation in the

G8-plus-5. He expressed hope that the United States would

coordinate closely with China as we established new rules for

the organization, and that it would not become an

organization that duplicated the United Nations or the G-8.

VFM He expressed reservations about how fast the G-20 could

expand to handle issues beyond economics and finance, but

noted that if the organization was going to stay relevant for

leaders it's scope would have to grow. He specifically

mentioned the need for a coordinating mechanism on global

diseases and counter-terrorism.



North Korea

--------------



9. (S) VFM He downplayed Premier Wen Jiabao's upcoming

October 4-6 visit to Pyongyang, stating "we may not like

them," but "they (the DPRK) are a neighbor," and the trip was

part of the 60th anniversary of relations celebrations. He

stated that the Premier would convey a strong message on the

need to denuclearize, to come back to the Six-Party talks,

and to not abandon the Six-Party Talks framework. He noted

that North Korea often tried to play China off the United

States, refusing to convey information about U.S.-DPRK

bilateral conversations. Clearly seeking a clarification for

the record, VFM He asked if the United States were prepared

to accept a nuclear-armed but non-proliferating North Korea.

The Deputy Secretary stated this was not acceptable or

sustainable.



Tires

--------------



10. (C) VFM He lamented the United States' recent 421 tire

decision, and expressed concern that lawyers in the United

States were preparing additional cases on products such as

textiles. He opined that China and the United States relied

too much on "technical" negotiators.



11. (U) The Deputy Secretary has cleared this message.

HUNTSMAN