PRC/IRAN: SCHOLARS ON TEHRAN'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002933 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/22/2034 TAGS: PREL PARM ENRG PTER MNUC IR CH SUBJECT: PRC/IRAN: SCHOLARS ON TEHRAN'S VIEWS ON NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS Classified By: Deputy Political Minister Counselor Ben Moeling. Reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A senior Middle East specialist at a well-connected think-tank reported that Iranian diplomats in Beijing were seeking ways to push Tehran to negotiate with the P5-plus-1 but want to do so through cutouts, such as scholars. Beijing-based Iranian diplomats hoped that China would host a P5-plus-1 meeting with Iran, to include bilateral talks with the U.S. side, according to Chinese contacts. In negotiating with Tehran, the multilateral channel should be used to present accomplishments in public, but the bilateral track was the only forum in which real compromise was possible. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was taking the process in a step-by-step manner and was driving the process personally, our contact argued. He suggested that the P5-plus-1 countries should define specific phases of the negotiations to keep the talks focused, and offered that China would be willing to host Track 1.5 or Track 2 talks, although he cautioned that Iranian academics might find it difficult to participate due to the current political environment in Iran. He downplayed the significance of Premier Wen's October 15 meeting with Iranian First Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi. Another scholar claimed that Chinese firms had adopted a cautious approach to investing in Iran and would be reluctant to take the lead in investing in large-scale projects there, but a move by European companies to ramp up investment would push Chinese firms to quickly follow suit. END SUMMARY. Iranian Diplomats in Beijing Seeking Progress, Cover -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Li Guofu (protect),Director of the Center for Middle East Studies at the MFA-affiliated China Institute for International Studies (CIIS),told POLOFF October 20 that he had met with Beijing-based Iranian diplomats several times in the past month urging Iran to engage with the international community in good faith. He had stressed to the Iranians that progress on the dialogue was in both Iran's and China's interests. The Iranian diplomats had sought twice to persuade Li to write down his comments for them to demonstrate to Tehran, he suggested, the importance for Iran-China relations of making progress in engagement with the P5-plus-1, without exposing the diplomats to possible criticism that they were pushing too hard. He said that the Iranians also had expressed hope that China would host a meeting between Iran and the P5-plus-1, to include a bilateral U.S.-Iran meeting. Bilateral, Multilateral Channels Affect Each Other -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) Li observed that efforts to deal with the Iranian nuclear program were taking place on two levels: bilateral between the U.S. and Iran, and multilateral. Noting that each level had a potential effect on the other, Li suggested using the multilateral channel to present accomplishments in public, and the bilateral track to engage in quiet diplomacy, the only forum in which real compromise was possible. Based on his discussions with Iranian officials, he concluded that Tehran was convinced that President Obama needed symbolic progress at present to deal with domestic political pressures but the Iranian leadership lacked confidence in what Iran would receive in return for compromise. Supreme Leader Driving the Process -------------- ¶4. (C) Li claimed that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was prepared to improve relations with the U.S. and that this, in part, drove his strong backing of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the wake of the June election, as Ahmadinejad's re-election would allow Khamenei to directly intervene in the nuclear negotiations. Li stressed that the Supreme Leader was taking the process in a step-by-step manner, watching the results of each phase carefully before moving forward. He stressed the importance of Khamenei's deteriorating health, which was forcing him to consider how to move quickly to ensure regime survival and a smooth transition to new leadership when he passed away. Li stressed that the regime remained very sensitive to domestic political pressure given its relatively weakened position after the contested election. He said the instability stemming from the election had yet to be fully resolved and Khamenei was concerned that he would confront criticism from both the hard-line and reformist camps as he moved forward with engagement with the P5-plus-1. Track Two Talks BEIJING 00002933 002 OF 002 -------------- ¶5. (C) Li claimed that the results of the October 1 P5-plus-1-plus-Iran meeting in Geneva were more positive than anyone had expected, including China. He stressed the need to define specific phases of the negotiations with individual goals to prevent expectations from running too high and keeping the talks focused. He offered that China would be willing to host Track 1.5 or Track 2 talks, although he cautioned that Iranian academics might find it difficult to participate due to the current political environment in Iran. Wen-Rahimi Meeting Not Significant Given Wen's Role -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Li downplayed the significance of Premier Wen's October 15 meetings with Iranian First Vice President Rahimi, stressing that Wen does not have a foreign policy focus in his job, and was only prepared to deal with the bilateral relationship in general terms. Given the domestic focus of Wen's role, Li noted that Wen was not in a position to announce a change on China's Iran policy. Li said that Wen stressed to the Iranians that China supported direct U.S.-Iran dialogue as the way forward on the nuclear issue. Li said that Wen stressed the two sides' shared interest in defeating the Taliban and stabilizing Afghanistan, which were very much in China's interests as well. He reported that Wen also underscored with the Iranians the importance of energy cooperation between the two sides. Chinese Firms Cautious About Risks of Iran Investments -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Chinese officials wanted to maintain good bilateral relations with Iran but not at the expense of good relations with the United States, CIIS Senior Research Fellow Xia Yishan (protect) told EconOff October 19. Xia said he had cautioned Chinese officials about the potential impact that Chinese investment could have on China's relations with other nations, particularly the United States. He had also advised Chinese companies of the potential security and political risks involved with investing in Iran. Aware of these risks, Chinese firms had adopted a cautious approach to investing in Iran and would be reluctant to take the lead in investing in large-scale projects in Iran, Xia said. He added that a move by European companies to ramp up investment in Iran would push Chinese companies to quickly follow suit. Regarding possible Iranian membership in SCO, Xia said membership was unlikely in the near term, arguing that the "conditions were not right" to admit Iran. HUNTSMAN