PARANOIA ON PARADE: CHINA'S LEADERS TAKE NO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002811 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2029 TAGS: PHUM PGOV PREL PROP CH SUBJECT: PARANOIA ON PARADE: CHINA'S LEADERS TAKE NO CHANCES AS THEY PREPARE TO CELEBRATE 60TH NATIONAL DAY REF: A. BEIJING 2692 ¶B. 08 BEIJING 3057 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction: In a security clampdown reminiscent of the lead-up to the August 8, 2008 Olympic Games opening ceremony, authorities in Beijing are setting up checkpoints, locking down dissidents, and tightening Internet censorship in the run-up to the October 1 national day. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, China's State Council met September 28 and called for greater efforts to maintain public order and social stability during the national day holiday (which will run October 1-8). Department heads in municipal and state agencies have been told that they will be held personally responsible for security incidents. Neighborhood security organizations have received instructions to "control" key groups, including Falun Gong practitioners, petitioners, students, migrants, and persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Industry and Information, meanwhile, conducted a major Internet security drill September 17 that involved all of China's major Internet service providers. Several journalists complained about tight media and Internet restrictions, but most believed press freedoms would improve in the weeks following the holiday. End Summary. Security Much Tighter than 50th Anniversary in '99 -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Just as overbearing security sapped enthusiasm of many Beijingers for the Olympic Games last year (ref B),similar precautions -- along with a healthy dose of traffic controls during numerous parade rehearsals -- have tested the patience of many in the capital and, several contacts tell us, fueled the impression that the festivities are more for the enjoyment of the CCP elite than average Chinese. Most of our interlocutors said that security at this year's event was much tighter than it was during the 50th national day in 1999. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, China's State Council met September 28 and called for greater efforts to maintain public order and social stability during the national day holiday (which will run October 1-8). Preparations for the October 1 parade have included draconian restrictions on tenants of buildings along the parade route. Residents of the Qijiayuan Diplomatic Compound, which overlooks Jianguomen Wai Avenue, a parade staging area, received a notice September 11 from the building management stating that residents were forbidden from venturing out onto their balconies or even opening their windows during the parade. Hotels are forbidden from renting rooms facing the parade route October 1. Three Japanese journalists were beaten by security forces September 18 after they allegedly attempted to film a parade rehearsal from a hotel balcony. Auto mechanic Li Xuan (protect),encapsulating a reaction we heard from many, told PolOff September 11 that the tight security and tense atmosphere had "spoiled the mood" during what should be a time of celebration for China. Need to Control "Key People" -------------- ¶3. (C) Using Google "deep search" techniques, PolOff downloaded an internal document, posted on a Beijing government web server, containing security directives to officials of the Anzhen Street Area (a community a few blocks north of the Embassy). The document provides a snapshot of municipal security directive implementation at a neighborhood level. The document describes local measures that will be taken to ensure social stability during the 60th anniversary celebrations. Groups of concern targeted for "control" include Falun Gong practitioners, petitioners, students, migrants, and persons with disabilities. The document notes that the "610 Office" (an agency often cited as having specific responsibility for combating Falun Gong) had been assigned a number of responsibilities in the neighborhood, including combating cults and BEIJING 00002811 002 OF 004 identifying "key people" to control. The language of the document is militaristic and divides the task of anniversary preparations into "pre-war" (i.e., June 10 to August 31) and "war time" (September 1- October 10) duties. The "pre-war" duties primarily involve addressing the grievances of petitioners, monitoring key groups including migrant workers and recent graduates, and cracking down on Falun Gong. The "war time" efforts are described as "controlling key trouble makers" and "getting rid of petitioners." The experiences of several contacts who work with petitioners track with the measures described in this memorandum. Liu Anjun (protect), a human rights activist who assists petitioners in Beijing, complained to PolOff that he had been under house arrest since September 10 and PSB officers had prevented him from meeting with foreign journalists. Chen Shuhua (protect),a petitioner from Hebei province, likewise told PolOff local authorities had put her under house arrest to prevent her from traveling to Beijing. "Looking for Uighurs..." -------------- ¶4. (C) The July 5 riots in Xinjiang, according to Wang Chong (protect),an editor for the news magazine China Weekly, had greatly heightened official anxieties about the national day celebration. "The nervousness feeds on itself," Wang said, and authorities' desire to "minimize all uncertainties" had led Beijing public security officials to sweep the streets clean of pickpockets and prostitutes, even though this had little or no direct bearing on the safety of the parade itself. On September 24, China Reform Forum Vice Chairman Xue Fukang told PolOff that state and municipal department directors had been notified by the central government that they would be held personally responsible for any incidents or lapses in security that marred national day celebrations. ¶5. (C) Because of recent years' unrest in Xinjiang and Tibet, Uighurs, and to a lesser extent Tibetans, are subject to close scrutiny by security forces. Starting in mid-September, authorities have implemented checkpoints along highways leading into Beijing. On September 13 PolOff experienced a six- hour delay while returning by car to Beijing from surrounding Hebei province. Police at a checkpoint were thoroughly searching every vehicle, causing traffic to backup for miles. While waiting at the checkpoint, several truck drivers told PolOff that authorities were "looking for Uighurs." Dai Lin (protect),the abbot of a Tibetan Buddhist monastery in Chengde, Hebei province, said he had changed out of his monks robes in order to pass a similar checkpoint leading into Beijing September 21. Dai Lin told PolOff that someone dressed as a monk would not be allowed anywhere near Tiananmen Square until after October 1. ...And Disgruntled Loners -------------- ¶6. (C) Hong Dayong (protect),a Renmin University sociologist, said Party leaders viewed discontented individuals, rather than large organized demonstrations, as the greatest threat to the national day festivities. Party leaders were taking such drastic security steps because there was concern disgruntled individuals or small groups would use October 1 as an "advertising opportunity" and seek to disrupt the parade to draw attention to their grievance. Zhou Qing'an (protect),a communications professor at Tsinghua University, agreed, saying that while Uighur terrorists remained a concern, security officials were most worried about violent acts by deranged individuals. Such fears, Zhou said, were heightened by a September 17 incident near Tiananmen Square in which a drunken man from Jilin province stabbed two people to death in a reportedly random act of violence. We're Going to Party Like It's 1949 -------------- ¶7. (C) Contacts offered mixed views on the October 1 parade itself, with most decrying the huge expense and militarism of the display. Fan Jinyu (protect), BEIJING 00002811 003 OF 004 the Beijing bureau chief of the Nanfang Ribao media group and a longtime CCP member, said that the public was divided in its attitudes about the 60th national day. One third of Chinese, Fan said, were excited by the hoopla, one third did not care, and the final third (including Fan himself) were critical of the Party and saw its record over the last 60 years as mixed, at best. Several contacts noted a clear divide between popular and intellectual opinions. Many ordinary Chinese, according to Zhong Weizhi (protect),chief editor of the Economic Observer, felt very patriotic and were proud of China's economic model, especially given China's success in weathering the financial crisis. The tanks and missiles in the parade, Zhong told PolOff September 9, reminded the public of China's growing international power and clout. Chinese intellectuals, however, viewed the 60th anniversary celebration as distasteful. "Only China and North Korea do these kinds of displays," Zhong remarked. The China Reform Forum's Xue Fukang noted that the primary reason a military parade would be the centerpiece of this year's national day celebrations was that the practice of holding a parade every ten years played a critical historical role in party continuity. A decision to downplay or forgo the military aspects of this anniversary would cause questions over the direction and legitimacy of the Party, Xue said. Taking a Page from Pyongyang -------------- ¶8. (C) Many contacts echoed Zhong's unfavorable parallels between the October 1 parade and North Korea's Stalinist state celebrations. Mou Guangfeng (protect),a Director General at the Ministry of Environmental Protection (whose Japanese-educated father was severely persecuted in the 1960s and 70s) told PolOff September 6 that the 60th anniversary celebration made him uncomfortable, especially the expense and the inclusion of so many school children in the parade. Mou said his aversion stemmed partly from his experience spending endless hours as a child rehearsing and marching in such displays "and it is difficult to see kids today subject to the same treatment." "Only China and North Korea do such things," Mou said, "because in a democratic country such lavish expenditures would never be approved by elected lawmakers...There are many, many ways this money could be better spent." Zhou Qing'an, of Tsinghua University, said the 60th parade was "more North Korea-like" than the 50th national day celebration in 1999. Zhou, who marched in the 50th national day parade when he was a Tsinghua student, said this parade was much larger and more regimented. Unlike in 1999, Zhou said, when Tsinghua students were merely told to wave and act festive, this year the Tsinghua students were being told by parade organizers to make specific motions and shout pre-approved slogans. Zhou claimed the parade was bigger than originally planned, with Party leaders making a last-minute decision to add more student groups. According to Zhou, President Hu Jintao and Vice President Xi Jinping themselves were behind this effort to expand the parade. ¶9. (C) Hong Dayong, of Renmin University, told PolOff September 21 that intellectual hand-wringing over the 60th celebration should not be taken too seriously. Many intellectuals were critical of the expense and extravagance of the October 1 parade, but they had made the same arguments against the 50th national day parade. In the end, Hong argued, the CCP simply did not care what intellectuals thought. "The Party cares about mass opinion, not elite or intellectual opinion," Hong said. Scholars might scoff at the parade, Hong said, but for most Chinese the 60th anniversary was an important milestone. Chinese had a strong sense of national pride, and for them the 60th national day was a time to reflect on China's accomplishments, especially in the post-Mao reform era. Harmonizing the Media -------------- ¶10. (C) Several journalists lamented the tight media controls in place, though most expected the BEIJING 00002811 004 OF 004 atmosphere to improve after October 1. Wang Chong, the China Weekly editor, told PolOff September 15 that, while he had expected the CCP Propaganda Department to keep a tight grip on the media around the 60th anniversary, the atmosphere was much worse than expected. China Weekly, a news magazine launched in May and published by the Communist Party Youth League, encountered serious problems after publishing several articles that angered Party leaders (including an article about the son of Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai, which broke a taboo on reporting about the children of senior leaders). China Weekly was attempting to write an article about Beijing lawyers who lost their licenses after taking on politically sensitive cases (ref A),but editors killed the story knowing it would anger Party censors. Wang Chong said even his own personal blog had been "harmonized" (bei hexie, a play on the CCP's "harmonious society" slogan that has become a euphemism for censorship) when an executive at his blog-hosting service asked him in early September to take down an article critical of China's education system. (Note: Authorities have ratcheted up Internet censorship as October 1 nears. For example, the government ordered the Tibetan culture website www.tibetcul.com to shut down its blog and chat pages until October 12, according to a notice posted on the site.) ¶11. (C) Wang and other media contacts commented that in the current environment, even Caijing magazine, known as China's most daring print publication, had been largely muzzled. Cheng Mingxia (protect), international page editor at the Economic Observer, bemoaned Caijing's recent timidity, saying that "it was now just a financial news service." Huang Shan (protect),international editor of Caijing magazine, downplayed such changes. While Huang admitted Caijing had been impacted by the pre-October 1 tightening of media controls, he said this was "normal" for the period leading up to sensitive events. Caijing had weathered such periods before, and, he predicted, the atmosphere would improve after the National Day holiday passed. HUNTSMAN