AF/PAK: PRC VIEWS ON COOPERATION WITH U.S.,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 002810 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM AND S/SRAP E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2029 TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID MARR KDEM AF IN PK CH BM SUBJECT: AF/PAK: PRC VIEWS ON COOPERATION WITH U.S., AFGHAN ELECTIONS AND "STRING OF PEARLS" THEORY Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1. 4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Summary: PRC distrust in U.S. strategic intentions in South Asia and the PRC's stove-piped bureaucracy impede China's willingness to coordinate efforts with the United States on Afghanistan and Pakistan, according to Chinese scholars at two government-affiliated think tanks. To overcome these problems, contacts suggest establishing a mechanism for South Asia akin to the Six-Party Talks, holding track-1.5 talks on donor assistance, and demonstrating U.S. understanding of PRC sensitivity to instability in Xinjiang. Our contacts urged the United States to advise India to provide security assurances to Pakistan. The scholars dismissed the "string of pearls" theory that China seeks to contain India, and suggested that China needs to cooperate with India and the United States to protect sea lanes in the Indian Ocean. One scholar urged the United States to persuade the Afghan Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to certify and announce the election results as soon as possible, arguing that stability in Afghanistan is more important than democracy. End Summary. Trust Deficit Impedes Cooperation -------------- ¶2. (C) China was concerned that the United States sought to contain China, Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) South Asia scholar Wang Shida told EmbOffs September 30, pointing to long-term U.S. military presences in Japan and South Korea, treaty relationships with Thailand and the Philippines, "full-spectrum" cooperation with India, and the U.S. military footprint in Central Asia. While acknowledging U.S. efforts to dispel this notion, including Ambassador Holbrooke's September 7-8 visit to Beijing, Wang maintained that Chinese concerns about U.S. efforts to contain China impeded U.S.-China cooperation on Afghanistan and Pakistan. CICIR South Asia scholar Li Li separately suggested to EmbOffs September 30 that the United States could build trust and engender bilateral cooperation in South Asia by consulting with China on U.S. diplomatic initiatives on China's periphery. MFA-affiliated China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) South Asia scholar Rong Ying separately suggested to POLOFF September 24 that a lack of precedent on U.S.-PRC cooperation in South Asia hindered coordination. Unlike China's East Asia diplomats, who were accustomed to frequent contact and coordination with the United States, China's South Asia specialists had limited experience in working with U.S. counterparts. What was needed, Rong suggested, was a mechanism for South Asia similar to the Six-Party Talks, whereby U.S. and Chinese officials could build trust through frequent contact. Cooperation Hindered by Stove-Piped PRC Bureaucracy -------------- -------------- ¶3. (C) The lack of coordination among Chinese ministries dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan was "a real problem" that posed an obstacle to greater U.S.-China cooperation, according to CICIR South Asia Studies Institute Deputy Director Hu Shisheng. Hu cited "scores of PRC agreements" with Pakistan that had never been implemented because senior Chinese leaders had not considered the views of all agencies involved and the agencies did not coordinate among themselves. Noting the U.S. proposal for China to send an interagency delegation of working-level officials to Washington for talks on Afghanistan and Pakistan, Hu suggested that State Councilor Dai Bingguo was the key player who could direct various ministries to include appropriate officials in the delegation. He acknowledged that U.S.-China coordination on assistance programs made sense and suggested that the two sides work together on concrete projects, such as restoring irrigation systems and rejuvenating the handicraft industry in Pakistan's tribal regions. ¶4. (C) CIIS' Rong separately agreed that Chinese bureaucratic rigidity served as a primary hindrance to coordination of donor assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan. One way to crack open China's donor assistance plans for Pakistan, Rong suggested, would be to propose a track-1.5 conference of U.S. and PRC experts that addressed the philosophy guiding each country's donor programs to Pakistan. Such a dialogue could pave the way for follow-on discussions between USAID and BEIJING 00002810 002 OF 003 MOFCOM on project identification and funding methodologies. Rong predicted that MOFCOM officials would be more open to this type of indirect, trust-building approach than to direct requests for information on China's assistance programs in Pakistan. Xinjiang: A Key Factor for China -------------- ¶5. (C) Beijing University Islamic Studies Professor Wu Binbin asserted to POLOFF September 23 that China viewed cooperation with the United States on Afghanistan and Pakistan through the lens of its concerns about stability in Xinjiang. He stated that Uighur extremists had previously received training from the India-supported Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. CIIS South Asia scholar Lan Jianxue suggested to POLOFF September 24 four actions that the United States could take to demonstrate understanding of PRC sensitivities on Xinjiang, which could in turn could lead to increased U.S.-PRC cooperation in Afghanistan and Pakistan: 1) repatriate Uighurs currently held at the Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility; 2) provide tangible support to China with regard to the World Uighur Congress; 3) instruct the National Endowment for Democracy to halt funding for the World Uighur Congress; and 4) ensure that President Obama's comments on Xinjiang were "mild" during his November visit to China. CICIR's Wang separately emphasized that the PRC government had to factor public opinion -- particularly from netizens -- into its policy decisions, and U.S. actions that improved Chinese citizens' views of the United States would create more political space for Chinese leaders to cooperate with the United States on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Pakistan's Involvement in Afghanistan -------------- ¶6. (C) Pakistan's long-standing involvement in Afghanistan's political system was key to Pakistan's strategy on India, according to CICIR's Hu. Hu explained that Pakistan viewed Afghanistan as a source of strategic depth and as a balance against expanding Indian economic and military influence. CIIS' Rong separately agreed, stating that Pakistan's Afghanistan policy was directly linked to its sense of insecurity vis-a-vis India. Increased Indian influence in Kabul would be a setback for Pakistan, Rong argued, and would have implications for Pakistan's sense of security and for its willingness to cooperate with the United States. To unwind this dynamic, Rong suggested, the United States should encourage India to give Pakistan the security assurances it needed to feel confident that India was not a threat. Scholars Dismiss "String of Pearls" Theory -------------- ¶7. (C) CICIR's Li dismissed the "string of pearls" theory, arguing that China did not have a strategy of containing India by establishing Chinese military ports and facilities around the Indian Ocean. Li said the theory had been created by an American scholar and "sold to the world by the Indians." China would abide by its policy of not establishing foreign military bases, she insisted. CIIS's Lan separately agreed, commenting that the basis of the "string of pearls" theory was in fact a series of related but distinct projects around the Indian Ocean to improve China's ability to protect sea lanes of communication (SLOCs). Lan suggested it was impossible for the PLA Navy to establish an exclusive economic zone in the Indian Ocean and argued that the PLA Navy did not have the capacity to play a major role in the Indian Ocean because it was focused on the East and South China Seas, where China still had territorial disputes. ¶8. (C) CICIR's Li separately acknowledged that China had a Malacca Strait "dilemma," citing concerns over China's dependence on the Malacca Strait as the major transit route for China's energy imports and over the ability of India's strong naval force to control the strait. Although China was looking for alternative energy routes, such as land routes through Burma and Pakistan, these routes would take time to develop. As a result, China needed to cooperate with India and the United States to protect SLOCs in the Indian Ocean, according to Li. CIIS' Lan separately echoed this point, suggesting that SLOC protection in the Indian Ocean provided a unique opportunity for the United States, China, India and Japan to cooperate rather than compete. BEIJING 00002810 003 OF 003 Afghan Elections: Stability Should Trump Democracy -------------- -------------- ¶9. (C) CICIR's Hu suggested that the United States persuade the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to certify and announce the election results as soon as possible, arguing that stability in Afghanistan was more important than democracy. Election opponent Abdullah Abdullah could not win a run-off against President Karzai, and, Hu warned, prolonging the electoral process would only add to instability and could lead to a "disaster." HUNTSMAN