CHINESE GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF POTENTIAL COLLISION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIJING 002769 SIPDIS STATE FOR OES/SAT, EAP/CM, ISN/MDSP, AND T NASA FOR A/A O'BRIEN TOKYO FOR NASA ATTACHE JTILMAN E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2019 TAGS: TSPA TSPL TPHY PREL CH SUBJECT: CHINESE GOVERNMENT INFORMED OF POTENTIAL COLLISION BETWEEN SY-3 SATELLITE AND SPACE OBJECT REF: EAP/CM EMAILS 9/23 AND 9/24 Classified By: ACTING ESTH COUNSELOR C. SHERRY HONG ¶1. (SBU) On September 23, Post provided to the China National Space Administration (CNSA) and both the Department of Arms Control, Outer Space, and Missile Issues and Department of North American and Oceanian Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA),information regarding the potential for collision between Chinese satellite Shiyuan (SY-3) and another known space object, based on United States Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) information. The predicted time of closest approach occurred on 25 September at 07:16 UTC with an overall miss distance of 508 meters, and a radial distance of 75 meters. The close distance raised concerns regarding the potential for collision and creation of space debris. ¶2. (C) Following delivery of the close approach notification by fax to the MFA and to the China National Space Administration (CNSA) on September 23, ESTHOFF followed with a phone call to CNSA to ensure that the proper authorities were notified and asked that the USG offer to provide ephemeris data support be directly acknowledged by the Chinese satellite operator. ¶3. (C) On September 25 Post learned from CNSA that the information was passed to the China Launch and Tracking Control (CLTC) Authority as soon as it was received by CNSA on September 23. CLTC is the correct PLA entity responsible for tracking and maneuvering Chinese military satellites, and CNSA understood that CLTC would be working to reposition the satellite. That said, as of two hours before the time of predicted closest approach, neither the Chinese government nor CLTC had contacted Post or the JSpOC. ¶4. (C) In a direct conversation with the JSpOC also on September 25, Post relayed that the proper Chinese satellite operators had been informed of the potential for collision. JSpOC noted that because their scope of work on conjunction assessments has grown significantly in recent months, they now expect more of these types of warnings to be issued as they seek to enhance safety-of-flight operations. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: Given that the Chinese satellite SY-3 is a sensitive military satellite, CNSA, as a civilian organization, has no authority over military space operations. In this case CNSA's sole function could only be to funnel JSpOC's conjunction assessment to the right military satellite operators. They cannot compel a PLA organization to contact the JSpOC directly, nor would CNSA necessarily be informed of the final action taken by CLTC, if any. END COMMENT. HUNTSMAN