CHINA: NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE REPORTING REQUEST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BEIJING 002593 SIPDIS DEPT FOR EAP/CM AND ISN/MNSA GENEVA FOR CD UNVIE FOR IAEA USUN FOR POL USNATO FOR POL USEU FOR POL E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019 TAGS: PARM PREL AORC CDG ENRG KNNP MNUC PGOV UNGA IAEA, NPT, CH SUBJECT: CHINA: NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE REPORTING REQUEST REF: STATE 83600 Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reason 1.4 (b and d) ¶1. (C) Below, please find Embassy Beijing's responses to reftel questions in preparation for the 2010 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference (RevCon). -- What is the host government's general attitude towards CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts? What factors influence its attitudes and positions? CTBT: According to MFA Arms Control Department officials, China would welcome U.S. ratification. China's official position is that it is moving toward ratification and supports early entry into force for the CTBT. Arms Control Department General Policy Division officials have asked to be kept abreast of U.S. efforts to ratify the CTBT and, informally, some have indicated an interest in synchronizing China's ratification with our own. FMCT: MFA Arms Control Department contacts maintain that China welcomes the adoption of the FMCT program of work and looks forward to the beginning of negotiations. The Chinese suggest we try to address procedural questions from other countries regarding the negotiations now in order to promote productive negotiations beginning next year. China is preparing for the negotiations and is considering asking for bilateral negotiations/consultations on the FMCT with key countries including the United States. The Chinese characterize such bilateral talks as good for "mutual understanding." NPT: MFA officials tasked with preparing for the REVCON have told us that China seeks a successful REVCON with substantive results and supports a "balanced approach" to the three pillars. Traditionally, China positions itself as a supporter of developing countries and will almost certainly emphasize that the concerns of non-nuclear states should be addressed. Our MFA contacts maintain that we should balance disarmament efforts with the peaceful use of nuclear energy and try not to create confrontations in preparation for the REVCON. U.S.-Russia Disarmament: Chinese state-run media has generally reported news of the renewal of U.S.-Russian talks favorably. Our Chinese MFA contacts tell us that they look forward to early substantive results to ongoing U.S.-Russia negotiations because a good result would promote the disarmament process worldwide. Our discussions with Russian counterparts in Beijing lead us to believe there may be opportunities to work jointly with Russia in promoting nuclear disarmament by the Chinese, particularly in pressing the Chinese to be more transparent about whether they maintain a stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons or continue to manufacture fissile material. We have informally told the Chinese that their lack of transparency complicates U.S.-Russian disarmament talks because both Washington and Moscow must take into account China's arsenal. The Russians in Beijing share our belief that the Chinese have received a sort of "free pass" on arms reductions talks and have maintained the same talking points for over twenty-five years (namely, that Russia and the United States should disarm first, China's arsenal is small compared to the two major powers, and China is willing to discuss reducing its arms only after Russia and the United States reduce theirs.) Factors of influence -------------- There are three major factors of influence on PRC arms control policies: ¶1. U.S. positions and policies. The overall positive trend BEIJING 00002593 002 OF 004 in Sino-U.S. relations and the importance of that relationship to senior Chinese leaders is invaluable. It is important when meeting with Chinese counterparts to frame our nonproliferation measures in terms showing their importance to the overall relationship. Repeating key phrases used by our leaders such as our shared desire "to build a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship for the twenty-first century" reminds the Chinese that nonproliferation discussions do not take place in a vacuum. The President's nuclear initiatives and calls for nuclear arms reduction give us new opportunities to engage with the Chinese. New initiatives such as the UNSC Conference and Nuclear Security Summit benefit the efforts of arms control officials in the Chinese government and help create momentum within China as well. The Chinese have appreciated recent efforts by senior Department officials to consult with them on nonproliferation and disarmament matters. ¶2. Developing countries' attitudes are very important to China. Some traditional friends of China maintain that Western countries have double standards allowing nuclear weapons in the West while thwarting moves among developing countries. As a result, some bureaucrats in Beijing push China to remain neutral on these issues. Generally, China sees its role as trying to play on the differences in order to enhance its own interests. ¶3. Regional security environment. We must take into account the security environment in the area surrounding China as well as China's own national security interests. -- What position on CTBT, FMCT, NPT, and U.S.-Russian arms control efforts is the host government likely to take in upcoming fora, such as the Conference on Disarmament, the UNGA First (Disarmament) Committee, and the NPT Review Conference in 2010? Conference on Disarmament: Our MFA contacts maintain that the Conference should focus on issues beyond the FMCT. Other priorities should include negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. China hopes the conference will have a wide focus and "move forward in a balanced way." UNGA: China is preparing for the UNGA First Committee meeting and looks forward to see what other countries will put forward. Our interlocutors do not expect China's position to change on expected resolutions. NPT REVCON: The Chinese would like to resolve recent obstacles. (Note: Our MFA contacts have made special mention of the need to duly consider Egypt's proposal for a Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.) Chinese officials hope all parties can avoid confrontation over Iran and North Korea. They emphasize the importance of making the REVCON a success and acknowledge that failure to do so would be a major blow to disarmament and nonproliferation progress around the world. -- With which countries does the host country work most closely on these issues? China holds regular bilateral consultations on these issues with the United States, UK, EU, France, Germany and Russia. China has periodic dialogues on these issues with Pakistan, India, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. Chinese officials discuss nonproliferation under the aegis of ASEAN Regional Forum with Indonesia, Malaysia and other ASEAN members. The fact that China has discussed with us Egypt's proposal for a Middle East nuclear weapons free zone suggests the Chinese also discuss nonproliferation issues with some members of the Non-Aligned Movement. -- Who are key government personnel involved in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making in the Ministry BEIJING 00002593 003 OF 004 of Foreign Affairs, related ministries (such as Defense and Energy),and their diplomatic missions to arms control fora? The Director General for Arms Control and Disarmament, currently Cheng Jingye, is the key MFA official on these issues. Cheng led the Chinese delegation to the September 8 Nonproliferation Dialogue in Washington and is well known in international nonproliferation circles. VFM He Yafei, a former DCM at the Chinese Embassy in Washington, is very engaged on nonproliferation and arms control matters. He told our Ambassador that the recent emphasis on nuclear-related diplomacy, including the DPRK, Iran (P5-plus-1),upcoming nuclear summits and CTBT ratification is forcing a reconsideration of China's nuclear strategy with attendant staffing and workload implications. Some issues rise to a higher lever -- reaching to State Councilor Dai Bingguo, Premier Wen Jiabao, and President Hu Jintao. Other ministries play roles to varying degrees depending on the issue. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) closely coordinates on these issues, in particular the Armament Division, the 2nd Artillery Division of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the General Staff. Civilian agencies involved in these issues include the National Atomic Energy Agency, the Department of Public Security and the Customs Office. While the MFA has a major policy-making role, it must work with other ministries. Coordination usually takes place at the DG level, but will sometimes rise to the Vice Minister level. -- What role does China play in arms control and nonproliferation organizations? Does it take a leadership role on any issues? China is the chair of the Six-Party Talks aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. Generally, China does not play a leadership role on other arms control and nonproliferation issues, seeing the U.S. and Russia as the leaders of the global denuclearization effort. China generally supports international efforts to build a more secure world and often prefers to work through the United Nations. -- How does the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation policymaking process work, and what is the interplay among government officials and agencies? A major obstacle to better bilateral coordination with China on security issues in general and nuclear nonproliferation issues in particular is bureaucratic stove-piping within the PRC. In preparing for upcoming nonproliferation meetings, Washington should invite interagency Chinese teams to discuss relevant issues. -- Which people and agencies carry the most weight, and on which issues? MFA VFM He Yafei is influential and is well known in Washington. State Councilor Dai Bingguo is the Secretary's counterpart in the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. FM Yang Jiechi has some influence. Senior officials within the MND have strong influence, and Post suggests U.S. teams visiting Beijing to discuss nonproliferation affairs seek appointments with PLA intelligence and general staff officers. MND and MFA have different nonproliferation and arms control functions within the Chinese government. MND has the lead on nuclear force structure and modernization, preparation to counter any nuclear threat and intelligence. MFA is the lead agency on international nonproliferation and arms control diplomacy. We rarely observe MFA officials at MND-sponsored events or PLA officers at MFA meetings. Post suggests that USG officials sponsoring meetings focused on nonproliferation and arms control invite Chinese officials from both MND and MFA. -- What are the key factors that drive adoption or rejection of particular policies or positions on nuclear arms control or nonproliferation issues? BEIJING 00002593 004 OF 004 Inter-ministerial debate is often intense. Generally, this process is opaque, but recent experiences with other security issues in which different ministries advocated different policies suggest that differences were only solved by elevating the decision to higher-ranking leaders, sometimes to President Hu Jintao. -- How many people in China's missions (New York, Geneva, and Vienna) to arms control fora deal with arms control and nonproliferation issues? Who are they? New York: 2 people dedicated to these issues - one Counselor and one attache. Geneva: Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs, 2 Counselors and 3 other staff members. Vienna: Ambassador plus one counselor and one staff member. -- Are mission personnel and resources augmented during key relevant meetings? China regularly sends large, multi-agency delegations to key meetings. This promotes policy coordination, especially when officials from key ministries are exposed firsthand to other nations' views. -- What are the roles and influence of China's nuclear power industry (if any),academia, and non-governmental organizations in nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decision-making? The nuclear power industry plays an advisory role to consultations (e.g., FMCT and the multinational fuel supply mechanism). In recent years, academics and NGOs in China have played an increasingly prominent and important role in fostering discussion of ideas, not only in China but in their interaction with U.S. NGOs and think tanks, through their publications and in the media. They sometimes coordinate foreign experts visits to the MFA and other ministries . Post encourages visiting U.S. delegations to meet with Chinese academics and to invite them to visit Washington. HUNTSMAN