PRC CONCERNS ABOUT POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 002456

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/26/2029
TAGS: PREL PARM EAID MARR NATO PTER CH PK AF
SUBJECT: PRC CONCERNS ABOUT POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN
AFGHANISTAN

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson for reasons
1.4 (B/D)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In an August 25 meeting with PolOff, Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) Central Committee International Liaison
Department (CCID) Third Bureau Director Wu Baocai expressed
concern about post-election violence in Afghanistan and
uncertainty as to how to evaluate the strength of the
Taliban. While noting that the CCP looked to expand its
party-to-party engagement with Afghanistan beyond current
levels, Wu confirmed that the CCP did not have and was not
seeking contact with the Taliban. Wu suggested that the U.S.
and Iran shared common interests in Afghanistan and
acknowledged that the CCID was evaluating how to improve
China's image in the Muslim world following the early July
outbreak of ethnic unrest in Xinjiang province. End summary.

POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE
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2. (C) Wu Baocai, Director of the CCID Third Bureau, which
covers West Asia and North Africa, told POLOFF during a
wide-ranging 90-minute conversation August 25 that the
violent aftermath of the June 12 Iranian presidential
election had been a surprise, and CCID officials were "very
concerned" about the prospect of post-election violence in
Afghanistan. Wu expressed belief that there was a high
likelihood that losing presidential candidates in
Afghanistan's August 20 presidential election would stir
public discontent by drawing public attention to voting
irregularities. He expressed hope that losing presidential
candidates would respect the legal process and avoid seeking
redress for perceived injustices through violent means. When
asked what actions the Chinese were prepared to take to aid
stability following the announcement of results, Wu responded
that his organization did not have any plans, in keeping with
China's policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other countries.

CCID UNSURE ABOUT STRENGTH OF TALIBAN
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3. (C) According to the latest information Wu said he had
received, the Afghanistan Taliban's current active force
strength was at approximately 5,000-7,000 fighters and the
Pakistan Taliban's combined active force strength was at
roughly 10,000 fighters. Wu indicated that he did not have a
high degree of confidence in these figures. Wu stated that
he read a press report August 24 that Pakistan Taliban leader
Baitullah Mehsud was sick, yet still alive, which conflicted
with U.S. press accounts of Mehsud's death. Wu acknowledged
the difficulty in evaluating the overall strength of the
Taliban as well as the level of coordination between various
factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. International
attitudes toward the Taliban, including by the Muslim world,
were "very confusing," Wu said. Did Pakistan support and
direct Taliban actions, or was the Taliban an enemy of the
Pakistani state, Wu asked rhetorically.

CCP SEEKS RELATIONS WITH POLITICAL PARTIES, NOT TALIBAN
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4. (C) The CCP had a formal party-to-party relationship with
one Afghan political party, the Islamic Movement of
Afghanistan, and hoped to develop formal party ties with
additional legally-recognized political parties in
Afghanistan, according to Wu. The CCP currently maintained a
formal party relationship with 520 political parties from 160
countries and had two preconditions for establishing such
relations. First, the foreign political party had to be
legally recognized by the state in which it operated.
Second, the foreign political party had to seek positive,
friendly ties with the CCP. On this basis, the Taliban did
not qualify for a relationship with the CCP because it was
not legally recognized as a political party under Afghan law.
The CCP "does not have any contact with the Afghanistan
Taliban," Wu stressed, and did not have any plan to establish
contact.

U.S. AND IRAN SHARE COMMON INTERESTS IN AFGHANISTAN
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5. (C) Wu expressed the view that the U.S. and Iran shared a
common interest in defeating the Taliban, stemming the
transnational flow of drugs and weapons from Afghanistan,
building Afghanistan's infrastructure, and expanding its

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economy. Afghanistan and Iran shared a historical and
linguistic bond that helped the two countries understand each
other's intentions. Iran's investment in northwest and
western Afghanistan and its plan to build a railway link and
expressway running through Afghanistan were praiseworthy
endeavors, according to Wu.

CHINA PURSUING MUSLIM OUTREACH
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6. (C) Following the early July outbreak of ethnic unrest in
Xinjiang province, CCID had launched a comprehensive review
of China's relationship with the Muslim world, Wu noted. As
part of this review, CCID was studying various countries'
outreach to the Muslim world, "especially the United
States'." The Chinese had noted President Obama's Cairo
speech and recent message to the Muslim world on Ramadan.
The Muslim world was growing, and thus it was important to
improve China's relations with countries of the Muslim world,
according to Wu.
HUNTSMAN