PRC SCHOLARS URGE QUICK ASSISTANCE FOR IDPS; WARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001969 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2029 TAGS: PREL PARM PTER NATO MOPS MARR EAID CH PK AF IN SUBJECT: PRC SCHOLARS URGE QUICK ASSISTANCE FOR IDPS; WARY OF COORDINATION WITH U.S. IN SOUTH ASIA REF: BEIJING 1698 Classified By: Acting Political Minister Counselor Ben Moeling for reasons 1.4 (B/D). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) State Council-affiliated academics told Embassy officers that recent progress on counter-terrorism efforts in Pakistan could collapse if the basic needs of IDPs resulting from military operations were not addressed quickly. According to Chinese scholars, mistrust of U.S. military intentions in South Asia remains pervasive in China; one scholar insisted that military defeat of the Taliban was impossible. Historical and more recent estrangement between China and its ostensible allies in the region contributes to China's "hands off" approach to Pakistan. The PRC predilection to view ethnic unrest among China's Muslim population through the prism of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement and U.S. support for Rebiyah Kadeer and the World Uighur Congress stoke suspicions about the sincerity of U.S. offers of counter-terrorism cooperation with China. (Note: the following discussions, which also addressed recent Sino-Indian tensions (septel),took place prior to the July 5 onset of unrest in Xinjiang. End Note.) End summary. Economic Assistance Needed for IDPs -------------- ¶2. (C) China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) scholar Ye Hailin suggested to PolOff July 1 that the Pakistan military operation in Swat district reflected positively on the military "because they killed a lot of militants," but that President Zardari and Pakistani civilian leadership had gained little confidence from the Pakistani public. He also expressed concern that without coordination from coalition forces in Afghanistan, Pakistani security forces' operations targeting Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in Waziristan would not succeed, suggesting that Taliban forces would melt into the local populace and that Mehsud would escape to Afghanistan. ¶3. (C) Noting that refugee populations had been a prime recruiting pool for the Taliban, Ministry of State Security-affiliated China Institutes for Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) South Asia scholar Hu Shisheng told PolOff July 2 that the popular support for military operations against the Taliban could quickly dissipate if the needs of the IDPs were not promptly ;addressed. China had supported the operation in Swat but, reflecting its economic approach to the insurgency issues, China also hoped for rapid reconstruction efforts for the civilian population. Hu also underscored the need to restore the tribal social structure, stating that the balance of influence between the maliks/elders and religious leaders unfortunately had shifted towards the latter. China Does Not Trust U.S. Intentions in South Asia -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) CASS' Ye noted that most Chinese, even those in the government, continued to cling to the notion that the ultimate objective of U.S. military action in Afghanistan was to establish a permanent military presence from which to pressure China, adding that some Chinese go so far as to believe the United States is supporting terrorist groups as a pretext for maintaining a large military force in the region. While he acknowledged the illogical elements of such reasoning, he stated he was part of a small minority who believed U.S. objectives in the region were not directed at China. Because of these persisting suspicions, China would avoid high-profile cooperation with the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He suggested that China would be amenable to increasing its assistance in bilateral channels in response to direct requests from the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments. ¶5. (C) CICIR's Hu separately argued that U.S. military defeat of the Taliban was "impossible" and that some form of the Taliban would always remain. While the United States "can just leave" the region, China would be left dealing with the consequences of the conflict, and therefore, China was reluctant to cooperate with the United States. Hu said China needed to retain the option to deal with the Taliban as a BEIJING 00001969 002 OF 002 hedge against a possible future Taliban victory in Afghanistan. Aware of its central role in providing information to China on terrorist activities, Pakistan's ISI "makes business" with China, Hu asserted. ISI maintains its indispensability to China by providing information on terrorists while still supporting extremist elements. Hu acknowledged that such a balancing act had negatively impacted Pakistan in those cases when ISI had lost control of the terrorist groups who, in turn, attacked the government and civilian population targets. Asked why China did not push Pakistan to address the insurgent threat, Hu suggested that from a broader perspective, China did not want to jeopardize its close relationship with Pakistan and end up with another difficult neighbor like Russia, Vietnam and North Korea. Xinjiang Seen Through the Prism of ETIM -------------- ¶6. (C) (Note: the following discussions took place prior to the July 5 onset of unrest in Xinjiang. End Note) CASS, Ye noted Chinese government difficulties in dealing with a Uighur population in Xinjiang that did not share a national identity with Han Chinese. Contrasting Uighurs with ethnic Hui Muslims (who Ye said were "Chinese,") Ye recalled a recent trip to Xinjiang where local Uighurs complained to him that the central government had not strongly condemned Israeli aggression against Palestinians. "That's why we don't like you," Ye reported his Uighur interlocutor said, adding that "you" meant both the central government and Han Chinese. ¶7. (C) CICIR's Hu separately agreed, noting that many Uighurs espoused a supra-national "Islamic ideology" combined with an ethnic identity separate from Han Chinese, a combination that fueled separatist tendencies. Hu said that East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) activities continued in Xinjiang and that arrests of "underground groups" were not publicized so as to avoid raising security concerns in the general public. U.S. involvement with Uighur activities negatively impacted the potential for U.S.-China cooperative counter-terrorism efforts, he said, citing the transfer of Chinese citizen Uighur detainees from Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility to Bermuda and other third countries and media reports noting National Endowment of Democracy (NED) funding for Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uighur Congress. Such actions cast doubts in the minds of Chinese leaders about the sincerity of U.S. offers of counterterrorism cooperation. Pressed further, Hu intimated that many Chinese believed the United States was supporting separatist activities in Tibet and Xinjiang to "keep China internally focused and tied down." GOLDBERG