SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS A MIXED BAG OF TENSIONS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIJING 001384 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2029 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS PBTS PHSA IN NP PK CH SUBJECT: SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS A MIXED BAG OF TENSIONS, DISAGREEMENTS AND PROGRESS Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson, reasons (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Chinese academic and Indian diplomatic contacts in recent meetings painted a mixed picture of Sino-Indian ties. Interlocutors cited historic tensions and present disagreements, but also noted that incremental progress had been made. Chinese scholars downplayed the "String of Pearls" strategy and emphasized that China's presence in the Indian Ocean focused on economics and that China's growing influence in South Asian countries like Nepal was not a strategy aimed at containing India. One scholar said India was not a "friend" of China, but neither was it an imminent threat. On the China-Pakistan-India triangle, PRC contacts said China was deeply worried about ties between India and Pakistan and wanted to help balance their relationship, but Indian contacts said China's bias in favor of Pakistan hampered its mediatory role. Despite joint training exercises in 2007 and 2008, Sino-Indian military-to-military ties remained limited, contacts said. END SUMMARY. Context: Sino-Indian Relations -------------- ¶2. (C) Peking University Professor Yu Tiejun told PolOff February 27 that India had always been worried about China, and China was the "main rationale" behind India becoming a nuclear power. Most in China, however, still did not view India as a major threat, he remarked. In the 1950s and 1960s, Chinese had viewed India as critically important to China, but the border conflict in 1962 had seriously damaged the relationship. Yu noted that out of approximately 50 scholars who worked on international affairs at Peking University today, only two conducted research that touched on India and none considered it their full-time specialty. According to Yu, there have been no systematic Chinese studies of Indian strategy. ¶3. (C) Gourangal Das (protect),Indian Embassy First Secretary, told PolOff May 15 that the two sides had made incremental progress in the economic and people-to-people ties, adding that relations were "very good at the working level." Siddhartha Nath (protect),Second Secretary at the Indian Embassy, told PolOff February 23 that ties between India and China were "warming," but he acknowledged that a less positive countercurrent ran in the relationship. Border issues and Chinese incursions remained a worry for India. The Indian Ocean and China's String of Pearls -------------- ¶4. (C) China Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) South Asia scholar Ye Hailin told PolOff May 13 that the "String of Pearls" concept (involving the establishment of Chinese military ports and facilities around the Indian Ocean, and more abstractly, Chinese influence in South Asian countries) was not useful to China. It would be a "stupid strategy," he said, because without naval protection, the "pearls would be easy to remove." He pointed out that China was worried more about security in the Malacca Strait choke-point and about Indian and Vietnamese intentions in the South China Sea, because China could not currently rely on its navy to ensure the safety of shipping routes. ¶5. (C) West of India, China's activities posed little threat to India, according to Professor Ye, arguing that Gwadar port in Pakistan was for civil use and run by a private company. He called Gwadar "useless" militarily, suggesting it was redundant because it lay so near to a military port in Karachi. Ye said China could use the Gwadar port as a trade link by building a railway/pipeline overland to Gwadar and bypassing the Indian Ocean. Currently Gwadar's only land link was to Karachi. ¶6. (C) Professor Han Hua of Peking University told PolOff May 11 that "cooperation without conflict" was still possible between China and India in the Indian Ocean, as long as there was no clear sign of military encirclement or containment. In contrast, Indian diplomat Das suggested that the economic development explanation for Chinese development of each BEIJING 00001384 002 OF 003 "pearl" was weak. "The Chinese have an economic excuse for everything," he said, "but China clearly has a strategic interest in the 'String of Pearls.'" PLA Navy Activities in Indian Ocean -------------- ¶7. (C) Peking University's Professor Han said it was difficult to guarantee China's shipping security without provoking India, as India perceived the Indian Ocean as its backyard. However, China had its own concerns about activity in the Indian Ocean, a vital link to Chinese interests in the Middle East and Africa. Han noted the U.S.-Japan-India Malabar exercises, in particular the anti-submarine component. Peking University Professor Yu Tiejun noted Chinese desire for ports to access the Indian Ocean and cited China's interest in Africa as part of the reason. He emphasized that the PLA Navy's deployment of two frigates to participate in international efforts to combat piracy was "amazing" because the decision was made so quickly. China was symbolically paying more attention to the protection of its citizens abroad, according to Yu, trying to show that the PRC government cared. He speculated that the deployment would strengthen the military's voice in budget negotiations. CASS's Ye suggested that this naval deployment demonstrated China's weakness. China did not have a blue-water navy or the capability to protect sea lines of communication. "If we want to stay," continued Ye, "we need a logistics support base." He said Gwadar port would not serve as such a purpose because it was a civilian facility and the Pakistan Navy exclusively used the Karachi port. The China)India)Pakistan "Triangle" -------------- ¶8. (C) According to Professor Yu, China was deeply worried about ties between India and Pakistan and wanted to help balance the relationship. CASS's Ye stated that China had tried unsuccessfully to "break the bonds" of the China-India-Pakistan triangle. The triangle, he added, was unique because within it, India was economically "number one" for China while Pakistan was strategically "number one." Ye clarified that China's strategic partnership with Pakistan was important because China was "not friends with India," Pakistan had cooperated to keep terrorists from infiltrating China, and it was a large, Muslim country with "a special position" in the Muslim world, where China had interests. Pakistan was also a land route from China to the Indian Ocean and had proved willing to support China over the United States, he noted. Ye said that in Internet polling, the Chinese people had voted Pakistan to be the friendliest country, ahead of Russia and the United States. India fell in the middle of the poll's spectrum, he said. ¶9. (C) India, in contrast, said CASS's Ye, had proved unable to effectively handle a "weak democratic regime" in Pakistan and had "pushed Pakistan too hard" after the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008. He said he thought China should be more involved in helping to stabilize Pakistan. The difficulty was determining what type of help to offer. ¶10. (C) Indian diplomat Nath stated that China was consistently a forceful advocate of the Pakistani position. Though the Chinese viewed their approach to India and Pakistan as "even-handed" and "not zero-sum," he said, there was no doubt that China and Pakistan shared a strategic relationship. Indian Embassy's Das said China's ties to Pakistan hampered Sino-Indian relations, calling Chinese post-Mumbai diplomacy "disappointing" and "a chance for China to show off to the international community." If China had wanted to be helpful, he continued, PRC officials "could have taken a stronger message to Pakistan." Battle for Influence in South Asia -------------- ¶11. (C) According to Ye, India "lacks the confidence" to accept China's involvement in its neighborhood. For example, China had expressed strong interest in joining the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Allowed to attend as an observer, China had sent top-level representatives to the summit. Ye contrasted this to India and the SCO, where India had sent ministers to summits to BEIJING 00001384 003 OF 003 which other nations sent heads of state. Ye added that India had poor relations with its neighbors and wanted to dominate and be treated deferentially by them. He called this the attitude of a "small" country: "India is a big country with a small heart," declared Ye, adding that India wanted to get something from China without giving anything, but "they have nothing to give us." Nepal: Ties Driven By Maoists -------------- ¶12. (C) Beijing University Professor Han said the Maoist leadership in Nepal had driven the uptick in Nepal-China relations by demanding clarification from China on its policy toward Nepal. Indian diplomat Das agreed that increased Sino-Nepalese engagement was not a result of shared socialist ideology and came mainly from increased Nepalese interest. He acknowledged concerns in India, especially in the press, that a treaty between China and Nepal would allow China unfettered access to the Indian border. However, Das said, the Indian media reports were overblown, and he viewed China's goals in Nepal as limited, with Tibet remaining the key Sino-Nepalese bilateral issue. Military-to-Military Relations -------------- ¶13. (C) Though two joint China-India military training exercises had taken place, one in late 2007 and the second in late 2008, China, according to Indian diplomat Das, did not want to brand the exercises as "military exercises," but rather "training." The military-to-military relationship was "burdened by Pakistan," Das underscored. CASS scholar Ye Hailin told PolOffs that China and India did not have military-to-military "cooperation" but rather "contact," which he said was all the two countries needed because there were not many areas for cooperation militarily. He hypothesized that disaster relief or counter-piracy operations might be avenues for cooperation but noted that it was more likely that the two sides would work on an issue in parallel rather than cooperating with each other. China's goal in joint exercises with India, said Ye, was to "show how friendly" the two countries were and to try to balance India and Pakistan. Border Disputes -------------- ¶14. (C) Indian diplomat Das predicted that a date for Sino-Indian border talks might be set after the Indian parliamentary elections. He said that China's position in the talks had become "more rigid over the years," and Chinese scholars regularly used "public sentiment" as an excuse for this harder line. In contrast, CASS's Ye characterized the Sino-Indian border issue as more difficult to solve than the Taiwan issue because of India's refusal to negotiate. He emphasized that in the near term at least, China would not welcome any military conflict over the disputed territory, primarily because China would bear the brunt of the blame in the international community for such a conflict. WEINSTEIN