Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BASRAH57
2009-10-28 08:38:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

BASRA: THE SLUMS OF HAYYANIYAH

Tags:  SOCI ECON PREL PGOV SMIG IZ IR 
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VZCZCXRO2142
RR RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0057/01 3010838
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280838Z OCT 09
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0932
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0510
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0970
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000057 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SOCI ECON PREL PGOV SMIG IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRA: THE SLUMS OF HAYYANIYAH

BASRAH 00000057 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000057

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SOCI ECON PREL PGOV SMIG IZ IR
SUBJECT: BASRA: THE SLUMS OF HAYYANIYAH

BASRAH 00000057 001.2 OF 003



1. (SBU) Summary. Hayyaniyah is a poor and politically
sensitive Basra city neighborhood with a history very similar to
Baghdad's Sadr City. Wracked by extreme poverty, high
unemployment, and an extremely dense population, the enclave of
about 300,000 is largely comprised of Shi'a Marsh Arabs from
surrounding rural and tribal areas who have arrived in waves
over recent decades. Though other Basrawis often stereotype the
inhabitants of Hayyaniyah as poor, illiterate and potentially
criminal, there is a recognition of their toughness and
resilience. While Hayyaniyah was a militia stronghold in the
past, today provincial and military officials insist that this
threat is dramatically diminished. In the past, Hayyaniyah was
such a notorious slum that even Saddam's police left it alone.
Today's provincial government is far more involved, but efforts
are still inadequate in the face of the neighborhood's poverty
and density. Working with local officials, the USG has many
initiatives to improve the delivery of essential services.
Those efforts cannot and should not be a substitute for the
elected provincial government's own solutions to the enclave's
deep-seated problems. Hayyaniyah remains one of Basra's most
vulnerable and precarious neighborhoods. End summary.

History
--------------


2. (SBU) Then president Abdul Karim Qassim established
Hayyaniyah in 1958 as a public housing project for former rural
agricultural workers in Basra and other rural southern
provinces. The beneficiaries were particularly Marsh Arabs from
Basra, Maysan, and Dhi Qar Provinces that had moved to Basra
City to find work. The area was officially known as Hay
Al-Husayn, but residents began calling it Al-Hayyaniyah after
then-Governor Muhammad Al-Hayani. The Iraqi agricultural sector
was suffering from a severe economic crisis as the oil industry
began to expand. The result was a significant rural exodus to
Iraqi cities. Government officials parceled the area into
thousands of 100 square meter sections. Residents later
subdivided these plots as the number of inhabitants grew, often
sharing their land with extended family members. At first the
houses were made of mud; the government later began building
them of cement blocks; still later, some streets were paved.


3. (SBU) Another well known public housing project also
developed in Baghdad at the same time, also on Qasim's order:
"Revolutionary City," now known as Sadr City. It was designed
and built by the same architect for the same purpose. Both are
densely-populated and impoverished, comprised primarily of

Shi'a, have histories of militia activity, and could be
catalysts for instability.

Demographics: The Young and the Restless
--------------


4. (SBU) The population of Hayyaniyah has grown over the years.
As with much of Iraq, the PRT is unaware of any official
population estimates, but most contacts and analysts place it in
the range of 300,000, about the same density as
very-high-density city states of Macau, Singapore, and Hong
Kong. (Note: Hayyaniyah is the name for the both the original,
1.2-square-mile enclave, as well as the roughly twice as large
surrounding sub-district which encompasses a few other slums of
similar socioeconomic situation. For most Basrawis,
"Hayyaniyah" refers to this latter area. End note.) According
to a recent DoD Human Terrain Team (HTT) study, the average
household is comprised of around 8-10 people, usually living in
two rooms (each about 540 square feet). Provincial government
data places a staggering 50% of the population under 25 years
old. Formal unemployment rates are well over 30%.

Social outcasts and negative stereotypes
--------------


5. (SBU) Most of Hayyaniyah's original and subsequent arrivals
came from rural and tribal areas largely lacking schools,
hospitals, electricity, and running water. Many had lived in
reed huts in the marshes. Those who took refuge in the city
found assimilation, to the extent they attempted to assimilate,
difficult. Tribal values and traditions are still evident as
different sections of Hayyaniyah display their own distinctive
tribal norms. Most early arrivals were semi-literate at best,
and subsequent generations appear to be caught up in a vicious
cycle. Primary school completion rates are much lower than Iraq
as a whole.


6. (SBU) For middle class Basrawis, relations with public
housing enclaves such as Hayyaniyah have always been uneasy.
Other Basrawis sometimes stigmatize the "Ma'dan" or "Garamsha"
(names of some of the more prominent Marsh Arab tribes) as
illiterate, criminal, and all "from Maysan with 10 kids." They
consider the neighborhood a crowded maze of open sewers and
trash-strewn walkways with high levels of crime. They

BASRAH 00000057 002.2 OF 003


generalize large households crammed together in ramshackle
homes, dogs and goats feeding on heaps of garbage, all suffering
from insufficient supplies of water and electricity.
Consequently, a resident of Hayyaniyah--often identifiable by
dress, accent, or surname--can sometimes face impediments to
employment and marriage prospects.

But the truth is more complex
--------------


7. (SBU) While some of these stereotypes have foundation in
reality, they can be a caricature. Hayyaniyah faces massive
problems, but few areas of the city are without them. The rate
of formal unemployment is high, but people are not idle. There
is an active informal employment network. Most residents are
proud of their neighborhood. Many jobs are menial and informal
(largely construction),but Hayyaniyah is also home to some
educated professionals - doctors, lawyers, and engineers - who
live in some of the relatively cleaner and safer areas of
Hayyaniyah. Many Basrawis will also openly acknowledge their
respect and admiration for Hayyaniyans' toughness and fortitude.
They are well aware that the 1991 uprising began in Hayyaniyah,
and that thousands from that district paid with their lives.
According to the Basra Investment Commission Chairman, many
residents of Hayyaniyah own their own property. It is not an
insignificant asset; depending on location, it can be worth as
much as USD 50,000-USD 100,000.

Ethnic, Tribal Composition
--------------


8. (SBU) According to a recent HTT analysis, up to 95% of
Hayyaniyah's population consists of Shi'a Marsh Arabs that have
arrived in irregular waves since 1958, and with only small
changes since 2003. Deciphering the precise tribal and ethnic
composition is more difficult. The HTT and GOI's Ministry of
Interior's Directorate of Tribal Affairs contends that
Hayyaniyah has several major and mixed tribes, mainly the Albu
Muhammad/Al-Zubaydi and Al-Muntafaq confederation, the latter
which encompasses the influential Al-Maliki (or Bani Malik) sub
tribe, related to the Prime Minister. Apart from the Maysan and
Dhi Qar marsh areas, the remaining population comes from
Baghdad, the Middle Euphrates, other northern and western
provinces, and tribes straddling the Iraq-Kuwait border.

Waves of internally displaced
--------------


9. (SBU) After its 1958 beginning as a home for economically
displaced Iraqis, the first large-scale wave of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) (also largely Marsh Arabs) came in the
wake of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. A second wave, also of
Marsh Arabs, arrived in the 1990s, comprised of those driven out
by Saddam who had punished them for their uprising against him
during the first Gulf War by destroying their marshes and
traditional habitat. A third wave came after 2003. Like Basra
City and Province, the majority of IDPs have been there since
before 2003 invasion, with relatively small changes since.
After decades of distinct IDP waves, today it is hard to say for
certain who is an IDP and who is a settled resident. The HTT
study cited International Organization of Migration and United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees figures indicating that
about 5-15% of Hayyaniyah's population is recently displaced
persons, the majority of whom came after 2003.

Many have returned; some have stayed
--------------


10. (SBU) As the security situation has improved, many of the
more recent IDPs have returned to their villages, and sometimes
with the assistance of the ISF and other GOI agencies. In the
case of those who remain and who had fled other urban areas,
some lack the money to rebuild destroyed homes. Others find
former homes are occupied and residents unwilling to return the
property to the original family. Some are reluctant to return
to where a loved one was killed. In still other cases, some
have stayed in Hayyaniyah due to better economic opportunities
or a more promising life for themselves and their children in
Iraq's second largest city. As the cost of living is less than
in Baghdad, some can buy or build homes in Hayyaniyah.

Past militia control
--------------


11. (SBU) Hayyaniyah was a Jayash al Mahdi (JAM) stronghold
leading up to the March 2008 Charge of the Knights campaign when
Coalition Forces and the ISF reclaimed this Sadrist stronghold.
Local sheikhs have told us that they "lost control" of some of
their tribe members during this time to the militias. Today,
while some observers assert that Hayyaniyah could still be an
active breeding ground for Iran-backed militias such as the JAM,

BASRAH 00000057 003.2 OF 003


the PRT's Basra military and police contacts insist that the JAM
presence and threat has dramatically decreased. In any event,
both sides agree that the JAM still enjoys some amount of local
support and some isolated JAM elements could still be resident
there. Given the enclave's extreme poverty, it remains a
potential militia recruitment center. Local sheikhs have also
told us that Iranian officials frequently visit the area, and
discuss assistance projects - but nothing has come to fruition
so far.

A more involved, but still ineffective, government
-------------- --------------


12. (SBU) Hayyaniyah was such a notorious slum that even
Saddam's security forces largely left it alone. Saddam also
considered it to be inhabited by criminals or anti-Baathist
elements. Today's provincial government is much more involved
and making a credible attempt to improve the situation. It is
still insufficient. They face massive challenges. While the
provision of basic services (water, sewage, electricity, trash
removal) still falls far short, contrary to the claims of some
local sheikhs and others, the enclave actually receives roughly
the same amount and quality of services as other neighborhoods.
The problem is that this supply is overwhelmed by the sheer
density and poverty of Hayyaniyah, and years of neglect means
that the infrastructure is that more degraded. Illegal housing,
off-the-grid electricity hook-ups, squatters, and non-licensed
markets overstrain services exacerbating the prevalence of
blackouts, irregular supplies of water, open sewers, and
insufficient trash removal. Though this is common throughout
Basra, the situation is worse in Hayyaniyah. The Directors
General of water, sewage, electricity, and trash indicate that
they do not have the authority to hook up illegal homes and
markets to their services. The government plans to move some of
these unauthorized residents to new homes (the "one thousand
homes" project),but supplies are limited, and such moves could
also disrupt some residents' work and family networks. The ISF
has also done some limited recruitment drives in Hayyaniyah.

U.S. and other donor engagement
--------------


13. (SBU) Hayyaniyah has been a focus of USG assistance efforts
in recent years, including those of the 364th Civil Affairs
Brigade, the 34th Infantry Division, the Task Force for Business
Stability Operations (TFBSO),the 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2/4
BCT),the 17th Fires Brigade (17FiB),USAID, and the PRT. Other
foreign donors, international organizations and NGOs have also
have been involved. The 17FiB, working with local DGs, has
programs for water, electricity, solid waste, and sewage, and is
also contemplating a schools infrastructure effort. TFBSO is
presently rehabilitating an open air market. The 2/4 BCT
removed an enormous scrap metal heap in Hayyaniyah. The United
Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID)
constructed several water towers which the GOI and the 17Fib,
with CERP funds, plans to connect to the Hayyaniyah water
distribution network. All these efforts are not without risks:
17Fib teams entering the neighborhood are sometimes greeted with
rocks, and one soldier recently had his jaw broken and some
teeth knocked out during a recent mission.

Comment: Elected government must do its job
--------------


14. (SBU) The poorest of Basra's poor, Hayyaniyah problems can
appear almost insurmountable. Like poor neighborhoods in
virtually any city in the world, the problems are deep-seated in
nature, and there are no easy fixes. The provincial government
has slowly begun to step up its efforts to improve services, but
much more is needed, including in the areas of reconciliation,
job creation, and education. The many USG efforts to provide
essential services are important. At the same time, they should
not be a substitute for the proper role of the elected
provincial government assisting one of Basra's most vulnerable
and precarious neighborhoods. End comment.
NALAND

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