BASRAH: THE PORT OF UMM QASR AND AN OVERVIEW OF IRAQ'S PORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 BASRAH 000052 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON EWWT EAID KSEC PREL PBTS ELTN IZ SUBJECT: BASRAH: THE PORT OF UMM QASR AND AN OVERVIEW OF IRAQ'S PORT SYSTEM BASRAH 00000052 001.2 OF 006 ¶1. (SBU) Summary: The port of Umm Qasr, Iraq's only deepwater port, with significant U.S. assistance, has made major progress in its rehabilitation since 2003, following years of wars, damage and sanctions, and must continue to play a central role if Iraq's post-war economic recovery is to be sustainable. Most of Iraq's food imports and much of its imported goods enter via Umm Qasr, and the port has seen growing volumes in recent years, reflecting Iraq's continuing economic and security improvements. Underscoring its security-related importance, Umm Qasr is also home to the Iraqi navy and close to Iraq's two international oil export terminals. Since 2003, the port has undergone major improvements in the areas of security, shipwreck removals, dredging, and commercial development. However, bureaucracy, technical shortfalls, and human resource deficiencies hamper more rapid development. The United States plays a crucial role in the port's continued transformation, overseeing improvements in security, rehabilitation, and commercialization. In particular, the U.S. Coast Guard is working with port authorities to achieve the International Maritime Organization certification for International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) certification, which would reduce ship and cargo insurance and spur greater port business. Other foreign donors, particularly the Japanese, are also active in providing assistance. In the future, the GOI envisions a new megaport in Al Faw on the Persian Gulf, to fill a perceived need for a large regional port. But even if such a plan ever advances, it is at least a decade away, and is not without major bureaucratic, engineering and financial challenges. Thus, for now and at least the next decade, the Port of Umm Qasr will be Iraq's only major port, and a key to continued economic growth. End Summary. Port of Umm Qasr history -------------- ¶2. (U) Umm Qasr (umm KA-sir) is said to be near the site of Alexander the Great's landing in Mesopotamia in 325 BC. During World War II the Allies established a temporary port there to unload supplies to dispatch to the Soviet Union. Construction of today's port followed a few years after the Iraqi Revolution of 1958, and was intended to serve as Iraq's major port and reduce its dependence on the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway that marks the border with Iran. In the 1960s and beyond, a newly industrializing Iraq began to ship goods to the region from newly-built factories via Umm Qasr. The port became a symbol of progress and independence of the Revolution. During three recent wars from 1980 to 2003, however, its facilities and harbor were severely damaged or impaired with ship wrecks, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and silted waterways. The city of Umm Qasr was one of the first Iraqi cities captured in the 2003 Iraq invasion; after it was de-mined and reopened, it played an important role in the shipment of humanitarian supplies. Central economic lifeline -------------- ¶3. (U) Thirty miles south of Basra city at the southern end of the Khawr Abd Allah waterway at the Kuwaiti border, the Port of Umm Qasr is Iraq's only deep-water port and primary port of entry for cargo and food, and key to maritime transportation and trade. Some 85 percent of Iraq's bulk food supply, including 350,000 monthly tons of wheat, comes through the port. Divided into North, Middle and South Ports, it has 22 operational berths, 33 warehouses, and two container cranes. Drafts range from about 4 to 10.5 meters. In 2008, about eight million tons of cargo and 100,000 twenty-foot-equivalent units (TEUs) arrived (few exports leave from Umm Qasr),a 20 percent increase from 2007, and compared to about 5.99 million tons in 2007. These numbers reflect continuing economic and infrastructure improvements, as more ships and cargo are arriving, and all berths are routinely occupied. Weekly, thousands of Iraqi trucks carry containers off to the interior of Iraq. Umm Qasr also has decent road and rail links to Basra and Baghdad, and is reasonably well-provided with water and electricity. ¶4. (U) According to most port consultants, Umm Qasr is a decent, if modest-sized port (ranking around 200th worldwide in terms of volume or weight),and has the potential to expand capacity. While current generation container ships carry about 20,000 TEUs, the maximum capacity ship that can normally access Umm Qasr is about 6000 TEU. According to port consultants, with BASRAH 00000052 002.2 OF 006 proper improvements, its annual intake could eventually reach 500,000 TEU. The main imports are wheat, cement, sugar and rice. And while Iraq imports about 30 million tons/year of goods, over 50% of this is transported overland via neighboring ports, hence the need to further develop Umm Qasr. Primarily a commercial port, Umm Qasr also has a passenger terminal, with ferry service to/from Dubai twice per week, and carries around 1500-1800 passengers per month, or around 20,000 annually. The port also has GOI customs and immigration team units for incoming ferry passengers. Security status -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Umm Qasr is also home to the Iraqi Navy which, as well as protecting port traffic, has the vital role of guarding (with U.S. assistance) the two nearby offshore oil terminals of Al Basrah and Khor Al Amaya in the Persian Gulf, through which around 95 percent of exported oil passes, around 1.4 million barrels/day, and accounting for around 75 percent of Iraq's GDP. Perimeter and port security is performed by Iraqi marines and police, mentored by U.S. military units. However, while the GOI port security manager informally runs overall security with participation of a dozen GOI agencies, there is still no legally established entity in charge. Rehabilitation, shipwreck removal, dredging -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Hundreds of wrecks, objects and UXO remain throughout southern Iraqi ports, rivers, channel approaches and sea lanes, mainly a result of the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. As a result of efforts since 2003, about three-dozen priority wrecks that had clogged these areas in and around Umm Qasr and the Shatt Al-Arab have now been removed. Turkey-based Tuzla Shipyards has been the main GOI contractor for this effort. Other priority clearance and dredging has also been done, as well as some yard and crane rehabilitation -- but much more work remains. These efforts will enable the port to receive more and larger vessels in the future. Port authorities are also planning the construction of four more container berths, each with a 500,000 tons/year capacity, which would increase total annual port capacity by 2 million tons. Additional warehouses, yards, and truck parks are also being developed. These and other capacity improvements related to berth depth and gantry crane repair could increase annual handling capacity by another two million tons. Some of these projects will be funded by Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds. Commercial efforts lifting volume, bringing new private operators -------------- -------------- ¶7. (SBU) While the GOI has ruled out any outright port privatization, the Ministry of Transportation (MOT) and General Company of Ports, Iraq (GCPI) have prepared short and long term development plans for all of Iraq's ports, and seek partners to manage and operate a number of major investment projects. They and international port operators and investors recognize Umm Qasr's vital economic role. In Umm Qasr's South Port, U.S.-based American United Logistics (AUL) and France-based CMA-CGM each recently won three-year contracts to provide general cargo, container, warehousing and staging services. Although not a significant private operator incursion (and both would have preferred longer terms),it is a small but important first step for a small private sector foothold in the Port. It is also an opportunity for port management and workers, so long cut off from the world, to gain a better understanding about global port operations. The GCPI has pledged to put North Port out to a short term management arrangement and South Port to a long term concession. The Port has hosted nine recent investor visits in the last 12 months. But technical, human resource problems limit Umm Qasr's growth -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) While Umm Qasr has done a credible job at rehabilitation and expansion since 2003, it is unlikely to ever gain the substantially extra capacity and deeper drafts to allow it to become a major regional hub. Umm Qasr was actually designed to service only third generation container ships, about BASRAH 00000052 003.2 OF 006 270 meters long, up to 3500 TEUs, and 11 meter drafts. Today, less than 7% of the world's commercial fleet is third generation or smaller, and less than 1% of ships being built are that small. Even with regular dredging, maximum water depth is around 10-11 meters, and the typical maximum ship is a Panamex, relatively small by global standards. The port is also handicapped by its long, single, and narrow inland approach channel, which still has wrecks, silt, UXOs and minefields (although priority obstacles have been removed). Still-unresolved territorial disputes with Kuwait (and Iran in the case of two smaller ports) hinder further needed dredging and wreck removals near border areas. Lack of adequate navigation aids impacts safety, so that only smaller vessels can regularly access berths. This in turn translates into higher fuel and shipping charges, longer transit times, and shipping agents opting for foreign ports, all costs ultimately borne by Iraq in terms of higher subsidies or cost of goods. Meanwhile, eighth and ninth generation container ships, carrying 14-18,000 TEUs are already on the drawing boards around the world. ¶9. (SBU) Human resource problems are also evident. Decades of wars, sanctions and attendant isolation have contributed to a general resistance to needed management improvements and new ideas. The port has a bloated workforce: according to port consultants, the work done by the 5,000-odd workforce could be accomplished by around 1,000 workers. A port that advertises 16-hour days actually sees most of its staff leaving at around 3pm. A typical day at the port is a pandemonium of trucks, containers, cars and people moving in all directions; the port lacks even the most basic traffic or safety plan. Many basic services -- warehousing, hotels, restaurants, banks -- are sub-par or non-existent (and great opportunities for such businesses are squandered). There still is no established central legal authority for overall security. Customs and immigration capacity is also weak. Ideally, the port should hire a management consultant to oversee a badly needed integrated commercial-security-rehabilitation vision for the port. While the GOI agreed to hire U.S.-based port consultant Cornell Group to assist in restructuring and concessioning the port for development and operation, this has not yet occurred. Many GOI agencies vie for control -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Iraq's ports are managed by the Basra-headquartered GCPI, a semiautonomous agency under the MOT, and with whom the PRT and Embassy Baghdad enjoy good relationships. However, while the GCPI might exert nominal control, in fact, over a dozen GOI ministries and agencies have a role at the Port of Umm Qasr, a fact which complicates coordination here and at other ports. GOI agencies include the ministries of Finance, Defense, Interior, Trade (operating a grain silo),Industry and Minerals (operating a cement factory),Construction and Housing, Agriculture, as well as the Iraqi marines, Customs, Immigration, Port Police, and intelligence services. Some U.S. re-deployment efforts to go through Umm Qasr -------------- -------------- ¶11. (SBU) As the United States begins the long drawdown of troops and material from Iraq (retrograde operations),the Port of Umm Qasr will also play a role. Currently there is intermodal movement of containers from the Taji Army base, 20 miles north of Baghdad, to Umm Qasr. The containers are transported by the U.S.-backed Iraqi Trucking Network to the Iraqi railways station in Baghdad, and from here moved by rail to the Port of Umm Qasr, as well as to ports in Iraq, Jordan and Kuwait. Extensive USG involvement in the ports -------------- ¶12. (SBU) The Port Development Advisory Team (PDAT),an Embassy Baghdad multi-agency unit led by the Office of the Transportation Attache, advises and mentors the civilian port leadership in the areas of security, rehabilitation, and commercialization. PDAT enjoys excellent relations with the GOI, including the dozen-odd GOI ministries and agencies at the port, as well as private sector and third country stakeholders. PDAT also coordinates the disparate USG agencies providing support in these areas (detailed below) and monitors and BASRAH 00000052 004.2 OF 006 provides guidance on the multinational rehabilitation efforts involving wreck removals, dredging, equipment upgrades, cranes, fire fighting, rail improvements, electrical power lines, and guard towers. ¶13. (SBU) The U.S. Coast Guard's Port Advisory Coordination Element (PACE) is working with GOI port authorities to achieve the International Maritime Organization's (IMO) International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) certification, which could sharply cut shipping insurance costs (now at "war risk" premium) and draw new port investment, and benefit Iraqi consumers. PACE consists of a USCG maritime security advisor to Embassy Baghdad's Office of the Transportation Attache (OTA) and MNF-I, three people at the Port of Umm Qasr, and facilitates the detailed changes to port security needed to achieve ISPS accreditation. The first step remains to achieve the still-lacking legal security framework in the port. The PACE team, which has also assisted other foreign countries in this area, integrates with the PDAT and Port of Entry Training Teams (POETT),already at Umm Qasr, who work closely with political, economic and port management leaders. The ISPS Code is a performance based standard which establishes a set of measures to enhance security of ships and port facilities, and is the sole blueprint recognized by IMO to meet the standards of Safety of Life at Sea. ¶14. (SBU) PACE assists Ministry of Transport, GCPI, and local staff to detect security threats and take preventive measures against them. PACE establishes roles and responsibilities, ensures efficient collection and dissemination of security information, and provides a methodology for security assessments. A standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk is the primary goal, which enables GOI decision makers to offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability for ships and port facilities and determine appropriate security levels and corresponding security measures. The consequences of failing to comply or maintain continuous compliance could be serious, including damaging Iraqi commercial maritime interests. ¶15. (SBU) A U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) POETT, a U.S. Army eleven-person contingent, advises and mentors GOI immigration and customs personnel at the North Port. GOI security personnel are trained in people and baggage search to ensure the safety of ferry passengers traveling between Dubai to Iraq. ¶16. (SBU) The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Gulf Region South has also overseen the construction of security towers, electrical substations, dredging, and a roll-on/roll-off berth in North Port. USACE is also building new piers and a seawall on the Iraqi Naval Base in South Port. ¶17. (SBU) Several U.S.-led military support teams based near the Port of Umm Qasr mentor a variety of GOI security, police and military forces related to overall port security. These Military Transition Teams (MITT) work closely with Iraqi security, police and military groups to ensure port perimeter security, help professionalize Iraqi security forces, interdict the flow of lethal accelerants, increase capacity, and otherwise improve overall stability. Other foreign government involvement -------------- ¶18. (U) The United States, United Nations and other foreign donors have provided millions of dollars in reconstruction since 2003 (including to the nearby 46,000-person town of the same name, and many of whose residents are employed directly or indirectly by the port). The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA),working with Japan-based Nippon and GCPI, has a $270 million Ports Redevelopment Program soft loan package for dredging, shipwreck removals, marine and land equipment procurement, civil and utility works, port operation and maintenance training for the ports of Umm Qasr and Khor Al Zubayr. The three-year project aims to rehabilitate operations and increase efficiency by the reconstruction of port facilities and shipping lanes, equipment upgrade, and the use of relevant consulting services. The initial phases of the project beginS this fall. BASRAH 00000052 005.2 OF 006 ¶19. (SBU) While the vast bulk of British forces departed Iraq in July 2009, a small group of mostly naval personnel was to remain at the Port of Umm Qasr, to mentor the Iraqi Navy in port safety, security, vessel boarding, and search and seizure techniques. Due to the still-pending GOI Council of Representatives ratification of the UK-GOI security agreement (which anticipates such a continued small Royal Navy presence), these forces have departed Iraq, putting an end at least for now their once extensive and historic role in Umm Qasr -- and Basra Province. ¶20. (SBU) The Danish Government, working with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP),has a $2.25 million aid program in 2009-2010 to provide the sea lanes near the ports of Umm Qasr and Al Zubayr with navigational aids and lightening buoys, to ensure the safe passage of large commercial vessels. Inadequate navigational aids impede 24-hour access, entail higher freight and insurance costs, and cause importers to avoid these ports and instead transit through neighboring countries. The Danes also have a capacity-building program to improve management, procurement, operations and maintenance, as well as the upgrading of a maintenance vessel which the GCPI has committed to upkeep. ¶21. (SBU) In 2004-05, the UNDP led the effort to dredge the entire 50 mile approach channel from the Persian Gulf to Umm Qasr, and increased capacity of the Iraqi dredge fleet. Through the World Maritime University, it has also supported port management by conducting a three-week continuing education program for port workers, in areas such as port planning, port performance measurement and port management structures. Iraq's other ports -------------- ¶22. (U) Four other smaller ports round out the port picture in Iraq. Al Maqil, the original port of Iraq, is in downtown Basra on the Shatt al-Arab waterway, 40 miles up from the Persian Gulf. Built by the British in 1914, it handles a variety of cargos, including oils and containers. It has 15 commercial berths with a 250,000 ton/year capacity, storage sheds, yards and other service facilities. Since suffering damage during the Iran-Iraq war its capacity has been limited. Abu Fulus, 12 miles down the Shatt Al-Arab southeast of Basra, serves feeder vessels and dhows. Built in 1970, it has three berths, with plans to increase capacity to 750,000 tons/year. Khor al Zubayr, 36 miles south of Basra city and 12 miles north of Umm Qasr, was built in 1979 to establish a second outlet for international trade. The GCPI plans to nearly double the current 4 million ton/year capacity with the construction 13 multi-purpose commercial berths. Al-Faw port, on the Persian Gulf 55 miles south of Basra on the Iranian border, was heavily used in the 1970s but was badly damaged in the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War. Heavily blocked by wrecks and silt, and capable of handling only smaller vessels, it is currently little used. Hope or hype? New megaport proposed in Al Faw -------------- ¶23. (SBU) As a possible remedy to Umm Qasr's long term physical limitations, the GOI has identified the port town of Al Faw, on the Persian Gulf, as a possible location for a modern deepwater megaport able to handle eighth generation, post-2006 mega-container vessels, with drafts of over 16 meters. Such a port could eventually have 50-100 berths and cost upwards of $20 billion. While the Ministry of Transport and GCPI have widely discussed this option for several years and have received some investor expressions of interest, it is still largely just a plan. ¶24. (SBU) Such a port would be the most modern in the region. Aside from a good location on the Gulf, some GOI officials and port experts contend that Iraq and the northern Gulf region need such sufficient capacity to handle the growing volumes of international trade. No such international hub in the region exists, although various countries including Kuwait and Iran have reportedly considered making such a big investment. Such a port would rival UAE's Jebel Ali in the southern Gulf and could serve local, regional and global markets. Iraq, with its sizeable and growing market, central geographical position and new-found stability and security, would be an ideal location. BASRAH 00000052 006.2 OF 006 With relatively decent rail and road networks, such a port might also reduce transit times of goods moving between the Far East, Turkey and Europe by several days -- and restore Iraq's own historic role as an east-west transportation link. And given that so much Iraqi-bound cargo still arrives overland via ports in Kuwait, Jordan and Turkey, such a facility could gain back this market share. ¶25. (SBU) However, given that there is virtually no chance that the GOI could self-finance such a project, private investment -- foreign and/or Iraqi -- is key. But such private investment would inevitably imply at least some private sector control, something the GOI might find hard to accept. Such a massive and complex project could also prove too much for the glacial and limited abilities of the GOI bureaucracy. Also, industry experts contend that the heavy silt swept down the Shatt al-Arab waterway would require constant and costly dredging. And as there is presently no rail connection to Al-Faw, such an installation would be costly. Perhaps the most fundamental problem of all is the fact that Iraq simply has more pressing demands right now: for a nation barely able to provide even the minimum of essential services and security for its citizens, and unable to feed itself, advocating for a new world class megaport right now might represent a case of mismatched priorities. Comment -------------- ¶26. (SBU) While the Port of Umm Qasr still has many limitations and problems, it is important to remember how far it has come since 2003. With the continued involvement of the USG and other nations, security, rehabilitation and commerce-related improvements should continue. And while a new megaport is good to plan for, for the next decade or so, Umm Qasr is Iraq's only realistic port option. The USG and GOI goals for Umm Qasr continue to be modest and realistic: bringing its capacity to an optimal level so it can play a role in Iraq's continued economic recovery. But like Iraq as a whole, due to wars, sanctions and isolation, in many ways port officials are still largely stuck in a three-decade-old vision that needs reform if they hope to keep up with the lightening speed of international maritime operations. And while we are all impatient to see the port improve (and especially since the U.S. role is steadily diminishing),it will be up to Iraq to progress or not, on its own terms, and on its own time. NALAND