BASRA SECURITY FORCE LEADERS CAUTION US MILITARY TO KEEP LOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000028 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/31/2019 TAGS: MOPS PGOV PINS ASEC IZ SUBJECT: BASRA SECURITY FORCE LEADERS CAUTION US MILITARY TO KEEP LOW PROFILE CLASSIFIED BY: Mark W. Bocchetti, PRT Team Leader, PRT Basrah, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (a),(b),(d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Basra Operations Commander Major General Mohammed Jawad Huwaidi complained to the PRT about the increased visibility of U.S. troops in the province. The General's grievances were echoed by his deputy and the Iraqi Army (IA) 14th Division commander, who were also present. Mohammed cautioned that the large number of U.S. troops on the street put security at risk by undermining local security forces and provoking retaliation from extremists. The generals recommended that U.S. forces reduce their movements and force size. End summary. ¶2. (C) From his office at the Basra Operations Command, General Mohammed expressed his concern over the growing number of U.S. military vehicles on the streets of Basra. He warned that the greater visibility was creating serious security problems for both the local population and U.S. forces. Mohammed's deputy, Major General `Abd Hussein, and 14th Division commander Major General Abd al-Aziz al-Dalmi, agreed. They contrasted U.S. military operations with those of the British, who maintained a very low profile until giving up the MND(SE) battle space on May 1. ¶3. (C) The generals asserted that the U.S. military's increased visibility threatens local security by undermining public confidence in the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Mohammed explained that Basrawis were not accustomed to large numbers of foreign troops on their streets, and he contended that a misperception --that the ISF is incapable of independent operations -- could result. Without public backing, General Aziz concluded, the ISF could not be effective. ¶4. (C) Mohammed warned that the appearance of a growing foreign military presence would provoke retaliation from extremists and he blamed the large size of U.S. troop movements for the recent rise in improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) across Basra. Aziz cautioned that the economic downturn was breathing new life into terrorist activities and that Iran was already heavily involved. To lower visibility, the generals recommended the U.S. military minimize its forcesize and movements, as the British had done to great effect. ¶5. (C) Mohammed also complained of the poor communication between the U.S. and Iraqi military operating in Basra. Specifically, he said that Iraqi Special Forces and police S.W.A.T. teams were operating with their U.S. advisors without the knowledge or consent of the Iraqi commanders. ¶6. (C) Comment: Complaints about the American military presence throughout Basra have steadily increased since the British relinquished command of MND-SE at the end of March. Police Chief Major General `Adil Dahhan made a similar complaint to the PRT in a May 5 meeting. U.S. Commanders at the 2nd Brigade 4th Infantry tell us that movements into the city should not be appreciably higher than they were under the U.K, but speculated that the Iraqi complaints may be a reaction to movements of Brigade command staff as they establish themselves in a new battle space. This supports the view of the 20th Armored Brigade (U.K.) that U.S. movements are currently higher than U.K. levels had been even prior to the drawdown commencing in January 2009. ¶7. (C) Military movements were very low in April, as U.K. forces prepared to exit MND-SE battle space. The absence of Coalition military targets likely explains the lull in IED and EFP activity recorded that month. Basra PRT Regional Security Officer reports that although IED numbers have increased significantly since mid-April, they are still slightly lower than mid-March levels - before U.S. forces assumed command of MND-SE. End comment. BOCCHETTI