THE BANGUI SPRING HAS COME TO AN END

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000047 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C SSARDAR, MASHRAF, SLOPEZ, KWYCOFF PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD NAIROBI FOR CANDERSON AFRICOM FOR KOCH E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON CT SUBJECT: THE BANGUI SPRING HAS COME TO AN END REF: BANGUI 00012; BANGUI 00045, BANGUI 00046 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: 2009 began on a note of unprecedented optimism; the formal peace accords with all major rebel groups and the completion of another "Political Dialogue" made it possible to imagine that real progress might be possible. To be sure, all was not perfect; the government of national unity looked more like just one more shuffle of the same suspects and it was not clear that the opposition, armed and disarmed, had begun any effort to get to know each other or organize themselves into the kinds of groups that might be able to influence the future through the follow on committees and thus lay the foundations for successful elections in 2010. This has all changed for the worse in the last month. This telegram is a catalog of the things that AmEmbassy Bangui is following. It is too early to assess the full implications and interrelationships between these events, but it is clear that at best, the "Bangui Spring" is over. At worst, the Bozize government may face the real prospect of collapse or overthrow in the coming year. END SUMMARY -------------- NEW ARMED GROUP IN THE NORTH -------------- ¶2. (SBU) As reported 09 BANGUI 12, there is a new armed group (CPJP - Patriotic Convention for Justice and Peace) that is active in the north. This is particularly worrisome because: -- While the group draws its force from long term ethnic tension between the Rounga and Goula tribes, the leadership of the group may well be Chadian or Sudanese; former members of the President Bozize's Presidential Guard (GP). Intelligent observers in the region, to include the Sultan/Mayor of Ndele (STRICTLY PROTECT) are very worried that conflict will spread across the Vakaga region unless the Central African Government (CARG) takes immediate action to resolve the issues. He sees no signs that this is happening. -- All indications are that President Bozize has decided to "resolve the issue by force." He is reported to have said as much in his Sango (but not French) speech in Ndele on World Food Day and a Minister made the same comment to the DCM. -- The FACA's apparent return to their failed tactics of violence and intimidation has already produced a flow of over 5,000 refugees across the border to Chad with more following at a rate of 150 per day. Furthermore at least 2,800 confirmed IPDs have been documented north of Ndele. -------------- JAIL BREAK IN BOSSAMBELE -------------- ¶3. (SBU) At 0100 on 14 February, unknown persons attacked the military camp/prison at Bossambele. Reports and rumors are contradictory, but it appears that: -- Some 15 "Sudanese" were freed. This is believed to be a group of anti-Khartoum rebels who were seized in Birao, CAR in April of 2008. The group is reported to have fled to the north and also reported to have abandoned a car on the eastern side of Ndele, on the road to Birao. -- Two guards were killed. -- There are reports that part of the base was burned, including the FACA trucks and, more ominously, there are reports that quantities of "heavy" weapons were taken. ¶4. (SBU) While there is a press release that this attack was carried out by the same group that is operating north of Ndele, it seems unlikely that such a small group could cover so much territory, so fast. Whatever the real truth, the attack is reported to have been well organized and it is alarming that an BANGUI 00000047 002 OF 003 armed group can attack the CAR's main prison, less than 300 kilometers from Bangui, with impunity. -------------- NEW AND OLD PLAYERS IN THE SAME OLD GAME -------------- ¶5. (SBU) As reported 09 BANGUI 45, in the early morning of Saturday, 21 February, elements from the FDPC (Democratic Front of the Central African People) attacked the towns of Batangafo and Kabo in Northwestern CAR and absconded with weapons and ammunition. The FDPC, led by General Abdoulaye Miskine (currently in Libya) claims that some 400 troops attacked the town. Post believes the number was more likely 50, but more troubling are reports that hundreds of demobilized FDPC combatants have rejoined the group. Miskine, and his new political ally Abakar Saboun of the MLCJ (Movement of the Central African Liberators for Justice),rejected the national peace talks of late last year and are believed to be agitating for further concessions. The FDPC may be the force behind the Bossambele prison break. (See their website at: http://www.centrafriquefdpc.com/) -------------- BAD GOVERNANCE AND BAD PRACTICES -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Perhaps lulled into a sense of security by the peace accords and the Political Dialogue, the Bozize government continues its practices of bad governance seeming to prefer to focus on corruption and money making schemes rather than addressing serious political challenges or development needs. Examples include: -- Appointment of Saifee Durbar as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. Durbar, sought on fraud charges in France, has been instrumental in frustrating the progress of the Canadian mining company AXMIN (Aurafrique). As some thirty per cent of AXMIN's stock is held by U.S. citizens, this is directly contrary to U.S. economic interests. -- The closure of eight of the twelve licensed diamond trading companies in Bangui as well as the seizure of all diamonds, cash and records from the diamond collection agencies in Berberati and Bria. While there may be legitimate reasons for this action, the popular perception is simply that Minister of Mines Sylvain Ndoutingai is doing as a way to extort additional money. There are credible, but unconfirmed reports that he is operating several unlicensed diamond mines on the Cameroonian border, near the wildlife reserve at Bayanga. -- The conventional wisdom is that the Central African population is too demoralized to take any action. AmEmbassy has thus noted with great interest small but increasing reports of public discontent, including a police station looted and burned following a police killing and tires being burned in the streets of the industrial (by local standards) town of Bimbo, some five kilometers from Bangui. People were protesting increasing power outages; outages that continue despite the fact they continue to pay their power bills. Press coverage of the Bozize government remains uniformly critical. -------------- WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The most astute political observers in Bangui believe that Libya is funding the FDPC in the interest of deposed president Patasse. If the Libyans have, in fact, decided to fund a rebel group and especially the group that is traditionally the best led and armed, then this is very bad news for the Bozize government which can barely govern on the best of days. While there is no immediate danger of the rebels marching into Bangui or the immediate collapse of the Bozize government, BANGUI 00000047 003 OF 003 things do not look good. Even if these are all simply maneuvers to gain political advantage in the aftermath of the Inclusive Political Dialogue and in the run up to the elections of 2010, this new round of violence has already cased a humanitarian disaster in the CAR and will slow the already glacial pace of economic development. Specific warning signs include: -- Breakaways by the APRD or the UFDR. This might include their further splintering into new groups. -- Effective cooperation or joint operations by any of the major rebel groups. Any two might well have the military force to overthrow the Bozize government. -- Popular discontent transferred into action. This could include street demonstrations or the defection of elected or appointed officials to the rebel groups. -- Evidence of increased intervention by foreign states such as Libya or Chad. COOK