MINURCAT SRSG SPELLS OUT CONTINUED SECURITY THREATS IN NE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000272

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
NAIROBI FOR AKARAS
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL
INR FOR JPEKKINEN
DRL FOR SCRAMPTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF KPKO CT
SUBJECT: MINURCAT SRSG SPELLS OUT CONTINUED SECURITY THREATS IN NE
CAR

REF: A. A - 09 BANGUI 237

B. REF: B - 09 BANGUI 83

C. REF: C - 09 NDJAMENA 602

BANGUI 00000272 001.2 OF 003



1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On December 16, 2009, Victor Angelo [PROTECT
SOURCE], the Special Representative of the Secretary General
(SRSG) of the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central
African Republic (MINURCAT) met with the Ambassador. At the
former's request, the Ambassador gave the SRSG an update on the
current political atmosphere in the Central African Republic
(CAR) with Angelo, in turn, informing the embassy of three
significant events in MINURCAT's area of operation (Northeastern
CAR): the kidnapping of two French NGO workers from Birao; the
recent violence in Sam Ouandja; and a troubling clash between
the Chadian Army (ANT) and an anti-Deby Chadian rebel group -
the Union of Forces for Change and Democracy (UFCD) - that may
lead to the faction being pushed into the CAR. Each incident
demonstrates the continued fragility of the broader tri-border
area of CAR/Chad/Sudan despite a decrease in tension between
armed factions in Birao (Ref A). Additionally, this continued
strife will slow down the Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reintegration (DDR) process currently under way and complicates
plans for the Central African elections scheduled for April

2010. END SUMMARY.

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Kidnapping of French NGO Workers
--------------


2. (SBU) In late November 2009, two French NGO workers from the
organization Triangle were kidnapped in Birao, CAR, it what
appears to been a well-coordinated operation. They have not been
seen since. A group named the Freedom Eagles of Africa claimed
responsibility for the abductions, but it is the SRSG's firm
conviction that the group is not real and that the kidnapping is
not tied to those in Chad. Instead, he believes the group is
local, small, ``of Chadian orientation'', and driven need for
money to buy weapons and supplies. MINURCAT is in close
coordination with Triangle and the French Government to try and
resolve the situation. He said that he would be meeting with the
CAR government (CARG) thinking they can be helpful as he
suspects they know who is behind the kidnappings.

--------------
Sam Ouandja
--------------


3. (SBU) Recent violence in Sam Ouandja, location of the largest
Sudanese refugee camp in the CAR with some 3,500 people, is also
disturbing as it has potential to become more serious and
spread. (MINURCAT is directed to protect the refugees in Sam
Ouandja.) Sam Ouandja has been quiet since its brief occupation
by Zakaria Damane's Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)
in 2007. Until recently, the UFDR and the CARG jointly ran the
town and controlled its comparatively lucrative diamond and game
trade. During his 2007 visit to Sam Ouandja, the Ambassador was
told that Sudanese were not allowed to mine diamonds. Over the
last year, however, the Sudanese refugees began mining for
diamonds and are increasingly active in game poaching both for
meat and ivory (NOTE: This may or may not be related to the rise
of the CPJP as the Rounga who make up the majority of the CPJP
are the traditional miners of the Sam Ouandja fields. END NOTE)
This in turn is creating tension with the local inhabitants, who
are supported by the UFDR and CARG. On December 11, tensions
boiled over when an ambush of two UFDR members traveling on a
motorcycle resulted in the deaths of both militia men and one
ambusher. To make matters worse, one of Damane's close relatives
was among the two UFDR slain. The UFDR believe the attackers
came from the refugee camp; however the head of the camp denied

BANGUI 00000272 002.2 OF 003


that the dead ambusher originated from his community.


4. (SBU) Damane has repeatedly threatened the refugees since the
incident, spurring the deployment of a MINURCAT contingent. They
plan to maintain presence in Sam Ouandja for the near future. On
December 17, the UFDR and the Sudanese struck a deal in which
the Sudanese agreed to pay a blood price of 1.1 million CFA (USD
2,500). On the December 18, the Sudanese paid the blood price,
but tensions still remain high.


5. (SBU) Prior to the deal being struck on the payment of
restitution, Damane had demanded in writing that the Sudanese
refugees in Sam Ouandja be moved out of their camp and that food
aid to the Sudanese be cut. The UNHCR in the CAR, along with the
Nation Council for Refugees have signaled a willingness to
negotiate a proposed move of the refugees to Bambari (250 km
from Bangui). The CARG has not yet weighed in. This move has
good points and bad points:

-- Logistical costs will significantly drop for the UN as
Bambari is much closer to Bangui.

-- Security would be easier as relocation away from the border
may cause the troublemakers - who live among the refugees by
night and poach game and highjack motorized vehicles by day - to
leave the camp and return to the border area.

-- Conflict with the UFDR will be reduced.

--The Sudanese want to get away from the border to find better
agricultural land and fewer threats from the area's ubiquitous
bandits and the UFDR.

But there are other considerations to keep in mind:

-- The CAR government may not be happy about resettling 3,500
Sudanese deep within their national territory in what would
likely be a permanent move.

-- The departure would remove one of the primary reasons for
MINURCAT to be in the CAR. It is impossible to judge the
reaction of the CARG and the French (NOTE: The British are on
record as opposing an MINURCAT presence in the CAR. END NOTE.).
The departure of MINURCAT would unquestionably lead to a
deterioration of the security situation in the Vakaga, and thus
despite all of the criticism of MINURCAT, we would be reluctant
to see it leave the area.

-- UNHCR is currently out of funds.

The deal struck between the UFDR and the refugees may make this
potential move unnecessary. Still, this is an idea that may have
some traction because the underlying suspicion between the
groups will not be bought away so easily. Yet, for the reasons
mentioned above, it is likely the CARG will be unwilling to
allow this move.

-------------- --
Chadian Rebels Threaten to Change the Equation
-------------- --


6. (SBU) Angelo lastly discussed a possible major shift in the
balance of power in the northeastern CAR. On December 13, the
Chadian rebel group UFCD clashed with the Chadian national army,
the ANT. The SRSG described how the group has worn out its
welcome in Sudan and a combination of combat losses and
defections (Ref C) have weakened the UFCD. As a result, he
believes the UFCD may seek to relocate to the lawless and open

BANGUI 00000272 003.2 OF 003


area north of Birao. If so, this would put the group into
contact with the Goula dominated UFDR, the Kara dominated UMDR,
and the other minor armed groups in the region. If Angelo is
correct, the UFCD has some 70 vehicles and is heavily armed,
making it, in reality, more capable of projecting force than the
Central African Army or any of the other various armed groups in
the region. If indeed the group ends up in the CAR and comes
into conflict with any of the armed non-state or state actors,
the region will be at risk of a significant and perilous flare
up. Angelo described this possible move as a serious ``game
changer''.


7. (SBU) COMMENT: It is clear that Northeastern CAR is still
rife with instability just four months before the scheduled
national elections. Despite the attestations of the Independent
Electoral Commission that they recognize the threat to the
process posed by instability all along the north of the CAR, the
northeast's particularly hot conflicts seem unlikely to cool
before April 2010 without major intercession by the CARG. The
armed response of the CARG to recent violence in Ndele (reported
septel) suggests they are far from coming to a grand bargain
with the various warring factions. Additionally, the possible
arrival of a group like the UFCD would make DDR impossible in
the region. Even if the Chadian group does not descend into the
CAR, the previously reported tensions in and around Birao - and
now Sam Ouandja - diminish the prospects of any possible DDR
effort, especially by February 2010, as is the plan. END
COMMENT.
COOK