MINURCAT SRSG SPELLS OUT CONTINUED SECURITY THREATS IN NE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000272 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C USUN FOR DMUERS PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD NAIROBI FOR AKARAS AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL INR FOR JPEKKINEN DRL FOR SCRAMPTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR PREF KPKO CT SUBJECT: MINURCAT SRSG SPELLS OUT CONTINUED SECURITY THREATS IN NE CAR REF: A. A - 09 BANGUI 237 ¶B. REF: B - 09 BANGUI 83 ¶C. REF: C - 09 NDJAMENA 602 BANGUI 00000272 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On December 16, 2009, Victor Angelo [PROTECT SOURCE], the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) of the United Nations Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT) met with the Ambassador. At the former's request, the Ambassador gave the SRSG an update on the current political atmosphere in the Central African Republic (CAR) with Angelo, in turn, informing the embassy of three significant events in MINURCAT's area of operation (Northeastern CAR): the kidnapping of two French NGO workers from Birao; the recent violence in Sam Ouandja; and a troubling clash between the Chadian Army (ANT) and an anti-Deby Chadian rebel group - the Union of Forces for Change and Democracy (UFCD) - that may lead to the faction being pushed into the CAR. Each incident demonstrates the continued fragility of the broader tri-border area of CAR/Chad/Sudan despite a decrease in tension between armed factions in Birao (Ref A). Additionally, this continued strife will slow down the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) process currently under way and complicates plans for the Central African elections scheduled for April ¶2010. END SUMMARY. -------------- Kidnapping of French NGO Workers -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In late November 2009, two French NGO workers from the organization Triangle were kidnapped in Birao, CAR, it what appears to been a well-coordinated operation. They have not been seen since. A group named the Freedom Eagles of Africa claimed responsibility for the abductions, but it is the SRSG's firm conviction that the group is not real and that the kidnapping is not tied to those in Chad. Instead, he believes the group is local, small, ``of Chadian orientation'', and driven need for money to buy weapons and supplies. MINURCAT is in close coordination with Triangle and the French Government to try and resolve the situation. He said that he would be meeting with the CAR government (CARG) thinking they can be helpful as he suspects they know who is behind the kidnappings. -------------- Sam Ouandja -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Recent violence in Sam Ouandja, location of the largest Sudanese refugee camp in the CAR with some 3,500 people, is also disturbing as it has potential to become more serious and spread. (MINURCAT is directed to protect the refugees in Sam Ouandja.) Sam Ouandja has been quiet since its brief occupation by Zakaria Damane's Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR) in 2007. Until recently, the UFDR and the CARG jointly ran the town and controlled its comparatively lucrative diamond and game trade. During his 2007 visit to Sam Ouandja, the Ambassador was told that Sudanese were not allowed to mine diamonds. Over the last year, however, the Sudanese refugees began mining for diamonds and are increasingly active in game poaching both for meat and ivory (NOTE: This may or may not be related to the rise of the CPJP as the Rounga who make up the majority of the CPJP are the traditional miners of the Sam Ouandja fields. END NOTE) This in turn is creating tension with the local inhabitants, who are supported by the UFDR and CARG. On December 11, tensions boiled over when an ambush of two UFDR members traveling on a motorcycle resulted in the deaths of both militia men and one ambusher. To make matters worse, one of Damane's close relatives was among the two UFDR slain. The UFDR believe the attackers came from the refugee camp; however the head of the camp denied BANGUI 00000272 002.2 OF 003 that the dead ambusher originated from his community. ¶4. (SBU) Damane has repeatedly threatened the refugees since the incident, spurring the deployment of a MINURCAT contingent. They plan to maintain presence in Sam Ouandja for the near future. On December 17, the UFDR and the Sudanese struck a deal in which the Sudanese agreed to pay a blood price of 1.1 million CFA (USD 2,500). On the December 18, the Sudanese paid the blood price, but tensions still remain high. ¶5. (SBU) Prior to the deal being struck on the payment of restitution, Damane had demanded in writing that the Sudanese refugees in Sam Ouandja be moved out of their camp and that food aid to the Sudanese be cut. The UNHCR in the CAR, along with the Nation Council for Refugees have signaled a willingness to negotiate a proposed move of the refugees to Bambari (250 km from Bangui). The CARG has not yet weighed in. This move has good points and bad points: -- Logistical costs will significantly drop for the UN as Bambari is much closer to Bangui. -- Security would be easier as relocation away from the border may cause the troublemakers - who live among the refugees by night and poach game and highjack motorized vehicles by day - to leave the camp and return to the border area. -- Conflict with the UFDR will be reduced. --The Sudanese want to get away from the border to find better agricultural land and fewer threats from the area's ubiquitous bandits and the UFDR. But there are other considerations to keep in mind: -- The CAR government may not be happy about resettling 3,500 Sudanese deep within their national territory in what would likely be a permanent move. -- The departure would remove one of the primary reasons for MINURCAT to be in the CAR. It is impossible to judge the reaction of the CARG and the French (NOTE: The British are on record as opposing an MINURCAT presence in the CAR. END NOTE.). The departure of MINURCAT would unquestionably lead to a deterioration of the security situation in the Vakaga, and thus despite all of the criticism of MINURCAT, we would be reluctant to see it leave the area. -- UNHCR is currently out of funds. The deal struck between the UFDR and the refugees may make this potential move unnecessary. Still, this is an idea that may have some traction because the underlying suspicion between the groups will not be bought away so easily. Yet, for the reasons mentioned above, it is likely the CARG will be unwilling to allow this move. -------------- -- Chadian Rebels Threaten to Change the Equation -------------- -- ¶6. (SBU) Angelo lastly discussed a possible major shift in the balance of power in the northeastern CAR. On December 13, the Chadian rebel group UFCD clashed with the Chadian national army, the ANT. The SRSG described how the group has worn out its welcome in Sudan and a combination of combat losses and defections (Ref C) have weakened the UFCD. As a result, he believes the UFCD may seek to relocate to the lawless and open BANGUI 00000272 003.2 OF 003 area north of Birao. If so, this would put the group into contact with the Goula dominated UFDR, the Kara dominated UMDR, and the other minor armed groups in the region. If Angelo is correct, the UFCD has some 70 vehicles and is heavily armed, making it, in reality, more capable of projecting force than the Central African Army or any of the other various armed groups in the region. If indeed the group ends up in the CAR and comes into conflict with any of the armed non-state or state actors, the region will be at risk of a significant and perilous flare up. Angelo described this possible move as a serious ``game changer''. ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: It is clear that Northeastern CAR is still rife with instability just four months before the scheduled national elections. Despite the attestations of the Independent Electoral Commission that they recognize the threat to the process posed by instability all along the north of the CAR, the northeast's particularly hot conflicts seem unlikely to cool before April 2010 without major intercession by the CARG. The armed response of the CARG to recent violence in Ndele (reported septel) suggests they are far from coming to a grand bargain with the various warring factions. Additionally, the possible arrival of a group like the UFCD would make DDR impossible in the region. Even if the Chadian group does not descend into the CAR, the previously reported tensions in and around Birao - and now Sam Ouandja - diminish the prospects of any possible DDR effort, especially by February 2010, as is the plan. END COMMENT. COOK