CAR: PRESIDENT BOZIZE DELAYS IMPLEMENTATION OF USAID ROAD

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SUBJECT: CAR: PRESIDENT BOZIZE DELAYS IMPLEMENTATION OF USAID ROAD
PROJECT

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1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The USD 2.75 million USAID funded roads
rehabilitation project set to launch on October 26, 2009 was
delayed by President of the Central African Republic (CAR)
Francois Bozize due to a perceived lack of government
participation in the project. Despite fully informing the
government (CARG) of Post's plans since January 2009, the
President convoked the Ambassador to the Presidential Palace to
ostensibly find a role for the Ministry of Equipment - nominally
charged with road construction - in a project that is already
obligated and funded with the nongovernmental organization
ACTED. The ensuing meeting gave clear insights into the
functioning and motivation of the President and his closest
advisors, and demonstrates the significant lengths Bozize will
go to try to manipulate foreign assistance. The presence and
active participation of the Minister of Plans, Sylvain Maliko,
as well as the Foreign Minister, Antoine Gambi, but not the
Minister of Equipment, hints at the true poles of power in the
CARG. Unfortunately, this incident exemplifies that, while
certain individuals in the CARG are forthright development
partners, others at the highest levels of government are
determined to try to interfere with development assistance to
further private agendas. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On October 23, the Minister of Equipment, Cyriaque
Samba Panza, who has a long and solid relationship with the
Embassy, called Post to inform the USAID delegation that they
could not leave as scheduled for a field visit and official
project launch until the Ambassador met with Ministers Maliko
and Gambi. On the October 26, the Ambassador met with Samba
Panza who had been charged by the President to meet the
Ambassador instead of Maliko and Gambi. During the discussion
Samba Panza informed the Ambassador that ``certain ministers''
had ``misunderstood'' a statement by Bozize that the Ministry of
Equipment should be charged with the project instead of ACTED.
Samba Panza said he felt uncomfortable disagreeing with those
ministers during the meeting and that when he spoke to the
President after the meeting he believed he had come to an
understanding - that the Ministry of Equipment would observe the
project and would submit reports as needed. The Ambassador
agreed to this and the meeting adjourned.


3. (U) On short notice, the Ambassador was summoned to the
Presidential Palace on the evening of the October 26. During an
hour long meeting, the Ambassador affirmed the following about
the roads project:

-- Looking to employ 9,000 people over one year, the project at
its core is about community development and empowerment and
seeks to create durable microenterprises and encourage commerce.

-- The project would be an integral part of an east/west road
connection that directly responds to the Government's Poverty
Reduction Strategy Paper.

-- Working through an NGO was included in the congressional
appropriations spending plan and that money cannot go directly
to the host government by US law in this case.


4. (SBU) The President, with Maliko interjecting from time to
time, insisted on the same theme - that the Ministry of
Equipment, using heavy machines, could rehabilitate the road in
a fraction of the time, at half the cost, and with better
quality. Despite the Ambassador's repeated insistence that a
qualified USAID engineer had confirmed that the price, safety
specifications and legal regulations were in accordance with US
legal standards, the President continued to insist that his
vision was superior (NOTE: the President is a trained military

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officer with no background in engineering and neither the
Minister of Equipment nor any other road experts were present
during the meeting. END NOTE). By the end of the meeting two
possible conclusions could be drawn:

-- The President sought to have the Ambassador transfer the
project funds to the Ministry of Equipment - this despite the
Ambassador's clear assertion that this was not possible by US
law in this case.

-- The President does not understand the restrictions placed by
USAID funding as similar restrictions upon the executive are
nonexistent in the CAR.

While the latter is possible, the former is more likely as
Maliko, with extensive experience in the UN and other
international institutions, is intimately familiar with the
bureaucratic restrictions placed upon western governments and
proposed possible ways to circumvent the regulations during the
meeting. The Ambassador proposed a formal review of the project
with the ministers of the President's choice.


5. (U) The following day the Ambassador and the USAID delegation
met the Samba Panza and Gambi and came to an agreement that
Ministry of Equipment employees would follow the project closely
- as had been previously agreed - and that if ACTED needed heavy
machinery, that they would make a call to both private and
public actors for competitive bids with all due consideration
given the Ministry's bid.


6. (SBU) In the late afternoon of the October 27, French
Ambassador Jean-Pierre Vidon called on the Ambassador to discuss
the project at the behest of Bozize, who had asked him to
``reason'' with the U.S. Ambassador. (NOTE: The timing of the
call to the French is worrying as the meeting with Samba Panza
and Gambi ended before the call. END NOTE). With clear
reluctance, the French Ambassador asked for the details of the
agreement and gestured in agreement when the Ambassador
suggested the polemic was at its core likely a shakedown.
President Bozize met with the Ambassador and the French
Ambassador on the margins of ceremony on Friday, October 30,

2009. During that conversation he asked the Ambassador directly
if the French Ambassador had called him. The Ambassador assured
the President that they had spoken and told him to expect a
Diplomatic Note covering the project on Monday or Tuesday.


7. (SBU) COMMENT: The meeting with Bozize and the surrounding
events lead to the following impressions of the President and
his inner circle:

-- The President is personally interested in the monetary
benefits that international development money brings and will
seek to insert himself into the smallest details of the project
if he sees a potential financial gain.

-- The best interest of his citizenry is not be the President's
priority. The use of heavy machinery from the Ministry of
Equipment would take jobs away from the target population and
the President did not swerve from his argument when this was
made clear.

-- Gambi, present at the meeting with the President and the
second meeting with Samba Panza, is trusted by the President but
is not an ``ideas'' person. He was relegated to note taking
during the former meeting and during the later only reiterated
the points made by the President without adding any new points
or demands. He was likely at the second meeting to ensure that

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Samba Panza did not make any mistakes.

-- Maliko, along with Minister of Mines Sylvain Ndoutingui, are
the primary figures in the CARG and upon whom the President
counts for advice and strategy. Maliko is the primary
interlocutor with international actors ranging from AmEmbassy
Bangui to the UN to Sheikh Ben Jaber Youssouf Al-Thani of Qatar
and should be considered the functional head of government while
Prime Minister Faustin Archange Touadera plays a principally
representational role.


8. (SBU) In the short term, a Note will be drafted by Post and
submitted to the government with the principle elements of the
project restated and the agreement reached between the
Ambassador and Samba Panza enumerated. Despite this, it is far
from certain that the project will be allowed to continue. This
is clearly an inauspicious beginning for the project and is
emblematic of the principal challenge facing Post - with all the
troubles in front of President Bozize, from a failed state, to
active rebellions, to extreme poverty, he chooses to focus his
time on extracting payouts from foreign and domestic funding
sources. The CARG is not an active partner in its country's
development and thus Post will continue to ensure that
development projects are closely monitored and all steps are
taken to mitigate further issues on this and future projects.
END COMMENT.
COOK