MINURCAT PERFORMING WELL, BUT VIOLENCE IN NE CAR NEEDS A

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000212 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C USUN FOR DMUERS PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD NAIROBI FOR AKARAS AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL INR FOR CNEARY DRL FOR SCRAMPTON IO FOR TBROWN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT SUBJECT: MINURCAT PERFORMING WELL, BUT VIOLENCE IN NE CAR NEEDS A POLITICAL SOLUTION REF: A : 09 BANGUI 195 and Previous BANGUI 00000212 001.2 OF 002 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 8th, 2009, the United Nations Mission in Chad and the CAR (MINURCAT) hosted an Ambassadorial level (attended by POLOFF) trip to Birao, Central African Republic (CAR) as an informational session ahead of the October 21 Security Council meeting on the Mission's role. The northeastern town in the Vakaga prefecture suffered two attacks by ethnic Kara militias in June (Ref A) and ethnic tensions have simmered since. With the rains coming to an end, and suffering from a poor harvest due to the conflict, Birao and the surrounding area risks descending into renewed violence. MINURCAT in Birao is functioning well and is up to full capacity, but suffers from a fundamental mission flaw: it was sent to Birao to protect Darfur refugees and the humanitarians providing them services but is now facing an unexpected civil conflict. The solution to the quarrel in the region is a political one and MINURCAT is ill equipped to facilitate this. It is therefore the opinion of Post that the UN Office in the CAR (BONUCA) be pushed to take a more active role in the conflict with MINURCAT's mission in Birao supporting its efforts at mediation. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The town of Birao is still marked by the violence from June. The abandoned Kara area is over grown with weeds sprouted during the rains. The Prefet of Birao claims that all is returning to normal, citing evidence that the markets, empty in July, are now full again. Yet, when the delegation drove by, the market it was empty. The Prefet had no idea why the market was closed and it was only later that the delegation found out that it was because the Houssa ethnicity traders were on strike because of a violent reprisal the day before by a few Kara who had a bike stolen three days previous. The deficient knowledge of the Prefet was telling of the overall lack of engagement and understanding by the Central African Government (CARG). Though there was a marked increase in military (FACA) elements (NOTE: in June about 30 FACA were in Birao, now, the Prefet claims to have 100. END NOTE),the government has only three functionaries in the city. Furthermore, though MINURCAT offered to transport the teachers from Bangui needed to start the school year, the Prefet has until now not gotten back to them and schools have yet to open. ¶3. (SBU) The delegation then met with the Sudanese Consul. The Consul is the only accredited member of the diplomatic corps residing outside of Bangui and he is widely thought to be the true center of power in the town. As stated previously (Ref A), Birao and the cities in the east down to Bambari, 250 km away, depend almost exclusively on Sudan for their commercial goods. In exchange, this fertile area provides western Sudan with agricultural goods, diamonds and even ivory. As a result, the government of Sudan (GOS),through the Consul, is more active in Birao politics than the CARG. According to the Consul, the GOS sent the peacemaking mission of early July that halted major hostilities and is organizing a meeting in November for all the ethnic groups. He did not give any more details about the gathering and said that the ``ball is now in the CARG's court''. Alarmingly, the Prefet did not mention anything about the meeting. It is also very clear that the GOS interests lay with the Kara. The Consul stated with conviction that the town, which is thought to be majority Goula, is a Kara one. Therefore, it is a strong possibility that the GOS' role as an arbiter will not produce a peaceful consensus. ¶4. (SBU) The last meeting was with the humanitarian actors (NGOs) who were all pessimistic about the coming months. They believe that when the roads open after the rains - probably in BANGUI 00000212 002.2 OF 002 late October or mid November - there will be renewed fighting. Each of the NGOs agreed that they would not be able to leave Birao without armed protection and one said they had been informed by the Kara militia that if they left Birao, their cars would be stolen. To a person, the NGOs do not see any political motive for the threats towards the international actors; instead the militias are simply seeking the finances to buy more arms. ¶5. (SBU) The NGOs also are receiving troubling humanitarian reports from the west and south of Birao. They have heard that the Goula dominated west has suffered two serious floods that have decimated the area, but do not yet know the extent. To the south, there are unregistered displaced persons camps that very likely lack all basic needs. ¶6. (SBU) A new armed group now operates in the area and is run by two former Union of Democratic Forces for Unity(UFDR) officers who broke from the now Goula dominated group. According to the Prefet, they seek integration into the DDR process and do not seem likely to participate in the violence. Post worries that with the slow roll out of the DDR, and the logical inability of the UFDR to disarm with the threat posed by the Kara, that this group may add another destabilizing element to the witch's brew currently developing. ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: The Minister of Interior and the Minister of Communication are expected in Birao over the coming month, with the later there to start the DDR process. But if the rebels' frustrations with DDR first stages in the northwest are anything to go by, there risks being more discontent then less after the high level visits. In concert with the poor performance by the Prefet, Post believes the CARG has still not made the Vakaga a top priority. Though very influential, the GOS should be seen as a neutral arbiter either. ¶8. (SBU)Therefore, in order to stop the region from descending into bloodshed, it will take a concerted effort by an uninvolved third party. MINURCAT's endeavor to understand the situation on the ground and protect humanitarians is admirable, but they simply do not have the capacity to broker a political solution. As a result, only BONUCA, with its political mandate and presence in Bangui can truly engage with all the relevant actors. To do so BOUNUCA must install an office in Birao - which it plans to do - and develop a truly effective political office, which is currently does not have. The relations between the current Representatives are better than with the previous ones, but there needs to be more pressure from New York to clearly define the rolls of each, giving BONUCA the political lead and MINURCAT the capability to enforce BONUCA's negotiations and protect the NGO and civilian population. END COMMENT. REYNOLDS