CAR: LEADING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DISCUSSES VISION;

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000209 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C USUN FOR DMUERS PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD NAIROBI FOR AKARAS AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL INR FOR CNEARY DRL FOR SCRAMPTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT SUBJECT: CAR: LEADING PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE DISCUSSES VISION; FEELING PRESSURED REF: A. A 09 BANGUI 183, 68, 56 ¶B. REF: B 09 BANGUI 195 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. REF: C 08 BANGUI 256 AND PREVIOUS ¶D. REF: D 09 BANGUI 207 BANGUI 00000209 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: On October 5, 2009, the Charge (CDA) met with Martin Ziguele - former Central African (CAR) Prime Minister and 2005 Presidential candidate - who is President Bozize's principle challenger for the anticipated elections of 2010. Engaging, erudite and shrewd, Ziguele covered a range of topics including the state of his party, the Movement for Liberation of Central African People (MLPC),his vision for the 2010 elections and his rivalries with Bozize and former President Ange-Felix Patasse. He also gave the Charge a troubling letter currently circulating the National Assembly that proposes an extension of both the Deputies' and the President's terms in office. Ziguele is clearly feeling pressured by Patasse and knows that Bozize holds a significant incumbent's advantage in organization, funding and the influence spread by his ministries. Therefore, he is trying to involve the international community as much in possible in the lead up to the elections to try to create a more level playing field. Ziguele insists that the UN Office in the CAR (BONUCA) take a prominent role as a watchdog for the electoral process and that it must take the lead in establishing firm and unequivocal benchmarks that Bozize must be forced to meet. END SUMMARY -------------- ZIGUELE'S VISION FOR THE CAR -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Martin Ziguele, head of the CAR's opposition MLPC (Ref A),is a rare politician in Bangui who can explain his political vision rather than resorting to a litany of disagreements with the current incumbent. He declared that his platform for 2010 would consist of three principle points: -- Restoring the power of the State and bringing peace to the CAR through stronger leadership and diminished emphasis on clan loyalties (an overt reference to Bozize). If he wins, he claims he will form a government of consensus, involving 60 percent of members from his party, 30 percent from the opposition, and 10 percent from non-aligned parties. He acknowledged that a winner-takes-all approach would only lead to more rebellions. While he stated there would be no witch hunts against Bozize loyalists, he did insist that those who had ``stolen'' from the State would be expected to reimburse it. (COMMENT: This caveat might risk the same net effect he claims to want to avoid. END COMMENT). -- Economic reforms - such as the encouragement of agriculture, the support private development through increased transparency in the mining sector, and a crackdown on corruption. -- Greater investment in human capital: Ziguele lamented the state of the national education system. He conceded that the CAR would need significant help from the international community in this regard. ¶3. (SBU) According to Ziguele, despite the harassment suffered at the hands of regional authorities, the MLPC has set up offices in 13 of the CAR's 16 prefectures. He plans to open offices in the remaining three, but appears to be playing politics in at least one of the cases: though technically he does not need authorization, he is waiting for the Minister of Interior to grant the MLPC permission to go to the populous Ouham Prefecture (COMMENT: While MLPC activists have been impeded, but not stopped, from freely circulating, and BANGUI 00000209 002.2 OF 003 permission would likely smooth their travels, their delay in setting off for Ouham seems as much a ploy for sympathy and attention as a necessary precaution. END COMMENT). Ziguele noted that the violence ridden Vakaga (Ref B),while worrying, will not play a major role during the election due to its remote location and low population. ¶4. (SBU) Ziguele dismissed out of hand the thought of boycotting the elections, stating that boycotts in the African context are ``self defeating'' as the victor simply goes on without legitimacy. -------------- FEELING INSECURE -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Ziguele framed his attacks on Bozize in the context of the President's lack of leadership and vulnerability to international pressure. Conceding that Bozize is deficient in long-term strategic planning, he believes that Bozize is an astute tactician - one who is capable of playing competing national and international interests off each other for his short term benefit. Yet, he continued, when faced by a forceful response, Bozize will always bend to the international community. Citing examples of international pressure that resulted in concessions like the Inclusive Political Dialogue of 2008, if faced with a united international response, Ziguele believes Bozize will make the election process relatively transparent and increase accountability within his own government. ¶6. (SBU) Rumors that former President and longtime MLPC leader Ange-Felix Patasse's declared candidacy for the elections is making some in the MLPC reconsider their allegiances are also contributing to Ziguele's insecurity (NOTE: On October 6, 100 members of the MLPC from the prefecture of Mambere Kadei in the southwest [Ref D], released a statement that they were rallying to Patasse, the first members since those from his home town joined him upon his declaration of candidacy. END NOTE). It is unclear how much support Ziguele has lost, but he did go so far as to suggest that the international community pressure Libya - Patasse's current host - to expel Patasse. He also intimated that Patasse's mere presence would ``send people into the streets''. Surprisingly, he even stated that the head of BONUCA declared that she too wished to avoid seeing Patasse in Bangui. While such a statement by BONUCA seems very unlikely, it does contribute to an overall picture of a man feeling pressured by his former boss and rival - a position that Bozize clearly appreciates and encourages. -------------- WORRYING NEWS FROM THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Ziguele provided the CDA with an unsigned letter submitted on October 2 to members of the National Assembly. It proposes that the National Assembly extend its and the President's mandate for an unspecific amount of time to allow for: -- The role out of the Disarmament Demobilization Reinsertion (DDR) - scheduled to last three years. -- The return of the estimated 200,000 refugees and internally displaced people - no time frame exists. -- The expulsion of the LRA from the CAR. BANGUI 00000209 003.2 OF 003 This letter is likely a test balloon floated by the President's entourage. On September 5, 2009, the Prime Minister discreetly proposed the idea that perhaps the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) might be formed without with participation of the opposition, but after a resounding rejection by international and national actors, the idea died. ¶8. (SBU) COMMENT: While Post shares Ziguele's opinion of Bozize's likely response to concerted international pressure, Ziguele's focus on international engagement in the electoral process points to a more fundamental insecurity on his part: the electoral deck is stacked in Bozize's favor. Though the population is frustrated with the culture of impunity among those close to the President and with the deplorable nature of country's development, at least Bozize has brought a measure of stability to Bangui after the turmoil of Patasse's regime (which included military mutinies and the presence of Libyan soldiers and Congolese mercenaries). As a result, it is proving difficult for Ziguele to shake off the memories of him as Patasse's last Prime Minister. This history, coupled with the resources of the government, means the President is still the odds on favorite to carry the elections. ¶9. (SBU) The signing of the amended electoral law on October 3 by President Bozize, and the expected formation of the IEC expected for the October 9, hopefully deflates the specter of the government and the legislature extending their mandate indefinitely. Yet, if the fundamental problems cited by the letter remain (likely),or the IEC reaches some new deadlock (quite possible considering the level of recrimination) this idea may resurface and should be highly discouraged. As for Ziguele, he remains outwardly confident and buoyant, but it is clear he is feeling the heat. His idea that the BONUCA take a more forceful position is a good one and is already envisaged by the transformation of BONUCA into BINUCA (Integrated Office of the United Nations in the CAR) in the new year. The head of BONUCA, Ambassador Sahle-Work Zewde, has indeed intervened with the CARG on several occasions to keep the elections process moving along and chairs a coordination group to manage the efforts of the international community. END COMMENT. SMITH