BANGUI RESPONSE TO STATE 087508 - STATE OF CIVILIAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000191 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C USUN FOR DMUERS PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD NAIROBI FOR AKARAS AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL INR FOR CNEARY DRL FOR SCRAMPTON PRM FOR GPARKER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREF PGOV PREL PHUM PINR MOPS CG UG SU CT SUBJECT: BANGUI RESPONSE TO STATE 087508 - STATE OF CIVILIAN PROTECTION AGAINST LRA ATTACKS IN THE CAR REF: A. A- 09 State 87508 ¶B. Ref B - 09 Bangui 190 ¶C. Ref C - 08 Bangui 64 ¶D. Ref D - 09 Bangui 50 BANGUI 00000191 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Fundamentally, the solution to the LRA incursion into the Central African Republic (CAR) does not lie on the Central African side. The humanitarian community, already overstretched by the enormous demands in the rest of the CAR is trying to respond to the relatively small (but growing) needs of the Obo region of southeastern CAR. In its efforts, the humanitarian community is hampered by the distance to Obo, the rains, and the lack of physical and financial resources. The government (CARG) has sent 150 soldiers to the Obo area, approximately ten percent of their entire combat ready force. The small contingents of international forces in the CAR do not currently have the capacity, mandate, or desire to extend assistance to this region; thus any military solution will have to come from the Ugandans. The USG could help alleviate the stress upon the humanitarians by contributing financially to the UN, but a greater engagement or pressure upon the CARG is unlikely to be successful. Only the Ugandan military (UPDF) has any real capacity to stop the LRA from re-grouping in the CAR. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The Central African Army (FACA) has deployed 90 soldiers to Obo with 60 more currently on their way. This is approximately ten percent of their entire ``combat ready'' force of 1300-1500. The FACA ground commander is a former IMET grad with three years experience in Obo. The French Defense Attache (DATT),who has very close relations with the FACA, states he is happy with quality of the leadership on the ground but concedes that his confidence is relative to the overall quality of the FACA. The FACA normally suffer from an extreme lack of means, but have been given some cash for fuel by the French and appear to have sufficient ammunition. They have, however, broken the frame of their only vehicle. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the FACA says the force aims to have a 3-to-1 ratio in their favor when engaging hostile forces. Furthermore, communication with humanitarian relief groups is sporadic, although some FACA units are reportedly planning to deploy to Mboki (west of Obo) to protect humanitarian food supplies following a rumor of a planned LRA attack. Importantly, the local population was very vocal in expressing their complete lack of confidence in the FACA to the Ambassador and the UN representative during a recent visit to Obo. ¶3. (SBU) Information on the UPDF is less exact: Post understands they have 200 soldiers near Obo with two helicopters and a light reconnaissance aircraft. Post has received conflicting reports about the level of coordination between the forces, but tends to believe that the better armed and trained UPDF is likely acting in minimal coordination with the FACA; however, a joint FACA-UPDF operation on August 27, 2009 resulted in seven LRA fatalities. According to the French DATT and the newly appointed head of the Presidential Guard, the FACA has placed no restrictions on the number of UPDF allowed on Central African territory. The Chief of Staff of the FACA is reportedly headed to Kampala in early September for direct consultations with the UPDF. ¶4. (SBU) UN contacts fear the current humanitarian response may be insufficient. A current interagency mission is in the area with supplies, mostly nonfood items, meant for 2,500 internally displaced people and refugees. The UN High Commission of BANGUI 00000191 002.2 OF 003 Refugees (UNHCR) has registered 800 Congolese in Mboki and they suspect there are at least 400 in Obo with more arriving each day. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) estimates that there are at least 3,000 to 4,000 IDPs and a maximum of 5,000 IDPs in the area. The World Food Program (WFP) has sent a convoy in the last week with enough food to feed 2,000 displaced people for two months. Therefore, the UN may have underestimated the scope of the problem by about half. OCHA, which is coordinating the interagency mission, has basic contingency plans in place for up to 40,000 refugees and displaced people in the Obo area, but these plans have not been stress tested. OCHA contacts told Post that they will have a better of view of their options when the interagency team returns at the start of September. ¶5. (U) The various UN agencies have identified three pressing needs: -- More funding for Humanitarian Air Services (UNHAS) which will help bring additional aid to Obo and Birao (Ref B). While there is currently one plane available, OCHA and WFP are seeking an additional plane dedicated to providing supplies. -- Ground transport based in Obo such as pickup trucks and personnel transport. Until now, there has been very little humanitarian activity (only one significant NGO was active) and there is very little capacity to move the goods needed. This means that vehicles must be dispatched from Bangui for every visit. Transit time is five to seven days, each way, depending on rains, rivers, and bridges. -- Funds to set up a base of operations in the area. The UN is working out of temporary lodgings and want something more stable. ¶6. (SBU) With only about 300 troops, the UN Mission in Chad and Central Africa (MINURCAT) has no mandate or capacity to leave Birao in the Northeast. Furthermore, the Obo area is well beyond their helicopter medevac range. The Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR (MICOPAX) does not have the funding or will to extend their mission to the Southeast. They have shown scant inclination to engage in military operations in their own areas of operation and there are no plans to extend their limited capacities to Obo. ¶7. (SBU) Very little, if anything, should be expected from the CARG, even if the LRA re-groups in the CAR. Obo is simply too far, too sparsely populated and too removed from politics in Bangui to illicit a major response. Though President Bozize hopes to celebrate World Food Day in Obo in October 2009, Post believes this is not a signal of political will but more of a show to the rest of the country that Bozize's influence encompasses the entirety of the country. If instability persists, he would, without hesitation, cancel the plans. ¶8. (SBU) The French Embassy is the only other major international player outside of the UN that is in any way engaged with this issue (NOTE: The Russians and the Chinese do not engage on internal affairs and the CEMAC ambassadors lack the means and capacity to act. END NOTE). The French response has been limited to military to military information sharing. They do not consider that the southeast is connected enough to CAR politics nor do they think the threat posed by the LRA is significant at this point. The French DATT did say, though, that BANGUI 00000191 003.2 OF 003 a ``significant presence'' of the LRA on Central African territory would force them to reassess the situation, but it is worth noting that they continually denied the presence of the LRA in the CAR for months, even after the Ambassador's extended trip in 2008 (Ref C). ¶9. (SBU) COMMENT: The continued presence of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) around Obo is troubling as it further stresses the abilities of humanitarian actors to respond to the already onerous needs of the CAR. But while the LRA attracts much attention in Washington, it does not in the CAR. This is because the threat posed by the LRA pales when taken in context with the humanitarian needs elsewhere in the CAR. It should be noted that the total population of the region does not exceed 65,000, fewer than the number of CAR refugees already in Chad, for example. Ongoing internal conflicts around Ndele (Ref D), Birao, the lingering displacement of approximately 130,000 people, and the presence of multiple armed groups and road bandits throughout the country are higher priorities for the government and the humanitarian community. END COMMENT. COOK