CATCH 22 ON DISARMAMENT - WHY DDR IS NOT LIKELY TO WORK IN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000157 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C; PARIS FOR KANEDA; LONDON FOR LORD E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR ECON CT SUBJECT: CATCH 22 ON DISARMAMENT - WHY DDR IS NOT LIKELY TO WORK IN THE CAR ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: The international community and the government of the Central African Republic (CARG) have attached much importance to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) as the solution to the Central African Republic's (CAR) long running conflict. This would appear logical - disarm the rebels and reintegrate them back in to a peaceful society. This process, promoted by the United Nations (UN) in the Central African Republic (CAR) has been beset by problems such as the slow roll out of the program, mismanagement of funds by the government (CARG) and difficulty raising funds from the international community. Despite an agreement reached in April that produced a list of rebels to be disarmed and the recent acceptance by the CARG to use money granted by the Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC) for DDR for its expressed purpose, Post fears that observers are placing too much faith in the process as a solution to the CAR's ills. Until the CARG has the means, and more importantly, the will, to fill the vacuum left behind by disarmed groups, both on a security and economic front, the effort is unlikely to accomplish its goals. And beyond that is the overarching problem that the CAR is effectively a failed state - there is simply no economy into which former combatants can be "reintegrated." Post fears that the DDR process will merely give a small number of people some money to live on for a few months before they take up arms again. This telegram provides a glimpse of the reality on the ground. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) The town of Kaga Bandoro is a microcosm for the pitfalls DDR. Devastated economically by the passage of then rebel leader Francois Bozize's army in 2003, Kaga Bandoro suffers from the presence of two armed groups who effectively end the control of the CARG some five kilometers from the city center. The Army for the Restoration of the Republic and Democracy (APRD),the traditional rebel group of the region and signatory to the DDR process lives in an uneasy coexistence with a heavily armed group of Chadian bandits led by a man named Baba Lade. With a tiny gendarmerie presence, the town is at the mercy of those groups, though MICOPAX, a regional peacekeeping body is able to assure a modicum of stability if not order (Note: POLOFF witnessed a boy beaten by bandits being inspected by the commander of the MICOPAX detachment as the Gendarmes were powerless to respond). The local Prefect, akin to a governor, is so reduced in authority that he is often limited to being a spectator (NOTE: After a flair up in violence between Lade and the APRD, the Prefect provided good offices for this peace conference in June 2009) ¶3. (SBU) The realities of life in the CAR create a dangerous Catch-22 which renders disarmament very unlikely: -- The APRD, and groups like it, cannot disarm until general instability ceases. In many parts of the north, they are, ironically, the only elements of order. If they were to disarm, local and trans-border groups like Baba Lade's, who fund themselves through road banditry and illegal ``taxation'' of livestock, will run rampant. Only a capable and motivated Central African Army (FACA),gendarme, and police force can provide a better alternative than the rebels. The people of the north have suffered the civil war of 2003 that devastated all economic life in northern CAR and then a dangerous rebellion that has touched most parts of the country above the 6th parallel. With some CARG support, many towns have produced stout self defense militias to counter the threat posed by the rebels and bandits. These groups are appear to be effective, but they cannot replace a real police/military force, backed up by a functional system of justice. -- Because the DDR project focuses on those who have taken up weapons against the CARG and promises economic development ``later'', there is a dangerous possibility of new rebel groups forming to milk the system if they become impatient with the pace of development. Embassy Bangui reported previously that people are currently seeking to be recognized as rebels so they may be demobilized (Bangui 124). There is also the prospect that score settling and revenge killings may cause disarming rebels to be attacked, thus pushing them to rearm. ¶4. (SBU) COMMENT: The fundamental problem of the CAR is at BANGUI 00000157 002 OF 002 least thirty years of weak and corrupt governments that have failed (if they even attempted) to forge a national consensus and develop the country. Rebel groups are merely one symptom of the disease of poor governance - not the root cause of instability. Similarly, cross border adventures into the CAR by Chadians and Sudanese are not symptoms of the spread of the Chad/Sudan/Darfur conflict. Most Chadians and Sudanese who are active in the CAR are here as opportunists or at the invitation of various CAR factions looking for experienced help. ¶5. (SBU) COMMENT: The position of President Bozize, as expressed most directly to the United Nations in the person of Undersecretary for Political Affairs Pascoe and newly arrived Special Representative of the Secretary General Saleh-Work Zwede, (PROTECT BOTH) is that: -- DDR is the answer to the CAR's problems, but, -- DDR is the responsibility of the International community, not the CARG. Not surprisingly, both told the Ambassador that they were surprised by this response and attitude. Thus one ended their visit, and one begins their mission very, very disappointed by the CARG's position. (Zwede, in particular, seemed shaken.) More specifically, Bozize insists that he has done all he need do: -- He held the "Dialogue Politique Inclusive" (Inclusive National Political Dialogue) -- He formed a "Government of National Unity." -- He agreed to allow the CEMAC funds to be used for DDR. No local observer accepts any of these efforts at face value. (Post reporting has already outlined the weakness of all of these efforts.) ¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: Thus short term infusion of cash may have some benefits, but the final R - Reintegration- cannot be left solely to the international community as there will simply never be enough donor money to fix this country. The DDR process is not the answer to ills of the CAR except as part of a larger CARG commitment to national reconciliation, economic recovery, and poverty reduction; a commitment that the CARG has, thus far, shown no willingness to make. END COMMENT COOK