Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGUI155
2009-07-08 11:49:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Bangui
Cable title:  

NDELE REMAINS THE LOCUS OF THE THREATS TO THE CARG

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT 
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VZCZCXRO5941
PP RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0155/01 1891149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 081149Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0980
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0007
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0286
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0296
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0197
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0141
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0141
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0476
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0462
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0128
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0458
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1236
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000155 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/C
USUN FOR DMUERS
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: NDELE REMAINS THE LOCUS OF THE THREATS TO THE CARG

REF: A. (09 BANGUI 152)

B. (09 N'DJAMENA 247).

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000155 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C USUN FOR DMUERS PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT SUBJECT: NDELE REMAINS THE LOCUS OF THE THREATS TO THE CARG REF: A. (09 BANGUI 152) ¶B. (09 N'DJAMENA 247). ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ndele, Central African Republic (CAR) remains the locus of a serious threat to Central African political stability. While the Northeast and west maintain their violent potential, the Patriotic Convention for Justice and Peace (CPJP)goes into the rainy season increasingly political, reinforced by the dissident elements of the Democratic Front for the Central African People (FDPC),and unengaged politically by the Central African Government (CARG). As such, unless they are forcefully engaged in the coming months, the CPJP may indeed pose the single greatest threat to the CARG. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (SBU) As noted in previous reporting, the CPJP remains a largely unknown entity. The CPJP was originally said to be made up of UFDR members of the Rounga tribe who broke with the Goula dominated UFDR after being expelled from the diamond fields near Sam Ouandja. The Sultan/Mayor of Ndele (Consider source: The Sultan is distrusted by Bangui as a Rounga sympathizer.) maintains that there are former elements of the Presidential Guard in the CPJP, but is not clear to us if this means that they are political leaders or merely military advisors/trainers. Former Minister of Defense, Charles Massi has declared himself to be the spokesman of the group, but as his home is in the extreme west of the country and he has no previous engagement in the Ndele region, his role and importance are not clear In any case, while Massi is currently languishing in a Chadian jail as of early June 2009, the CPJP remains very active. Political commentators from the Birao area tell us that this group is not connected in any way with the Kara/Gouala conflict in the Birao area. ¶3. (SBU) On June 13, the Central African Army (FACA) was ambushed by the CPJP on the road from Ndele to the Chadian border and lost at least three soldiers. (Independent, unconfirmed reports claim that the FACA left several additional dead on the field.) While an immediate move towards Ndele is always possible, a move towards Bangui, grows increasingly remote by the day as the roads turn into muddy quagmires with the rains. Also, as of now, the CPJP do not appear to have the motorized capacity to set off on the road to Bangui. They do not a
ppear to have the political interest either. Thus, they will mostly likely settle for a compromise solution, such as renewed access to diamond mines taken by the Goula of the Union of United of Democratic Forces (UFDR) after the CARG/UFDR accords of 2007. Yet, the time off during the rainy season could give them occasion to conjure up bigger dreams. While Post believes the former to be most likely, the later scenario cannot be counted out. ¶4. (SBU) Multiple sources have informed Post that despite a peace deal agreed to between Abdoulaye Miskine of the FDPC and the CARG, dissident members of his group have set out to join the CPJP. Post estimates that ten to fifty members of the FDPC headed out on foot to Ndele in the last month to join the CPJP, probably as guns for hire, though possibly for ideological reasons. The later would be troubling and lend credence to the theory that the CPJP are not hoodlums looking to be demobilized and paid (Bangui 124) but may instead feel they have legitimate grievances against the CARG - making them all the more dangerous. Thus, while President Bozize has scored a reasonable political victory in decommissioning the troublesome FDPC, not all of Miskine's soldiers will go quietly and the CPJP, already the major menace to the CARG, may be stronger for it. ¶5. (SBU) A meeting with the French Defense Attache (PROTECT) on June 23, 2009 brought to light a development which, if true, could change the entire balance of power in the CAR. On June 7, the ANT (Chadian Army) stopped two, of what is thought to have been eight to ten, pickups carrying 120 AK-47s, two .50 caliber machine guns, ammunition, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. AmEmbassy N'djamena was briefed by the Chad Government on the seizure and was told that the arms were destined for Chadian rebels (09 N'Djamena 247). But French INTEL now says that half of the weaponry was destined for the CAR (being that they were stopped in Bahr Keita, Chad, after crossing Central African BANGUI 00000155 002 OF 002 territory north of Birao, it seems logical that the weapons are heading for the CPJP north of Ndele). The DATT was very perturbed by this possibility because he said that there are now not more than 120 AK-47's between the rebels in Birao and North of Ndele and that this would signal a surge in combat capability. He further speculated that the financing and origin of the arms were probably two pronged - some money coming from Khartoum, but he also suspects that the Chadian rebels are trying to create instability in both northern CAR and southern Chad to ease ANT pressure upon them in Eastern Chad. Furthermore the ethnicities of the region cross the CAR/Chad border and therefore the CPJP may be receiving aid due to clan ties as well. ¶6. (SBU) On June 13 the Ambassador met with Minister of Equipment Samba-Panza, the ``Ministre Resident'' of the Ndele region, prior to the latter's visit to Ndele. Ambassador shared observations from his own trip to the region in February and asked for the Minister's views upon his return. On July 2, Samba Panza told the Ambassador and visiting CAR Desk Officer that: -- He had warned the local FACA to cease physical threats against the Sultan. He stressed that there must be no incidents during or after his visit (Note: The FACA are going house to house in the Rounga neighborhoods searching for arms and arresting ``rebels''). -- The Sultan has applied to President Bozize for permission to come to Bangui and discuss the situation. Samba-Panza is generally well regarded and was Minstre Resident for Ndele once before. His visit could provide the CARG with an opening for political engagement. He told the Ambassador that he believes that the President will meet the Sultan. ¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: Recently, a very well informed Embassy source said he has solid evidence of ANT/FACA cooperation between Golongoso and Nanga, northwest of Ndele. Another source said there has been an uptick of Chadian Gendarmerie presence along the border north of Ndele. This is promising for the CARG if true, for there have been other signs that Bozize has recognized the threats to him and is trying to act: -- A mediation team sent to Birao (09 Bangui 152). -- The peace accord concluded with Miskine and the FDPC. -- A shakeup in the Presidential Guard with a respected colonel taking its reins. But Post still believes that Bozize faces in the CPJP a much tougher challenge than he can solve militarily. He must become an honest arbiter between the troublesome ethnicities and groups of the North - from the APRD to the UFDR - and deliver to them not only short term infusions of cash through demobilization efforts but long term development and leadership. Post has yet to see this level of statesmanship from the president and though he has made promising gambits, further optimism is not yet merited. END SUMMARY. COOK

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