THE WEAKEST LINK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGUI 000118 SENSITIVE SIPDIS DEPT FOR AF/C PARIS FOR RKANEDA LONDON FOR PLORD AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL,CKOCH E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT SUBJECT: THE WEAKEST LINK ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: With an abundance of arable land, rainfall, a plethora of minerals and wildlife and a low population, the Central African Republic (CAR) should be a wealthy nation. However, despite this potential, most of its population lives in increasing poverty. Male life expectancy declines six months every year and recently the CAR dropped from number 172 to 177 out of 178 on the Human Development scale and now has a GDP per capita of $456. Why is the CAR declining at a time when so many other African states are advancing? While factors such as the CAR's landlocked location and low levels of assistance are certainly important, the fundamental problem is that President Francois Bozize, and his government (CARG),have never made national development and good governance a priority. He appears instead to concentrate on schemes to enrich himself, his family, and his clan; schemes which not only retard development, but actively destroy commercial enterprises essential to the economy. Efforts by AmEmbassy Bangui, the European Commission, and even the very influential French to persuade Bozize to focus his government on development and good governance have been ignored or actively rebuffed. One reason for Bozize's lack of concern may well be a belief that no matter what he does, the French will always intervene, militarily if necessary, to save his government, as they did at Birao and Bria in early 2007. As reported SEPTEL we do not believe that this is a valid assumption on his part. At best, our best efforts notwithstanding, we may be unable to achieve our foreign policy goals in the CAR. At worst, we could well see the Bozize government collapse in the coming year. END SUMMARY -------------- Anatomy of a Hollow State -------------- 2.(SBU) The Central African Republic is dangerously close to being a failed state. Though named a ``ghost state'' in an International Crisis Group report in 2007, the CAR is perhaps better classified as a ``hollow state''. On the surface, the CARG appears to function and can credibly claim that its problems are the result of demographics, AIDS, historic poverty, and isolation. But this is misleading. While it has a structure that is able to feign functionality and has agents in most parts of the country, few of these agents actually conduct the business of the state or achieve any results. It has executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and a military, but outside of disparate geographic pockets, its control is exceedingly limited. The CAR is a country defined by its borders on the map and not by effective state control of its territory. ¶3. (SBU) In Bangui, the government provides less than the bare minimum of services. Most roads are unpaved and the few paved ones are pock marked with potholes. The wealthy parts of Bangui suffer from prolonged power outages (and damaging surges) and only intermittent running water while poorer parts of town have gone months without water and electricity. (NOTE: This is one reason that Post recently built wells at the CMR and the Chancery. The well at the chancery has markedly reduced the levels of Locally Engaged Staff (LES) absenteeism due to gastrointestinal illness.) Violent crime, sometimes committed by government employees, particularly the Presidential Guard, is disturbingly common throughout the city. ¶4. (SBU) Outside of Bangui, things are worse. Only the largest towns have any running water or electricity at all. Medical care is almost unavailable - it is estimated that there are fewer than 300 doctors practicing western medicine in the country and fewer than thirty outside of Bangui. Worse, many of the doctors in Bangui are no longer practicing medicine. Ironically, armed rebel bands provide the only real security and governance in almost half the country. -------------- Not For a Lack of Support -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Despite claims by some in the CARG to the contrary, the international community is deeply engaged in promoting development in the CAR. Examples include: BANGUI 00000118 002 OF 003 -- Many international/national non-governmental organizations (NGO) actively engaged in humanitarian and developmental projects, -- European Commission funded infrastructure projects, -- French direct budget support and development projects. (NOTE: They have, however, cut back on almost all military programs). -- World Bank and IMF programs. -- International companies attempting to invest in gold and uranium. The point being that the CARG has access to the financing and assistance that it needs. And while it is true that the CAR is not as well known as some other nations in crisis and that aid flows are probably below what is needed to speed development, it is even more true that even a dramatic increase in international assistance will do little to improve the situation until the CARG makes it a priority. ¶6. (SBU) From the top down, a culture of entitlement from foreigners pervades Central African government. The 2009 budget contains no/no provision to pay for the 2010 election preparations because, as many observers, in one way or another, have said, ``they [the Bozize government] know you [the international community] will not allow elections to fail. If they know you are going to pay for it, why should they?'' This sentiment is mirrored in the Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration effort. Though the international community is paying the cost of Demobilization, it is still looking to fund the last D and R, with no money coming from the CARG itself. Bozize has reacted with personal anger at the insistence by the United Nations that the money provided by the CEMAC nations for DDR be used for DDR. (The CARG had argued that this money was intended for general economic support.) As part of security sector reform, the CARG used all of the money granted by the international community to retire, i.e. pay off, a large part of its bloated officer corps. Predictably, the CARG is seeking more funds from the international community to conclude the process. International NGOs, who reentered the CAR in a wave after the violence of 2006, all echo the same frustrated sentiment that sums up the attitude of the international community in the CAR: ``we cannot want it more than the Central Africans do.'' After six years of President Bozize's rule, the international community is increasingly impatient and there are rumblings that perhaps letting the country fail and forcing its population to right itself is the only solution. -------------- The Path Not Taken -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Bozize has thus far been unwilling to take the steps that we, and most other observers, would consider the minimums needed to secure his country and indeed his own hold on power. These would include: -- Upgrading of the military and police to allow him defeat the various rebel factions and assure security, if only in Bangui. It is likely he feels threatened by strong armed forces and thus purposefully keeps the Central African Army (FACA) and the police weak. This in turn means that the CARG can neither defeat rebel forces nor effectively control its territory, leaving it rife with rebels, bandits and poachers. In this context, we note with dismay that the FACA pulled their previously approved candidate for U.S. sponsored training in Rwanda at the last minute with no substitute offered. -- At least enough development projects/public works, such as roads, water, electricity and trade, to send a clear message to the population (again, of Bangui at least) that they live better with Bozize than without him. Instead, President Bozize's kleptocratic government appears BANGUI 00000118 003 OF 003 content to control Bangui, the wood and diamond reserves of the southwest, and isolated regions with diamond, uranium and mineral deposits in the east. From this, they are able to steal enough money to buy large properties in Burkina Faso and South Africa and live comfortably, but not particularly luxuriously, in Bangui. Even recent observers, like the United Nations' Undersecretary General for Political Affairs, former U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, B. Lynn Pascoe, are shocked. He commented to the Ambassadors of the United States, France, and the European Commission his surprise that President Bozize made no mention of development during their conversation on June 9th, ¶2009. Instead, Bozize's entire focus was on DDR and SSR (security sector reform). When Pascoe finally raised the issue of development, Bozize made it clear that he considered development to be the responsibility of the international community, not the CARG. (Interestingly, he made the same comment on human rights; another issue for the international community.) To be fair, this was a brief meeting at the airport, as Bozize was en route to Libreville for the funeral of President Bongo. But it is clear that the United Nations is concerned enough to have briefed Pascoe on this issue and thus he pursued it. And Pascoe's reaction is the same of that of the resident ambassadors: the CARG simply does not see development and governance as a priority. -------------- What We Want, But Are Not Getting -------------- (SBU) COMMENT: A former Prime Minister once commented that, at a minimum, a CAR government had to keep the power and water on in Bangui in order to stay in power - the CARG has not done this for nearly a year. United States goals in the CAR are limited: we seek a stable, developing state in the center of Africa that can resist the spillover of the crises in Chad/Sudan/Congo, does not serve as a base or transit point for neighboring combatants, and has enough peace and prosperity not to aggravate conditions in neighboring states by producing refugees. We are engaged in two efforts: The end of hostilities by rebel groups and encouragement of good governance by the CARG (humanitarian relief, protection of human rights, economic development). These messages are matched with a third; that the CARG should look to the private sector, domestic and international, to fund development. Unfortunately, Post fears that we do not have an engaged partner in the President and the CARG. Worse, the steady decline of all indicators and renewed violence in the North may lead to a tipping point where Bozize's weak governance becomes untenable and leads to further chaos. END COMMENT COOK