AMBASSADOR AND UK COUNTERPART CALL ON PM ABHISIT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000953 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TH SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR AND UK COUNTERPART CALL ON PM ABHISIT AND KEY MILITARY LEADERSHIP AS BANGKOK VIOLENCE SUBSIDES REF: A. BANGKOK 00951 ¶B. BANGKOK 00935 BANGKOK 00000953 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. Summary: (C) The Ambassador and the UK Ambassador paid a joint call on Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva April 14 to discuss the violent protests of the past three days in Pattaya and Bangkok. The Prime Minister stated that order largely had been restored in Bangkok, and United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD, aka "redshirts") had been confined to a space near Government House. Indeed, during the meeting, the PM received word that the UDD had just officially ended its protest. Abhisit outlined his actions over the past several days, emphasizing that his top priority was to maintain order, while, at the same time, assuring that protestors, rights were protected. He stressed that no protestors suffered gunshot wounds, and that live ammunition was not used by security forces, except when fired in the air, or to halt a deadly threat. Army Commander Gen. Anuphong Paochinda, who also attended the meeting, confirmed that this was the policy of the military forces on the street. The PM labeled former Prime Minister Thaksin as "almost a terrorist," given the violence that he incited over the past several days, and stated that the RTG would not enter into any negotiations with him or the UDD on Thaksin,s political and personal demands. Abhisit would, however, offer a dialogue with UDD leaders who were committed to democracy to discuss their grievances in a manner that would help Thailand move forward. Abhisit assured the Ambassadors that the airport would remain open, and that it had been fully protected throughout the crisis. ¶2. Comment: (C) Abhisit does seem to have turned the corner in the past twenty-four hours and regained control over the security of Bangkok and the rest of the nation. Moreover, the dynamic between the Prime Minister and his military leaders was quite good in the meeting, dispelling recent rumors to the contrary. However, both Abhisit and ex-PM Thaksin have suffered significant damage. Thaksin increasingly appears bent solely on vengeance, not democracy, and the havoc that he and his redshirt forces have wreaked in recent days will severely constrain any political or propaganda gains in the near future. Abhisit, on the other hand, will likely be deemed the responsible party for losing control over the Pattaya summit venue and the city of Bangkok. Despite his desire to protect the right of peaceful civil disobedience, he did so at the expense of his responsibility to protect his citizens and foreign guests. Although he likely will recover from this episode much more quickly than Thaksin, Thailand,s regional and international image suffered another severe setback. End Summary. ¶3. (C) The Ambassador and UK Ambassador Quinton Quayle called on Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva April 14 at the First Infantry headquarters in downtown Bangkok. Abhisit was joined by Defense Minister Prawit Wongsuwan, Army Commander Anuphong Paochinda, Army Chief of Staff Prayudh Chan-ocha, and government spokesperson Panithan Wattanayagorn. The Ambassadors thanked the Prime Minister for agreeing to meet with diplomatic representatives during this crisis, and offered condolences on the injuries and deaths suffered by Thais. They noted that the damage to Thailand internally, as well as to its international reputation, was considerable, and asked what Abhisit,s plans were to deal with the fallout from the violence and move the country forward. THE PLAN: DO NO HARM -------------- ¶4. (C) Abhsit described the days leading up to the violence at Pattaya. Initially, the RTG tried to manage the protests in a manner that would protect the right of peaceful assembly and expression. Through April 8, that policy worked. On April 9, however, the redshirts started to become violent. The PM said he and his team felt that if they took forceful action in response to that violence, though, it would BANGKOK 00000953 002.2 OF 003 precipitate more redshirt violence and affect the April 11 ASEAN summit. The decision was that patience was the best way to deal with the protesters. Obviously, Abhisit said, this did not work in the end and the leaders had to be evacuated from the Pattaya summit venue. The critical mistake in the chain of events was that the policy allowed the redshirts to make it all the way to the hotel. (Note: At this point in the discussion, Abhisit and his military team all shook their heads in disappointment with the police inaction.) Moreover, security forces were not able to take strong action to round up the protest leaders in Pattaya until all of the leaders were evacuated. Given that the last leader did not depart until 1900, that gave the redshirts ample time to escape. ¶5. (C) Abhisit stated that he issued his emergency decree for the Bangkok area with great reluctance, in part because such decrees go against his principles, and in part because emergency decrees were used so often in the past year in Thailand that they had little effect anymore. Indeed, he noted, as soon as he issued his emergency decree in Bangkok, his car was mobbed by violent redshirts. Moreover, the redshirts increasingly had transformed from a group advocating their views on democracy to a mob that was bent solely on violence and vengeance on behalf of ex-PM Thaksin. Abhisit asserted that UDD leaders were offering during their speeches on stage bounties for the murders of the Prime Minister and other key officials. He described two groups of UDD protesters, one that was legitimately pro-democracy, and one that was composed of "racketeers, gangsters and thugs" who love violence, "particularly when they can get paid for it by Thaksin." He stated that the Royal Thai Army (RTA) had done an excellent job over the past two days of quelling the violence in an appropriate manner. Nodding at Gen. Anuphong, he stated that he was "grateful" for the military,s assistance. The PM stated that there were currently only one thousand redshirts outside Government House. (During our conversation, in fact, the PM received word that the UDD had ended its protest.) Gen. Anupong stated that there were now 49 battalions (about 25,000 troops) on the streets. These were half battalions, since much of the equipment was not needed in support of an emergency decree. ¶6. (C) I asked what he thought Thaksin,s motivations were in inciting these protests. Abhisit responded that Thaksin likely believed his own press, and the analysis of much of the international media, that the majority of the country still supported him. After the number of redshirt supporters rapidly dwindled from one hundred thousand on April 8 to only twenty thousand the following day, and no one in Thaksin,s base in the North and Northeast rose up in numbers, it was clear that he could not sustain grassroots support. In that instance, Thaksin switched his tactics to promoting violence, with the hope that either Abhisit would have to step down because he could no longer govern, or the military would stage a coup. Abhisit and Anupong both laughed at this notion, and stated that there was no intention by the military to do so. Abhisit stated that there now could be no talks with Thaksin, and that he hoped Interpol would help return him to Thailand. He noted that he considered Thaksin "almost a terrorist," and was "sickened" by him. He found it reprehensible that networks like CNN would continually interview him after his violent movement. "It,s like interviewing Bin Laden." The PM stated that he was willing to move forward and hold earnest discussions with UDD supporters who are non-violent and advocate democracy, but that he would not negotiate with Thaksin or his supporters whose only goal is to return Thaksin to power. ARMY NOT USING LIVE AMMUNITION TO DISPERSE CROWDS -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) The UK Ambassador asked if BBC reports about the RTA using live ammunition with the protesters was correct. The Prime Minister said that the RTA was not using live rounds, except to fire in the air. Gen. Anupong elaborated that although the RTA can use live ammunition only to fire into BANGKOK 00000953 003.2 OF 003 the air on rare occasions, it also had to use it on one other occasion when the UDD was driving a bus straight at the soldiers with an intent to use it as a deadly weapon. Abhisit noted that there were one hundred and ten casualties. Of those, seventy were redshirts, and forty were government officials and security forces. Those who sustained gunshot wounds were all among the forty on the government side. No protesters had sustained any gunshot wounds. This indicated that the government was using appropriate force, and that the redshirts were very well armed. There were two deaths, but that was the result of a day-long simmering dispute between the redshirts and shopkeepers in a district near the main protest venue. AIRPORT SAFE -------------- ¶8. (C) The Ambassadors asked for reassurances that the airport remain safe, given the great harm done last year by its closure. The Prime Minister stated clearly that the airport would remain open, and there were sufficient forces to ensure so. He recognized the damage that another airport closure would cause, and would not allow that to happen. CONTENT WITH HIS ACTIONS -------------- ¶9. (C) The UK Ambassador asked why Abhisit could not have defended Pattaya better. The PM stated that his security forces could not have used force to stop the protesters. Given Thailand,s history of political violence, if any of the redshirts had been killed, no matter whether they precipitated the violence or not, his Administration would have been blamed. His only regret was that the police did not hold their line farther away from the summit site. Abhisit stated that "I am confident with what I have done." KING,S HEALTH AND WHERABOUTS -------------- ¶10. (C) Abhisit advised that the King,s health was good these days. He had been bothered recently by some sort of dental problem, but he was fine now. There would be a state visit next month by Laos, and the King would receive them. He added that the King was currently in Bangkok, not Hua Hin. JOHN