THAI FM KASIT'S BURMA VISIT MARCH 22-23 - THAI MFA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 000815 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV BM TH SUBJECT: THAI FM KASIT'S BURMA VISIT MARCH 22-23 - THAI MFA READOUT REF: A. BANGKOK 721 ¶B. BANGKOK 770 ¶C. CHIANG MAI 37 BANGKOK 00000815 001.2 OF 004 Classified By: Political Counselor George P. Kent, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d) SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Summary: Thai Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya visited Burma on March 22-23, meeting with Burmese Prime Minister Thein Sein and Foreign Minister Nyan Win to discuss a wide range of Thai-Burmese bilateral issues (ref A). MFA Burma deskoff Jirusaya Birananda, notetaker for both meetings, gave us an informal readout March 27. Kasit discussed Thailand's general approach toward promoting political change in Burma, including the need for a genuine, inclusive dialogue that involved ethnic groups as well as the democratic opposition. To this end, Kasit proposed facilitating talks between the regime and the Karen National Union (KNU); such a rapprochement would also serve the Thai interest in stabilizing the border region long a source of illegal narcotics, migrants, and diseases. Kasit also raised the Rohingya issue, the possible visit of UN SYG Ban to Burma, pressed for more cooperation on counter narcotics on the Thai-Burmese border, a resolution of the demarcation of the border, and illegal migration. The visit of Kasit's wife and daughter to the Irrawaddy Delta to review assistance efforts was reported in ref B. ¶2. (C) Comment: Having stated rhetorically that the "vested" (personal business) interests of past administrations would have no role in Thai policy towards Burma under the Abhisit administration and having met Burmese exile activists prior to his trip, FM Kasit seems to have used his trip to explore practical ways in which the two governments could cooperate to make progress on specific issues. We believe his offer to facilitate GOB negotiations with the KNU is one of the more interesting initiatives and bears watching; Ambassador will explore the issue in more detail when he meets FM Kasit April ¶6. End Summary and Comment. KASIT'S APPROACH TO DEALING WITH BURMA -------------- ¶3. (C) MFA Burma desk officer Jirusaya Birananda, who accompanied FM Kasit to Burma on March 22-23 and took notes for his meetings with PM Thein Sein and FM Nyan Win, provided a readout of the trip to us March 27. Jirusaya commented that FM Kasit, while waiting prior to departure to Burma, had shared with her his philosophical approach to a country long problematic for Thailand. Different countries face different situations, Kasit stressed, and Thai officials needed to understand four critical elements shaping the landscape in Burma: - Long-standing problems between ethnic groups and the GOB; - Burma's colonial legacy, and its subsequent marginalization; - The challenge of the unity of the country (which Thailand also faced, Kasit noted as an aside); - The "Cold War" between the GOB and the international community, defined by human rights concerns. ¶4. (C) If these four elements could not be resolved, Kasit told Jirusaya, Thailand and the international community could not expect a completely democratic regime in Burma. In any event, at least they would try to push towards that same end goal as an ongoing process, to encourage Burmese focus on the shared goals, and to try to help the Burmese help themselves. DIALOGUE AND THE KNU -------------- ¶5. (C) FM Kasit's offer to facilitate discussions between the junta and the KNU grabbed most of the Thai media headlines. Jirusaya explained that Kasit raised the issue BANGKOK 00000815 002.2 OF 004 with both FM Nyan Win March 22 and PM Thein Sein March 23, based on the premise that, since Thailand advocated an inclusive dialogue for political reform, the armed ethnic groups needed to be a part of the process, not just the democratic opposition. The Thai also saw a link to restarting stalled talks with Aung Sang Suu Kyi (ASSK); if the GOB could start talking again to the KNU and reach some success, perhaps it would be easier to reengage with ASSK and the NLD. Kasit had the impression from talking to both FM Nyan Win and PM Thein Sein that the GOB continued not to understand ASSK or what she wanted and appeared at a loss on how to proceed. ¶6. (C) The long-running struggle between the GOB and KNU negatively affected Thailand through the continued flow of narcotics, communicable diseases, arms, and migrants across the border, Jirusaya noted. Kasit had no intention of "negotiating" with the KNU on the regime's behalf, Jirusaya stressed, but he intended personally to lead the effort to get the parties to a common table. Upon return to Bangkok, Kasit had assigned issue papers and requested interagency briefings. ¶7. (C) General Maung Aye had earlier requested to then Thai Supreme Commander GEN Boonsrang, current Thai Chief of Defense Forces GEN Songkitti, and Royal Thai Army (RTA) Commander Anupong, each of whom made visits to Burma during the past year, that Thailand "monitor" the Thai-Burma border and bring the KNU back to a "legal" presence inside Burma, Jirusaya noted. Kasit followed up with his offer; Jirusaya characterized the GOB as seeming genuinely interested, but she stressed the process needed to be inclusive. The previous Thai effort to broker talks, led by Thai GEN Lertrat in 2003, had ended with the removal of Burmese Military Intelligence Chief Khin Nyunt, she added. ¶8. (C) Jirusaya acknowledged the challenges facing such talks, in terms of interlocutors and positions. Despite FM Nyan Win and PM Thein Sein's apparent willingness for such talks to move forward, the GOB had not named its representative. The Thai were not sure who might best represent the KNU, either, given splits in the KNU after Bo Mya's death. Bo Mya's daughter was on the Central Committee but was not accepted by other KNU figures; the current KNU Supreme Commander was not a member of the Central Committee, but had expressed a willingness to listen to Rangoon without preconditions. The GOB started from the position that the KNU had to give up its arms; the KNU still clung to the notion of an independent state. ¶9. (C) When asked about the RTA order to the KNU to move from its Mae Sot offices in Thailand back into Karen State, Burma (ref C),Jirusaya acknowledged it had happened but stressed that the RTG would allow KNU members who were either too old or facing health issues to remain in Thailand. According to RTG intelligence, the KNU had acquiesced since they still controlled some territory inside Burma. The KNU was playing a weak hand, especially after the death of KNU leader Bo Mya and the assassination of his successor; the KNU realized the current chance for talks might be the last opportunity. ROHINGYA -------------- ¶10. (C) Kasit's discussions on the Rohingya issue in Burma stuck to bilateral elements and did not touch on the Bali process, Jirusaya stated. FM Kasit expressed appreciation to the GOB for its pledge at the ASEAN summit to supply statistics on "Bengalis in northern Rakhine State" and asked those be provided as soon as possible. To help stem the flow of Rohingya at sea, Kasit offered RTG assistance to improve the living conditions in Northern Rakhine State, either via UNHCR projects or via the GOB. The RTG also suggested an exchange of intelligence on suspected smuggling rings involved in the Rohingya movements, since Kasit could not believe the small boats which reached Thailand in December could have crossed the open Bay of Bengal without assistance; the GOB responded positively. ¶11. (C) ASEAN countries, including Thailand, had BANGKOK 00000815 003.2 OF 004 accommodated the GOB preference for using the term "Bengali" to refer to the Rohingya during ASEAN FM discussions February 27, Jirusaya noted, because Kasit and others felt that what was important was holding Burma to a commitment that the people had the right to claim residency. Kasit had traveled to Ranong personally to talk to the 78 Rohingya held by Thai authorities and was surprised when five individuals acknowledged they had come from Bangladesh, not Burma. Jirusaya stressed that that the identification of Rohingya migrants' area of origin was an important issue for the RTG, because they could not be sent back until their origins were determined. ENCOURAGING COOPERATION WITH THE UN/BAN'S TRIP -------------- - ¶12. (C) FM Kasit encouraged the GOB to cooperate fully with the UN, Jirusaya said. Kasit also stated Thai opposition to linking UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's appearance at the upcoming ASEAN Plus Summit meetings in Pattaya on April 12 to a potential trip to Burma. GOB officials indicated to Kasit that they were willing to receive Ban but not on the days he had requested, since it would coincide with the Burmese New Year holiday of Thinchian (equivalent to Thai Songkhran). Most GOB officials, including General Than Shwe, would be unavailable to meet with Ban that week, due to travel to far-flung provinces. Jirusaya said that the GOB did not indicate to Kasit any alternative dates for Ban. NARCOTICS, BORDER DEMARCATION -------------- ¶13. (C) Thailand was increasingly worried about narcotics production in Burma, which had soared in the past two years, Jirusaya explained. GOB officials promised to cooperate according to their national plan. The Thai have a long-standing offer to provide an alternative development project from the Doi Tung Foundation, but the site in southern Shan State selected by the Burmese continues to be affected by armed conflict and is not safe. The GOB offered to find an alternative site. When asked whether the Burmese had offered to combat methamphetamine flows controlled by the Wa, Jirusaya said no. ¶14. (SBU) Kasit had proposed restarting border demarcation; of the 2400 km Thai-Burma border, only 57 km have been demarcated. The Thai encouraged small practical steps through restarting efforts in the Joint Boundary Commission (JBC). The GOB expressed a willingness to cooperate, but no date has been set. DEMOCRACY IN ACTION NEXT DOOR - WORTH EMULATING? -------------- --- ¶15. (C) In what was undoubtedly the most unexpected exchange, PM Thein Sein told Kasit that he had watched a broadcast of the Thai no-confidence debate that had taken place in the Thai parliament the previous week (note: the debate was carried live on many Thai TV stations. End note). Thein Sein said that he appreciated and admired PM Abhisit's performance, and was confident Abhisit's government would be around for a while. Thein Sein also said that the GOB would try to improve the standard of living of Burmese citizens, after hearing an explanation of the Abhisit government's plan to distribute 2000 baht and increase assistance to the elderly as part of the anti-recession stimulus package. ¶16. (C) Jirusaya concluded that Thailand could play a helpful role in trying to help Burmese officials understand more about the reality of the "outside world." Human resource development could be key in this regard, through training opportunities and education. Mentioning a Japanese initiative to bring Burmese election officials to observe a local Japanese election, Jirusaya suggested that if other countries helped expose Burmese officials to such opportunities, it could help push Burma in the right direction. It was clear that the 2010 election process would not solve all of Burma's problems, but a shift from direct military rule might offer some opportunities for representatives from outside the military to participate in governance, she suggested. This would represent not an end, BANGKOK 00000815 004.2 OF 004 but a starting point to move towards a parliamentary system that would be more inclusive of diverse political voices, especially those of ethnic minorities. JOHN