ENGAGING THAI OFFICIALS ON LAO HMONG AND BILATERAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000650 NOFORN SIPDIS GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019 TAGS: PREL PREF PINS TH LA SUBJECT: ENGAGING THAI OFFICIALS ON LAO HMONG AND BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH LAOS BANGKOK 00000650 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: AMB Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador John and U.S. Ambassador to Laos Ravic Huso met with Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul March 4 on the disposition of Lao Hmong currently in custody in Thailand; Ambassador Huso separately met Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) Chief of Joint Staff General Ratchakrit Kanchanawat and RTARF Border Division chief LTG Niphat Thonglek on the same issue. Virasakdi rejected the prospect of UNHCR becoming involved in the screening of Lao Hmong; LTG Niphat seemed to welcome International Organization of Migration(IOM) involvement in returns to Laos. Ambassador Huso's Thai interlocutors noted that the Hmong insurgency in Laos continued, without Thai support. Ambassador Huso also engaged MFA Director General of the East Asian Affairs Division Anuson Chinvanno on a wide range of U.S.-Lao and Thai-Lao issues, including the expansion of health projects, accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO),Lao Hmong issues, and Thailand,s role in development projects and infrastructure. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: The Thai and Lao positions on the Hmong at the Huay Nam Khao camp in Petchabun appear closely coordinated. Both Bangkok and Vientiane are focused on the "pull factor" that they fear would accompany any resettlement of Hmong directly from Thailand to a third country. Both capitals also appear to believe that their current policies are resulting in an acceptable, although slow rate of "voluntary" returns achieved through a combination of financial incentives and pressure tactics. A recent worrisome Thai tactic is to arrest individuals for petty crimes and violations who may then be involuntarily repatriated. Once the process moves closer to the end-game and the population of Huay Nam Khao is reduced significantly, the Thai may be more willing to allow for international access and screening of the remaining Hmong. An indication that the Thai may be preparing for that day would be whether MFA follows through and provides us with their "screened-in" list, as PermSec Virasakdi agreed to do. That list could give us some basis for assessing how many potentially eligible asylum-seekers are actually in the camp, as well as other useful data in deciding on next steps. In the interim, both Embassies Bangkok and Vientiane will continue to press for international access, transparency and safe and humane treatment of the Hmong. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. Lao Hmong: Engaging the Thai MFA... -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassadors John and Huso, accompanied by RefCoord, discussed the importance of increased transparency in Laos for Lao Hmong returnees from Thailand with MFA PermSec Virasakdi Futrakul March 4. Huso noted that the GOL has allowed diplomatic missions (including UNHCR) to visit Phak Lak, a village set up to receive returnees from the Thai Army camp in Petchabun, northern Thailand. Virasakdi responded that the GOL was sending an official with extensive experience on Hmong issues to head their diplomatic mission in Geneva, and that the Thai MFA had encouraged greater GOL openness to assuage international community concerns. ¶4. (C) According to Virasakdi, the GOL had recently modified its stance on third country resettlement of the Lao Hmong. Until late 2008, the Lao Army (described by Virasakdi as "tough guys to deal with" and "paranoid") was against any form of third country resettlement of the Lao Hmong in Petchabun. Civilian GOL policymakers were eventually able to persuade the army to accept the concept of resettlement -- but only once the Hmong had returned to Laos. Virasakdi suggested the best solution "is to take all the remaining Hmong in Laos" for U.S. resettlement. ¶5. (C) Ambassador Huso clarified that the GOL was not, in fact, prepared to allow a refugee resettlement program in Laos, but envisioned a family-reunification immigration program instead. He stressed that from the U.S. perspective, the issue was not a possible future resettlement program for BANGKOK 00000650 002.2 OF 003 Hmong in Laos. The key issue was international access to the Petchabun population to determine who might have a legitimate fear of persecution if returned to Laos. Virasakdi asserted that "if there is a well-founded claim of persecution, we don't send the Hmong back." ¶6. (C) Ambassador Huso requested that the RTG provide an "informal" list of those in Petchabun found by the internal RTG screening to face danger if returned to Laos; Virasakdi promised to forward the request to the National Security Council and RTARF. (Note: there has been no follow-up on an October 2008 promise by RTARF Chief of Staff Ratchakrit to provide such a list.) Virasakdi rejected any role by UNHCR in screening the Lao Hmong, stating he was still "quite angry" that in 2006 a smaller group of Lao Hmong (many of whom are now in an immigration jail in Nong Khai) had received refugee status recognition by the UN agency. "We told them they have no mandate with the Lao Hmong!" ¶7. (C) MFA Director General for East Asia Anuson Chinvanno separately told Amb. Huso that the RTG needed to be able to determine whether the Hmong were refugees or economic migrants. Anuson explained that the RTG has respected humanitarian principles since 1975, and that Thailand,s track record has been clear regarding this point. He stated that Thailand,s screening process had shown that most of the Hmong were economic migrants and not refugees. Anuson commented that the Hmong issue needed to be settled once and for all to prevent a continuous flow into Thailand of Hmong seeking third country resettlement. ¶8. (C) Ambassador Huso reiterated the U.S. position that any Lao Hmong repatriation should be as transparent as possible. He stated that thus far there was no evidence that the Lao Hmong had been mistreated or harmed once back in Laos, but the USG would like broader access to returnees in Laos, as well as more international monitoring of the process. Ambassador Huso suggested that one alternative would be via health surveillance, by helping to monitor returnees for contagious diseases. He noted that the U.S. would not necessarily have to have a direct role in this surveillance. Touching on an issue related to why some Lao Hmong have fled Laos for Thailand in the past, Ambassador Huso noted that the Hmong insurgency in Laos appeared to be dying down. ...and the RTARF -------------- ¶9. (C) RTARF Chief of Joint Staff General Ratchakrit and Border Division chief LTG Niphat (directly responsible for the Lao Hmong return process) described their Lao army counterparts as becoming "bit by bit" more open on the issue. However, Ratchakrit asserted that the GOL would not allow international organizations or NGOs to become involved in any aspect of the repatriation process. Nipat described some of the Lao Hmong as "criminals that the Lao authorities want." He asserted that all Hmong in the Huay Nam Khao camp had to return to Laos and none would be resettled directly from Thailand. ¶10. (C) Unlike previous meetings on the issue, Ratchakrit did not suggest the prospect of U.S. resettlement directly from Petchabun for a small residual group of "CIA fighters" the RTA has apparently identified. In an apparent effort to ease concerns over the return process, Nipat claimed that the IOM was actively involved in assistance and transportation for the returns currently underway. (Note: A similar erroneous claim was made by MFA PermSec Virasakdi. IOM has proposed such a role as a way of providing de facto third party monitoring of the process, but IOM confirmed to us after the meeting that there has not been a response by the RTG to date.) ¶11. (S/NF) In response to Ambassador Huso's inquiry on the status of the Hmong insurgency in Laos, Ratchakrit stated that the RTARF currently intercepts "many" radio communications from Lao army units warning of resistance activity. No casualty reports had been heard recently, BANGKOK 00000650 003.2 OF 003 suggesting the frequency of actual armed clashes was very low. BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH LAOS -------------- ¶12. (C) Ambassador Huso and DG Anuson also discussed a broad range of U.S.-Lao and Thai-Lao bilateral issues. Ambassador Huso reviewed U.S. involvement in development aid to Laos and noted U.S. encouragement for Laos to enter the WTO, which would enhance trade with the U.S. In response, Anuson explained that when Thailand dealt with Laos, it required patience and achieved only incremental progress. Historical border skirmishes between Thailand and Laos, most significantly in 1988, had been an obstacle to good relations between the two countries. Anuson stated that Thailand's priority was to maintain Laos, confidence in Thailand, especially when Thailand,s government has changed so frequently recently. Anuson stated that Thailand currently had no policy of harboring Lao anti-government groups, and the Lao Government needed to keep hearing this regularly. ¶13. (C) Anuson said that Thailand was currently assisting Laos in infrastructure development; these new projects have helped to develop the GOL's confidence in Thailand. Anuson highlighted Laos, enthusiasm about the new Thanaleng train station rail link, inaugurated March 5, as an example of the Thai,s assistance. Anuson noted that ASEAN had a formal role in many of the internationally-funded development projects in Laos. ¶14. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Huso. JOHN