ENGAGING THAI OFFICIALS ON LAO HMONG AND BILATERAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000650

NOFORN
SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/05/2019
TAGS: PREL PREF PINS TH LA
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THAI OFFICIALS ON LAO HMONG AND BILATERAL
RELATIONS WITH LAOS

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Classified By: AMB Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador John and U.S. Ambassador to
Laos Ravic Huso met with Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA) Permanent Secretary Virasakdi Futrakul March 4 on the
disposition of Lao Hmong currently in custody in Thailand;
Ambassador Huso separately met Royal Thai Armed Forces
(RTARF) Chief of Joint Staff General Ratchakrit Kanchanawat
and RTARF Border Division chief LTG Niphat Thonglek on the
same issue. Virasakdi rejected the prospect of UNHCR
becoming involved in the screening of Lao Hmong; LTG Niphat
seemed to welcome International Organization of
Migration(IOM) involvement in returns to Laos. Ambassador
Huso's Thai interlocutors noted that the Hmong insurgency in
Laos continued, without Thai support. Ambassador Huso also
engaged MFA Director General of the East Asian Affairs
Division Anuson Chinvanno on a wide range of U.S.-Lao and
Thai-Lao issues, including the expansion of health projects,
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO),Lao Hmong
issues, and Thailand,s role in development projects and
infrastructure.


2. (C) COMMENT: The Thai and Lao positions on the Hmong at
the Huay Nam Khao camp in Petchabun appear closely
coordinated. Both Bangkok and Vientiane are focused on the
"pull factor" that they fear would accompany any resettlement
of Hmong directly from Thailand to a third country. Both
capitals also appear to believe that their current policies
are resulting in an acceptable, although slow rate of
"voluntary" returns achieved through a combination of
financial incentives and pressure tactics. A recent
worrisome Thai tactic is to arrest individuals for petty
crimes and violations who may then be involuntarily
repatriated. Once the process moves closer to the end-game
and the population of Huay Nam Khao is reduced significantly,
the Thai may be more willing to allow for international
access and screening of the remaining Hmong. An indication
that the Thai may be preparing for that day would be whether
MFA follows through and provides us with their "screened-in"
list, as PermSec Virasakdi agreed to do. That list could
give us some basis for assessing how many potentially
eligible asylum-seekers are actually in the camp, as well as
other useful data in deciding on next steps. In the interim,
both Embassies Bangkok and Vientiane will continue to press
for international access, transparency and safe and humane
treatment of the Hmong. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

Lao Hmong: Engaging the Thai MFA...
--------------


3. (C) Ambassadors John and Huso, accompanied by RefCoord,
discussed the importance of increased transparency in Laos
for Lao Hmong returnees from Thailand with MFA PermSec
Virasakdi Futrakul March 4. Huso noted that the GOL has
allowed diplomatic missions (including UNHCR) to visit Phak
Lak, a village set up to receive returnees from the Thai Army
camp in Petchabun, northern Thailand. Virasakdi responded
that the GOL was sending an official with extensive
experience on Hmong issues to head their diplomatic mission
in Geneva, and that the Thai MFA had encouraged greater GOL
openness to assuage international community concerns.


4. (C) According to Virasakdi, the GOL had recently modified
its stance on third country resettlement of the Lao Hmong.
Until late 2008, the Lao Army (described by Virasakdi as
"tough guys to deal with" and "paranoid") was against any
form of third country resettlement of the Lao Hmong in
Petchabun. Civilian GOL policymakers were eventually able to
persuade the army to accept the concept of resettlement --
but only once the Hmong had returned to Laos. Virasakdi
suggested the best solution "is to take all the remaining
Hmong in Laos" for U.S. resettlement.


5. (C) Ambassador Huso clarified that the GOL was not, in
fact, prepared to allow a refugee resettlement program in
Laos, but envisioned a family-reunification immigration
program instead. He stressed that from the U.S. perspective,
the issue was not a possible future resettlement program for

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Hmong in Laos. The key issue was international access to the
Petchabun population to determine who might have a legitimate
fear of persecution if returned to Laos. Virasakdi asserted
that "if there is a well-founded claim of persecution, we
don't send the Hmong back."


6. (C) Ambassador Huso requested that the RTG provide an
"informal" list of those in Petchabun found by the internal
RTG screening to face danger if returned to Laos; Virasakdi
promised to forward the request to the National Security
Council and RTARF. (Note: there has been no follow-up on an
October 2008 promise by RTARF Chief of Staff Ratchakrit to
provide such a list.) Virasakdi rejected any role by UNHCR
in screening the Lao Hmong, stating he was still "quite
angry" that in 2006 a smaller group of Lao Hmong (many of
whom are now in an immigration jail in Nong Khai) had
received refugee status recognition by the UN agency. "We
told them they have no mandate with the Lao Hmong!"


7. (C) MFA Director General for East Asia Anuson Chinvanno
separately told Amb. Huso that the RTG needed to be able to
determine whether the Hmong were refugees or economic
migrants. Anuson explained that the RTG has respected
humanitarian principles since 1975, and that Thailand,s
track record has been clear regarding this point. He stated
that Thailand,s screening process had shown that most of the
Hmong were economic migrants and not refugees. Anuson
commented that the Hmong issue needed to be settled once and
for all to prevent a continuous flow into Thailand of Hmong
seeking third country resettlement.


8. (C) Ambassador Huso reiterated the U.S. position that any
Lao Hmong repatriation should be as transparent as possible.
He stated that thus far there was no evidence that the Lao
Hmong had been mistreated or harmed once back in Laos, but
the USG would like broader access to returnees in Laos, as
well as more international monitoring of the process.
Ambassador Huso suggested that one alternative would be via
health surveillance, by helping to monitor returnees for
contagious diseases. He noted that the U.S. would not
necessarily have to have a direct role in this surveillance.
Touching on an issue related to why some Lao Hmong have fled
Laos for Thailand in the past, Ambassador Huso noted that the
Hmong insurgency in Laos appeared to be dying down.

...and the RTARF
--------------


9. (C) RTARF Chief of Joint Staff General Ratchakrit and
Border Division chief LTG Niphat (directly responsible for
the Lao Hmong return process) described their Lao army
counterparts as becoming "bit by bit" more open on the issue.
However, Ratchakrit asserted that the GOL would not allow
international organizations or NGOs to become involved in any
aspect of the repatriation process. Nipat described some of
the Lao Hmong as "criminals that the Lao authorities want."
He asserted that all Hmong in the Huay Nam Khao camp had to
return to Laos and none would be resettled directly from
Thailand.


10. (C) Unlike previous meetings on the issue, Ratchakrit
did not suggest the prospect of U.S. resettlement directly
from Petchabun for a small residual group of "CIA fighters"
the RTA has apparently identified. In an apparent effort to
ease concerns over the return process, Nipat claimed that the
IOM was actively involved in assistance and transportation
for the returns currently underway. (Note: A similar
erroneous claim was made by MFA PermSec Virasakdi. IOM has
proposed such a role as a way of providing de facto third
party monitoring of the process, but IOM confirmed to us
after the meeting that there has not been a response by the
RTG to date.)


11. (S/NF) In response to Ambassador Huso's inquiry on the
status of the Hmong insurgency in Laos, Ratchakrit stated
that the RTARF currently intercepts "many" radio
communications from Lao army units warning of resistance
activity. No casualty reports had been heard recently,

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suggesting the frequency of actual armed clashes was very low.

BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH LAOS
--------------


12. (C) Ambassador Huso and DG Anuson also discussed a
broad range of U.S.-Lao and Thai-Lao bilateral issues.
Ambassador Huso reviewed U.S. involvement in development aid
to Laos and noted U.S. encouragement for Laos to enter the
WTO, which would enhance trade with the U.S. In response,
Anuson explained that when Thailand dealt with Laos, it
required patience and achieved only incremental progress.
Historical border skirmishes between Thailand and Laos, most
significantly in 1988, had been an obstacle to good relations
between the two countries. Anuson stated that Thailand's
priority was to maintain Laos, confidence in Thailand,
especially when Thailand,s government has changed so
frequently recently. Anuson stated that Thailand currently
had no policy of harboring Lao anti-government groups, and
the Lao Government needed to keep hearing this regularly.


13. (C) Anuson said that Thailand was currently assisting
Laos in infrastructure development; these new projects have
helped to develop the GOL's confidence in Thailand. Anuson
highlighted Laos, enthusiasm about the new Thanaleng train
station rail link, inaugurated March 5, as an example of the
Thai,s assistance. Anuson noted that ASEAN had a formal
role in many of the internationally-funded development
projects in Laos.


14. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Huso.
JOHN