THAILAND: A KEY, IF SOMETIMES RELUCTANT, PARTNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 003145 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS AND PRM/ANE, PRM/A GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2019 TAGS: PREF PHUM TH BM SUBJECT: THAILAND: A KEY, IF SOMETIMES RELUCTANT, PARTNER IN REFUGEE AFFAIRS REF: A. BANGKOK 213 (MIL-MIL) ¶B. BANGKOK 706 (LAW ENFORCEMENT) ¶C. BANGKOK 611 (DISEASE RESEARCH) ¶D. BANGKOK 690 (REGIONAL MANAGEMENT PLATFORM) Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, for Reasons 1.4 (b and d.) INTRODUCTION AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Introduction: Thailand is ONE of our closest partners on refugee affairs, having hosted perhaps the largest number of long-term refugees in the world over the past four decades. Over the past thirty-five years, some half-million refugees have moved through Thailand to resettle in third countries, predominantly in the United States; no other nation can make that claim. Nevertheless, Thailand has never signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and has often proven a reluctant partner in providing refuge and facilitating onward passage to willing third countries on the full set of terms we would prefer. The history of vulnerable groups entering Thailand continues due to the poor governance and repressive policies of its neighbors near and occasionally afar, as well as Thailand's reputation for tolerance/lax enforcement; as a result, the Royal Thai Government (RTG) maintains its traditional concerns about being inundated by new inflows of what it calls displaced persons. ¶2. (C) In practice, the RTG makes practical accommodations towards certain vulnerable populations, while other arrivals are formally regarded as illegal migrants with little recourse to international standards of refugee protection. Camp-resident Burmese minorities, currently numbering about 150,000 and in Thailand in large numbers since 1990, are generally not returned to Burma, and the RTG has established an asylum mechanism to consider their cases. The large scale resettlement program of Karen and Karenni Burmese to the U.S. receives Thai support. Other arrivals - North Koreans, Lao Hmong, Rohyinga boat people, politically sensitive Chinese and Vietnamese, and a virtual United Nations of "urban cases" in Bangkok - are all officially subject to detention and deportation, although in practice there are gradations of treatment for each group. Such differences are based on the RTG's weighting of the value of the bilateral relations with the country of origin, and the personalities in charge at the National Security Council (NSC) and Immigration Bureau. Advocacy for non-Burmese groups involves intervention with RTG officials in several different ministries. ¶3. (C) Comment. While there has long been a legal gray zone in Thailand for vulnerable groups, we have generally been able to achieve our objectives over the years working persistently and quietly, often with multiple, simultaneous challenges, from established populations likely to be resettled to time-sensitive dissident/asylum cases. Our advocacy goal on vulnerable groups in Thailand is to encourage basic protections, to include non-refoulement, in line with the 1951 Convention on Refugees, to which the RTG is not a signatory. Thailand agreed to resettlement of the largest group, ethnic minority Burmese, in 2005, thus enabling us to provide the first available durable solution for that static refugee situation. ¶4. (C) Comment, cont: Given the wide range of refugee-related interests in Thailand, we must occasionally balance optimal outcomes in a specific case with our equities in other programs which depend on the same decision-makers and relationships. This dynamic is currently in play as we head to a seeming resolution of the Lao Hmong populations. With the investment of political capital, we can eventually win permission for high-profile individual cases to depart Thailand, including political dissidents from China and Vietnam. This cable is the final of a series which examines crucial operational elements of the broad and deep U.S.-Thai relationship that benefit U.S. interests; previous messages have examined the mil-mil relationship; law enforcement cooperation; health/disease research; and use of Thailand as a regional management hub (Refs A-D). End Introduction and Comment. Ambivalent Attitudes Toward "Refugees" -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Buffeted by the winds from thirty years of armed conflict and near genocide in neighboring countries, Royal Thai Government (RTG) attitudes towards vulnerable groups entering Thailand are informed by a fear of being inundated with new refugee inflows. RTG anxiety and conflicting attitudes towards vulnerable people arriving in Thailand are reflected in the language used by officials. The nine established refugee camps, which have housed over a hundred thousand ethnic minorities from Burma for almost two decades, are officially referred to as "temporary transit centers," and the refugees themselves as "temporarily displaced persons." However, with UNHCR assistance the RTG has established Provincial Admissions Boards (PABs),an asylum mechanism which considers whether individual cases should be allowed to stay in the camps. ¶6. (SBU) RTG attitudes are simpler for the other, smaller vulnerable populations in Thailand - Lao Hmong, North Koreans, Rohingya boat people, Chinese and Vietnamese political dissidents, and people fleeing unrest in Somalia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and elsewhere. All are formally considered as illegal migrants subject to detention and deportation to the last country of embarkation, and no domestic asylum mechanism exists to hear their cases. But even within this non-Burmese universe of refugees, there are gradations of treatment. RTG cooperation is provided to the Republic of Korea in "deporting" arriving North Koreans to Seoul, rather than to China (usually the last country of residence) or to North Korea. Asylum seekers confined in the main IDC in Bangkok are generally not deported if the individuals managed to contact UNHCR and begin the refugee status determination process before their arrest on immigration law violations. The Groups: The Burmese -------------- ¶7. (SBU) The sheer weight of numbers of ethnic minority Burmese entering Thailand, primarily to escape village relocation campaigns by the Burmese military (and associated forced labor),forces practical accommodations on the part of the RTG. About 130,000 are registered with UNHCR and the RTG, but it is thought that some 20-50,000 additional people are in the camps. New arrivals fleeing fighting are not forced to return to Burma. In June, for example, about 2,000 Karen Burmese entered Thailand when attacked by a Burmese government-backed militia and were allowed to remain in a temporary site on Thai soil. ¶8. (SBU) The PABs were established in the late 1990's to review whether arriving ethnic minorities from Burma are "fleeing fighting" and should be allowed to stay in the camps. At UNHCR's urging, "fleeing political violence" has recently been added to the PAB screening criteria, and has begun to be used in practice. In 2004-2005 the PABs formally admitted almost all of the ethnic Burmese minorities in the camps. A second round of PAB screening was completed in four pilot camps in November, and the remaining five camps will be processed in the first half of 2010. An estimated 30,000 or so new refugees will be permitted to stay, partially replacing the 54,000 who have departed for third country resettlement-the great majority to the U.S. Third Country Resettlement for Burmese -------------- ¶9. (SBU) In 2005, the RTG agreed to allow a large-scale third country resettlement program for ethnic minority Burmese. In FY09, 14,300 refugees entered the U.S. from Thailand, ONE of the largest such resettlement programs worldwide. About half of the current population of refugees has expressed interest in US resettlement. Although mildly disappointed that the large scale program has not "emptied" the camps, the RTG continues to support the effort as a measure to ease crowding (and related tensions) in the largest facilities. ¶10. (SBU) The long term solution to the plight of the ethnic Burmese refugees in Thailand is improvement in the human rights situation in Burma. In the interim, donor attention is focused on reducing their dependency on donor aid. Refugees in Thailand are not permitted to work or travel outside the camps, although in practice many in the larger, more accessible camps do so. The RTG has been resistant to attempts to link the major resettlement effort to a policy change allowing limited steps towards self-sufficiency for refugees. We have begun, along with other major donors in the established camps, an advocacy campaign to leverage our substantial investment in the resettlement program to increase the policy space for refugees to work and grow food outside the camps. The Lao Hmong: Petchabun and Nong Khai -------------- 11.(C) RTG policy towards Lao Hmong entering Thailand is formed by the particular history of this group, and the fervent desire to deter new arrivals. Some of the remaining 4,200 Lao Hmong in the army-run facility in Petchabun province were drawn to Thailand by a U.S. resettlement program in 2004-2005 of 15,000 Hmong from a long-established settlement at Wat Tham Krabok. Others are longer-resident, having migrated from Laos in the 1980's and 90's to live with kinship groups of Thai Hmong. Nervous that a new third country resettlement program would draw further numbers from Laos, the National Security Council (NSC) directed that all Lao Hmong should be treated as illegal migrants and returned to Laos. A 2007 MOU with Laos stipulates that the group should be returned by December 30, 2009. ¶12. (C) Actual implementation of the policy for the large Petchabun group is in the hands of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters (RTARF),which treats the issue as ONE of several (including drug and contraband trafficking) addressed in a regular Thai-Lao bilateral border commission. Over the past 18 months, about 2,800 people from Petchabun have been returned by the RTARF to Laos, induced by a combination of monetary incentives and threats of forcible deportation. Recent RTG pronouncements indicate that the remaining population - including some 500-plus identified in an internal screening process in January 2008 as having protection concerns - may well be returned to Laos in the coming weeks. ¶13. (C) A second humanitarian situation is presented by the detention of 158 Lao Hmong (including 87 children) in the small immigration jail at Nong Khai, along the border with Laos. The RTG attempted to deport the group, which has received UNHCR refugee status, in 2006. The forced return was stopped mid-stream after international community objections, and the group has languished in Nong Khai for three years. We have eased the crowding by constructing a temporary day-time rest facility outside the IDC and are funding nurse and teacher visits by IOM. In order to find a solution for this group, we have begun discussing with UNHCR (and other resettlement countries) the possibility of a exceptional, transit-in-Laos mechanism for third country resettlement. The concept rests on the willingness of the refugees to participate, which in turn will depend on the credibility of security guarantees by the Government of Laos during a planned short stay in Laos. Another 267 UNHCR-recognized Lao Hmong refugees live freely in Lopburi province and Bangkok, and their fate complicates any solution for the Nong Khai group. Asia's Boat People: The Rohingya -------------- ¶14. (SBU) The Rohingya, a Muslim minority group historically resident in Burma's Northern Rakhine State along the border with Bangladesh, are a de jure stateless people stripped of even the most basic civil rights by the Burmese regime. For several years, many Rohingya men have set sail in rudimentary vessels from Burma and Bangladesh in an attempt to reach hoped-for employment in Malaysia. The first inhabited islands encountered on the sea route belong to Thailand, and many boats landed there. In November 2008, local military commanders decided to begin pushing back to sea new arrivals as a deterrent. Lacking resources, local civil defense groups (typically local villagers) were given brief crowd control training and charged with rounding up and returning the Rohingya back to sea. ¶15. (SBU) Immediately after the first press reports surfaced of the push-backs in January 2009, we visited the arrival sites, advocating better treatment of the Rohingya boat people with local civilian defense volunteers and Thai military officials. The temporary policy was quickly abandoned, and the inhabitants of the next boat to arrive were turned over to immigration officials for normal processing. UNHCR was given access, and after the death of two of the detainees in a local immigration detention center (IDC) the group was moved to Bangkok's main IDC in August, where they remain. It appears this more humane policy will be followed during the upcoming sailing season (November to May, when seas are calmer.) We do not yet know what the ultimate disposition for this group will be. The North Koreans -------------- ¶16. (C) Reflecting its pragmatic approach to certain vulnerable groups, the RTG permits North Koreans entering Thailand illegally to resettle in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and, in much smaller numbers, in the U.S. The accommodation takes into account the relatively small numbers (1-2,000 per year),concerns regarding overcrowding in Bangkok's main immigration jail, and effective lobbying by the ROK government, an important trade partner and market for Thai labor. The special policy is publicly presented by the RTG as "Koreans being deported to Korea", with geographic distinctions between North and South conveniently blurred. UNHCR is not permitted a protection or refugee status determination role by the RTG. The "deportation" requires that all North Koreans are required to report to immigration detention before they are allowed to depart Thailand. Detention time depends on processing speed, and is currently is about 3-4 weeks for ROK-bound cases. ¶17. (C) U.S.-bound cases fortunate enough to have avoided arrest by Thai police can wait out processing steps in private accommodation or a local NGO shelter, and then enter the IDC when travel-ready to pay the fine and be "deported" via Seoul. For those arrested before U.S. processing is complete, waits in immigration detention can be months-long. After Ambassadorial meetings with the Immigration Commissioner, we are now generally able to gain access for the required U.S. processing steps to be completed. We are working with IOM to improve physical conditions in the IDC's cells, and to provide medical care for the detainees. As of December 13, only six North Korean cases/seven individuals remained in the active U.S pipeline in Thailand. Stricter control along the China-North Korea border, and refugee disenchantment with the longer wait times (compared to the ROK processing) needed for the U.S. resettlement program, appear to be the causes of the decline in numbers. The Political Dissidents (PRC and Vietnam) -------------- ¶18. (C) High-profile political dissidents from Vietnam and China make their way, either alone or more often with the help of advocacy NGOs, to Bangkok in an attempt to gain U.S. resettlement. (Note: Political activists from Burma, found mostly in the town of Mae Sot along the border, are not allowed to resettle unless they are in an established camp. Few enter, as they enjoy far greater freedom of movement and communications outside. End Note.) Vietnamese and Chinese dissidents normally enter Thailand without passport and/or visa, subjecting them to arrest and setting the scene for high-level interventions with RTG policy makers to enable them to depart Thailand. A recent case, involving the family of a prominent Chinese dissident, required the Ambassador's personal intervention with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. ¶19. (C) The procedure for obtaining the exit permit in such cases is deliberately left unclear, and in practice we must make separate, simultaneous representations to the National Security Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Immigration Commissioner. All cases require, at a minimum, payment of a fine for illegal entry into Thailand. Ideally, approvals are received from more than ONE bureaucracy, although ultimately the Immigration Commissioner is the key player: like any refugee, dissidents must pass through immigration departure at the main airport before leaving Thailand for the U.S. The process, which can take several weeks, takes significant investment of political capital on our part. Our requests cannot be repeated too often to avoid the perception that we are organizing an "underground railroad" of politically sensitive cases through Thailand. Low-key discretion without publicity is also key, particularly given Thailand's desire to improve relations with countries it viewed a generation ago as adversaries. The Urban Cases: Bangkok as Asia's Crossroads -------------- ¶20. (SBU) UNHCR currently has 2,000 so-called "urban cases" on its books in Bangkok, a catch-all category which includes Chinese Falun Gong, Pakistanis, Sri Lankans, Khmer Krom, West Africans, and others. All are attracted to Thailand by its status as a regional transportation hub, and its reputation as a center for fraudulent documents and lax law enforcement. The common denominator for urban cases is that many are in immigration detention in Bangkok's main jail, a crowded, dismal facility. Many spend months there, frozen in place by the lack of options for their departure. Access for resettlement waxes and wanes depending on the personal policies of the Immigration Commissioner. Until September 2008, access (and therefore resettlement) was strictly limited. Since then, a new commissioner has proven more flexible, and we receive regular referrals from UNHCR. Access by our other partners in the refugee resettlement program (USCIS, IOM and Overseas Processing Entity) is normally permitted without significant delay. Regional Refugee Work out of the Bangkok platform -------------- -- ¶21. (U) This message has focused on our efforts on refugee protection and resettlement in Thailand, as part of a series of deep and broad operational partnerships forged with Thai counterparts over the past several decades (reftels). In common with many other Mission Thailand sections, the Refugee and Migration Affairs office has a regional role as well. A large refugee resettlement program from Malaysia (over 5,000 people this FY) is managed from Bangkok, and we travel also to Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, and China to assist smaller refugee populations. JOHN