Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK311
2009-02-05 08:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT, FM KASIT

Tags:  PREL PGOV PREF TH 
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VZCZCXRO3445
PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #0311/01 0360814
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050814Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5949
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1371
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6755
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9419
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2100
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000311 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, PRM
NSC FOR PHU; GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT, FM KASIT
ON ROHINGYA

REF: A. BANGKOK 165

B. JAKARTA 176

Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000311 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, PRM NSC FOR PHU; GENEVA FOR RMA E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT, FM KASIT ON ROHINGYA REF: A. BANGKOK 165 ¶B. JAKARTA 176 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador engaged PM Abhisit Vejajjiva during a February 3 AMCHAM dinner and FM Kasit during a February 4 office call on the Thai response to Rohingya boat people from Burma and Bangladesh. Abhisit reiterated that his government, once made aware of the issue, insisted that all Thai officials treat Rohingya humanely, though the RTG considers them economic migrants. In the longer term, Thailand thought UNHCR needed to take the lead on a regional approach, with Burma, Bangladesh, and India the most important players, secondarily Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as Thailand. FM Kasit elaborated on the Thai diplomatic effort, stressed the need for the RTG to ensure security personnel had a better grasp of appropriate/humane procedures, and suggested he would personally stay engaged on the issue, possibly traveling to Ranong to assess relevant factors first hand. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Comment: The most recent revelation of a second boat load of Rohingya to land off of Aceh (ref B) adds fuel to earlier stories of mistreatment at the hands of Thai officials, compounding Abhisit's/RTG challenge - even if the alleged mistreatment predated Abhisit's policy directives. Abhisit and Kasit's comments, including Kasit's expressed interest in traveling to Ranong, are an indication of the high level attention the RTG has devoted to the Rohingya issue since the boat people stories broke in mid-January. DCM and Refcoord will attend a UNHCR Rohingya briefing February 6. End Summary and Comment. Abhisit on Rohingya, asking about Haiti -------------- ¶3. (C) Ambassador sat next to PM Abhisit at the February 3 AMCHAM dinner/DVC, raised the spate of negative publicity the plight of the Rohingya had generated for Thailand in the past several weeks, and asked Abhisit what his policy approach and desired end state would be. Abhisit stressed that humane treatment of the Rohingya was a top priority; as soon as the issue reached his attention after he came to office, he had ensured Thai security officials responded differently. Rohingya arriving in Thai waters were now brought on-shore; those requiring medical care (from beatings the Rohingya
;claimed had occurred at the hands of Burmese naval officials) received it. ¶4. (C) That said, Abhisit reiterated that Thailand considered the Rohingya economic migrants, not refugees. Abhisit suggested there was evidence that organized alien smuggler operations had been involved in the boat people movement and that he had asked Thai authorities to take strong action against such alien smuggler operations. The RTG maintained that the Rohingya who were previously left at sea were provided with food and water sufficient to reach their next/initial intended destination. (Note: ISOC and village defense force volunteers both claimed 10 days' food and water had been provided, see ref A). ¶5. (C) PM Abhisit asked about U.S. policy towards Haitian and Cuban migrants. Ambassador replied that the U.S. did not leave migrants at sea but, in the case of Haitians interdicted at sea, escorted/towed boats back to Haiti; Haitians who reached U.S. shores were processed via U.S. immigration/court procedures. The situation with Cuba was different; those fleeing an oppressive regime (Cuba) as opposed to economic distress (Haiti) were much more likely to be accorded refugee status. Abhisit asked if Haitian authorities cooperated in the returns, stressing that Thailand faced a different situation with Burma. Burma would react hostilely to any Thai ship appearing in a Burmese port attempting to return Rohingya, making a U.S.-Haiti-like approach impossible, Abhisit concluded. ¶6. (C) In the longer term, Abhisit stated that the RTG did not want to see large numbers of Rohingya fleeing to/through Thailand. Thailand felt UNHCR should take the lead in BANGKOK 00000311 002 OF 002 forging a regional approach/solution, first and foremost engaging Burma, Bangladesh, and India as the countries most immediately involved, secondarily Malaysia and Indonesia as the traditional intended destinations of Rohingya boat people, and Thailand as well. (Note: UNHCR has not yet been informed formally that the RTG would like it to take the lead; UNHCR believes affected countries should proceed first, with UNHCR willing to offer advice.) FM Kasit details regional approach -------------- ¶7. (C) FM Kasit reiterated Abhisit's basic themes in a February 4 meeting with Ambassador. Thailand awaited regional country reaction to Thai proposals for a regional approach laid out by MFA PermSec Virasak Futrakul to diplomats from Burma, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia. The MFA had suggested that UNHCR chair a follow-up meeting, to be held preferably in Bangladesh but possibly in Thailand. Kasit suggested there also needed to be better intelligence coordination, particularly with India, which controlled key islands in the Andaman Sea - how was it that more than 1000 Rohingya could board boats and begin weeks-long journeys without notice, he asked. ¶8. (C) Separately, Thailand thought UNHCR in Geneva should host a meeting with potential donor countries, both to help fund processing of the Rohingya who had already fled via boats, but more importantly to address the social and development costs of supporting the Rohingya in Burma as well as the 200,000 in Bangladesh, stated Kasit. A related issue the international community needed to grapple with was how best to handle a large de facto stateless population. ¶9. (C) Kasit also asserted that Thai officials needed to improve operational manuals and procedures for handling unexpected influxes of migrants. Kasit said he had tasked Thai embassies in Europe to explore with host countries how they dealt with migrants coming from North Africa and elsewhere across the Mediterranean; he had also asked the MFA's legal department to work with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) to better understand the Law of the Sea and other relevant legal norms. The RTN already worked with India on joint sea patrols; they clearly needed to increase such activity, including with other partners such as Malaysia (note: recent US-provided training by the U.S. Coast Guard to RTN and Maritime Police personnel focused on maritime interdiction of proliferated items also included a brief on U.S. migrant interdiction procedures in the Caribbean). ¶10. (C) In terms of handling the Rohingya already in Thailand, Kasit endorsed better RTG-UNHCR cooperation, including jointly categorizing the status of the detained Rohingya. Kasit added that the RTG had also provided access to the Rohingya to interested NGOs and the Thai Human Rights Commission, in addition to UNHCR. While reiterating the RTG saw most Rohingya as economic migrants, Kasit did not categorically rule out that some cases might uncover possible persecution - the first time we have heard a ranking Thai official acknowledge the possibility. Kasit also stressed several complicating factors: local Thai in Ranong province were already protesting the possibility of formal "Rohingya camps" being set up, fueled by a reality that 20,000 Rohingya in Thailand were already in "semi-camp" settlements. Kasit said he planned to go to Ranong shortly to explore the situation personally. JOHN

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