AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES THAKSIN AND LAO HMONG WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003018

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, PRM/ANE
GENEVA FOR RMA
NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PREF SMIG TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DISCUSSES THAKSIN AND LAO HMONG WITH
DEPUTY PM

REF: A. BANGKOK 3009 THAKSIN PULLS THE PLUG

B. BANGKOK 3003 AMBASSADOR MEETS THAKSIN,S SISTER

C. BANGKOK 2455 AMBASSDOR MEETS CROWN PRINCE ADVISOR

D. BANGKOK 2260 PALACE OFFICIALS QUASH RUMORS

E. BANGKOK 3015 ABHISIT CANCELS CHIANG MAI TRIP

BANGKOK 00003018 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY/COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) The Ambassador met with Deputy Prime Minister Suthep
Thaugsuban on November 27 to discuss the latest political
developments in Thailand. The Ambassador outlined for Suthep
USG outreach efforts with Thaksin's inner circle and core
"red-shirt" leaders in recent weeks (REF B),noting that we
had consistently stressed the importance of carrying out any
planned protests peacefully, while simultaneously
underscoring the illegitimacy of political gains achieved
through violence. DPM Suthep told the Ambassador that while
the RTG was relieved that Thaksin had decided to call off the
protests scheduled to start November 28, any relative peace
would be short-lived, as Thaksin remained committed to using
protests as a means of pressuring the King to grant him a
royal pardon. The same fundamental political fault lines
were still in place, according to Suthep, and as long as
those remained unaddressed, political tensions would
continue. Suthep worried about the possibility of someone
assassinating Abhsit and asked whether the USG was aware of
red-shirt training camps in Cambodia. On the subject of
reconciliation prospects, Suthep told the Ambassador that
there was no dialogue whatsoever between Thaksin and the
government. According to Suthep, Thaksin had approached the
Privy Council about opening negotiations, but Thaksin's
insistence on a pardon and no jail time was simply
unrealistic.


2. (C) Turning to the subject of Lao Hmong refugees in Nong
Khai and Petchabun, the Ambassador noted that PM Abhisit had
assured the Secretary in July there would be no mass forced
repatriations, a position that had been reinforced by PM
Abhisit and FM Kasit in November 5 meetings with the
Ambassador and Deputy Assistant Secretary Marciel. Suthep
told the Ambassador that in the interest of preserving good
relations with the Lao government, Thailand was effectively
ceding to Lao wishes on the issue. According to Suthep, the
Lao government was determined to proceed expeditiously, and
he urged the USG to dialogue directly with the Lao and work
to solve the issue quickly. Suthep vowed to try and provide
the Ambassador with a long-promised list of the screened-in
Petchabun group (See paras 11-14).


3. (C) Comment: Suthep was clearly relieved to have the
immediate burden of a large scale red shirt rally off of his
back. He is pragmatic, however, and freely acknowledged the
enormity of the task facing the Abhisit government as it
works to move the country forward despite a relentless
onslaught of challenges coming from Thaksin and his
supporters. Suthep and the RTG may breathe a little easier
knowing they won't have to worry about a sea of red in the
streets in the next week, but the mid-term prognosis remains
the same. End Summary and Comment.

USG - RED SHIRT DIALOGUE
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by outlining for
Suthep recent USG outreach efforts with Thaksin associates
and red shirt leaders (Note: the November 27 meeting with DPM
Suthep, who is in charge of security issues, was scheduled
prior to the cancellation of expected red-shirt protests in
Bangkok and Chiang Mai. We have actively sought out

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Thaksin's family members (sister Yingluck and ex-wife
Pojamon) and core red-shirt leaders to urge them to denounce
the extreme rhetoric that had recently emerged, and to
disavow the use of violence going forward, see refs A and E.
End Note). The Ambassador told Suthep that he had emphasized
in these discussions that political gains achieved through
violence were ultimately illegitimate. Violent protests also
reflected poorly on Thailand as a whole and damaged the
country's image, a message the Ambassador emphasized the USG
would also convey to yellow shirts were the circumstances
reversed -- and had done so in the 2008 yellow-shirt
protests.

THAKSIN
--------------


5. (C) Suthep thanked the Ambassador for USG outreach efforts
with Thaksin and the red shirts. Suthep described two types
of red shirts who associate with Thaksin: those who were
close to him and loyally supported him, as well as those who
sought to use Thaksin for their own objectives. Suthep
believed the majority of red-shirts were ideologically
extreme, and he noted that thousands of red-shirts had
already passed through red-shirt indoctrination schools.


6. (C) In terms of Thaksin's own motivations for maintaining
control of the red-shirts, Suthep believed he was primarily
interested in the movement as a vehicle to push his pardon
case with the King. In the absence of any viable legal
channels, Thaksin believed he could use the red-shirt
movement to apply pressure on the King to grant him a pardon.



7. (C) Suthep told the Ambassador he was relieved that
Thaksin had decided to cancel the upcoming protests, but he
was not under any illusion this decision had any long term
significance. The underlying dynamic had not changed at all,
and Thaksin would continue to stir up trouble in an effort to
eliminate his legal problems, recover his assets, and
ultimately return to power.


8. (C) Suthep told the Ambassador there was no dialogue
between Thaksin and the RTG at all. Thaksin had tried to
reach out to members of the Privy Council in an attempt to
barter his way back (REFS C and D),but these efforts had
failed largely because Thaksin's baseline negotiating
position was unrealistic. Thaksin wanted assurances that he
would not serve a single day in jail, and there was
essentially no legal mechanism by which this request could be
accommodated, even if the King were inclined to grant him
clemency. Suthep believed the King wanted to see the
standoff with Thaskin resolved as quickly as possible, but
Thaksin would need to adjust his expectations.

RED-SHIRTS
--------------


9. (C) While Suthep believed Thaksin was driven exclusively
by a desire to avoid jail, recover his money and possibly
eventually re-enter politics, Suthep thought many of the
red-shirts were striving for a full blown revolution. Suthep
suspected -- though he could not confirm -- that army leaders
also believed the red-shirts sought to end Thailand's
constitutional monarchy. Suthep did not believe the army
would ever allow this to happen, however, and he vowed to
personally work to preserve the monarchy as well.


10. (C) Suthep asked the Ambassador whether he had ever heard
about red-shirt training camps and training facilities in
Cambodia. The Ambassador told Suthep that he had not, but
assured Suthep he would share any relevant information if it
became available. Suthep also shared with the Ambassador

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concerns that PM Abhisit's life could be in jeopardy. Suthep
told the Ambassador he was doing everything possible to
protect him, and he noted that he had advised the PM to avoid
traveling to Chiang Mai on November 29 because of the
possible risks.

LAO HMONG
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador reminded Suthep of the RTG's recent
high level assurances that the Hmong would not be forcibly
repatriated, before stressing that the USG wanted to work
with the RTG and the Lao to avoid forced repatriations.
Without directly stating that circumstances had changed since
the RTG made those promises, Suthep told the Ambassador that
the USG should move quickly to solve the Lao Hmong problem,
warning the Ambassador that very little time remained. Given
the fact that Thai relations were already strained with
Cambodia and less than ideal with Burma, the last thing the
RTG could afford at this point was a major dispute with the
Lao government. With that in mind, the RTG felt obliged to
submit to Lao wishes on this issue, and the Lao were eager to
act with dispatch. The RTG had tried to push back the
timeframe as outlined by the Lao, but had been unsuccessful
thus far.


12. (C) Suthep told the Ambassador that while he feared this
issue might not be settled smoothly, he believed the Lao were
working to make some accommodations. The 158
UNHCR-recognized Lao Hmong in Nong Khai would be allowed to
move to a third country, for example, though the Lao
government had denied RTG requests to repatriate them
directly from Thailand. This group would first have to
return to Laos, Suthep said, where they would have a separate
area to stay. Provided a third government emerged that was
willing to re-settle this group, they would then eventually
be allowed to proceed there. The RTG was listening to Laos,
he said, and the situation was fluid.


13. (C) The Ambassador noted that although the USG also
wished to see the situation resolved as quickly as possible,
it was impossible to move forward without the long-promised
list of Hmong in Petchabun that Thai military officials had
told us repeatedly had been screened in after arrival in
Thailand. The USG had also demonstrated flexibility, the
Ambassador noted, pointing out that the USG had acceded to
the idea of moving the Hmong back to Laos for a short period
before being repatriated to a third country. While all
parties could agree to work expeditiously to solve this
problem, the Ambassador stressed that there was a proper way
to do it. A forcible repatriation would cause a major uproar
in the U.S. Congress and elsewhere, and the ramifications
would likely be severe.


14. (C) Suthep agreed to look into the matter of the list of
the screened-in group of Hmong in Petchabun and to try to
provide this to the U.S. If the USG could move quickly,
problems could be avoided. Suthep urged the USG to dialogue
directly with the Lao government, and the Ambassador assured
Suthep that was already the case.
JOHN