THAILAND: THAKSIN PULLS THE PLUG ON NEXT BIG RED

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003009

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: THAKSIN PULLS THE PLUG ON NEXT BIG RED
RALLY

REF: A. BANGKOK 3003 (AMBASSADOR MEETS THAKSIN,S SISTER)

B. BANGKOK 2931 (ABHISIT GOVT HAS LEGS REDS PLAN
NEXT RALLY)

C. BANGKOK 974 (BANGKOK CALM SOME REDSHIRT LEADERS
ARRESTED)

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Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (SBU) Summary: Fugitive former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra used separate November 24 phone-ins to urge
leaders of the United Front for Democracy Against
Dictatorship (UDD),aka the "red-shirts," and the opposition
Puea Thai party to stand down from a planned multi-day rally
scheduled to begin on November 28 and last through at least
December 2. Following Thaksin,s call-in, the actual
cancellation by UDD leaders November 25 was little more than
a formality. The cancellation temporarily lowered
temperatures in a city that had been bracing itself for the
largest red rally since April and the citywide invocation of
the Internal Security Act. Red-shirt plans for a possible
separate rally in Chiang Mai against PM Abhisit's anticipated
November 29 visit there are covered septel from CG Chiang Mai.


2. (C) Comment: As reported in REF A and elsewhere, in recent
days we had actively sought out Thaksin,s family members
(sister Yingluck and ex-wife Pojamon) and core red-shirt
leaders to urge them to denounce the extreme rhetoric that
had recently emerged, and to disavow the use of violence
going forward. Though Thaksin has artfully framed his
decision to call off the rally as a function of his deep
veneration of the King and a related desire to avoid
detracting from the upcoming birthday celebrations December
2-7, we suspect the primary rationale for the decision to
pull the plug was far more pragmatic. Faced with mounting
evidence that the Abhisit government was not on the verge of
imminent collapse, as well as the fact that the funds
required to bring protesters to Bangkok could be better used
elsewhere, Thaksin apparently came to the conclusion that he
would be better off scrapping the demonstration entirely.
Other factors in his decision may have been fears that fewer
protesters than anticipated would attend the rally, as well
as Thaksin's eye on court deliberations in his asset
forfeiture case, with a decision expected in early January.
End Summary and Comment.

REDS CALL FOR MASSIVE TURNOUT...
--------------


3. (C) In the wake of Thaksin's call to action in a late
October phone-in to supporters in Thailand's northeast,
red-shirt leaders launched weeks of preparations for a
protracted rally they hoped might unseat the government of
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva (REF B). In meetings with
us starting in early November, red shirt leaders like Vira
Musikapong had previewed their plans to hold a major rally in
the early December timeframe, despite our observation that
the timing would conflict with the King,s birthday
celebration, particularly the annual December 2 military
parade which takes place in the same area of Bangkok used for
the colored political rallies. Public red-shirt predictions
that one million Thais would join the UDD protest were
obviously overblown; private predictions were also
predictably overheated, with core red-shirt leader Jaran
Ditapichai claiming to us on November 24 -- before Thaksin's
call for withdrawal of the event -- that 300,000 people would
be participating in the protest (note: compared to
100-120,000 in April. End note). Bangkok's newspapers
published police/intelligence service estimates of 40-45,000
likely participants.

...BUT BACK DOWN AT THE NEXT-TO-LAST MINUTE
--------------


4. (C) Leaving little doubt who calls the shots for the
red-shirt movement, Thaksin called UDD leaders on November 24
and urged them to reconsider holding the protest, citing the
conflict with the King,s birthday celebration. UDD leaders
then met on November 25 to discuss Thaksin,s recommendation
and predictably opted to stand down. Given the weeks of

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planning, the most likely explanation for the cancellation is
a cold, hard cost-benefit analysis by Thaksin - how much a
rally would cost him financially in the short term (in terms
of bankrolling transportation and living expenses for
upcountry protesters) and perhaps in the mid-term (arguments
in his asset forfeiture case wrap up November 26, with a
verdict expected in January),as well as politically (Puea
Thai leader Yongyuth Wichaidit told us November 25 that a
majority of PT MPs were against the rally given the timing
around the King's birthday).


5. (C) Anuporn Kashemsant, an official with the office of the
King's Private Principal Secretary, on November 25 dismissed
the "good intention" rationale and suggested a more tactical
consideration: the rally would not have attracted the large
numbers red shirts wanted, because insufficient numbers of
up-country farmers were taking offers to decamp to Bangkok.
Even Thaksin's lieutenants freely admitted to us that, with
the Abhisit administration on increasingly solid footing, it
appeared highly unlikely the demonstration could have
achieved its stated goal of toppling the government (REF
A-B).

CITY-WIDE ISA AND FEARS OF APRIL RIOTS REDUX
--------------


6. (C) Prior to the red-shirt cancellation of the planned
rally, the Thai Cabinet on November 24 announced it had
approved the imposition of the ISA for all of Bangkok from
November 28 through December 14. The decision was based on
reports that the red-shirts planned to spread throughout the
city in a so-called "star-cluster" strategy, including plans
to target the houses of Privy Council Chair Prem and PM
Abhisit. UDD core leader Jaran claimed to us that this was
not actually part of the red-shirts' strategy; their goal had
been to have as many people together as possible.


7. (C) Putting aside red-shirt leader private assurances that
the planned demonstration would be peaceful and non-violent,
red rhetoric had been heating up in recent weeks in ways that
were disturbingly reminiscent of the rhetorical ramp-up in
March leading into the April red violence (ref C). This
included language used by Thaksin in his tweets, claims by
red-shirt leaders like Jatuporn that the demonstration would
continue until the government was overthrown, the
reappearance in media messaging of red violence practioner
MGEN Khattiya (aka "Seh Daeng") and fugitive red leader
Jakkrapob Penkair (who called for armed rebellion in April
prior to fleeing to Cambodia),and worst of all, red radio
incitement for Abhisit's death by Chiang Mai red leader
Phechawat on November 19.


8. (C) Human Rights Watch researcher Sunai Phasuk and
independent photojournalist Nick Nostitz, who only semi-jokes
about having been "embedded" in red circles for several
years, separately shared concerns with us that the red-shirts
were operating under the assumption the planned demonstration
would turn violent. Nostitz cited the rhetoric in particular
of Pattaya riot leader Arisman and Suphon Attawong (aka
"Rambo Isaan"). Thaksin's ex-lawyer, his sister Yingluck
Shinawatra, and Jaran all told us that the UDD planned for
the rally to be peaceful. However, red-shirt leaders offered
similar assurances to us in March-April, and Jaran said he
could not discount the possibility of a third party inciting
the government to crack down, at which point he said the UDD
leaders would not be able to contain the actions of the
people. We will continue to monitor red rhetoric and
developments closely.
JOHN