Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK2931
2009-11-18 10:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI DOMESTIC POLITICAL ROUNDUP: ABHISIT GOVT HAS

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM TH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002931 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI DOMESTIC POLITICAL ROUNDUP: ABHISIT GOVT HAS
LEGS; REDS PLAN NEXT RALLY; POLICE CHIEF UPDATE

REF: A. BANGKOK 2905 (FIREWORKS AT RALLY)

B. BANGKOK 2875 (THAKSIN STICKS FOOT IN MOUTH)

C. BANGKOK 2642 (CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS UNCERTAIN)

D. BANGKOK 2125 (POLICE CHIEF BATTLE)

BANGKOK 00002931 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: PolCounselor George Kent, REASON: 1.4 (B, D).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002931

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI DOMESTIC POLITICAL ROUNDUP: ABHISIT GOVT HAS
LEGS; REDS PLAN NEXT RALLY; POLICE CHIEF UPDATE

REF: A. BANGKOK 2905 (FIREWORKS AT RALLY)

B. BANGKOK 2875 (THAKSIN STICKS FOOT IN MOUTH)

C. BANGKOK 2642 (CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS UNCERTAIN)

D. BANGKOK 2125 (POLICE CHIEF BATTLE)

BANGKOK 00002931 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: PolCounselor George Kent, REASON: 1.4 (B, D).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Following a politically disastrous fortnight for
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his Puea Thai
political party (REF B),current Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva is riding a wave of newfound popularity and
enjoying the fruits of Thaksin's missteps. However, Abhisit
recognizes that these political gains are likely ephemeral
and is wary of the risks associated with calling for snap
elections, according to members of the PM's inner circle.
Rather than gambling everything by dissolving the Parliament
immediately and hoping for a Democrat party/coalition
victory, the PM instead appears poised to settle down in
Government House for as long as possible.


2. (C) Clouds remain on the horizon, however. The
anti-government United Front for Democracy against
Dictatorship (UDD),aka the "red-shirts," plan to return to
the streets of Bangkok for a "showdown" rally, scheduled to
begin November 29. Red-shirt core leader Jatuporn Promphan
announced November 18 the group planned to assemble more than
one-million people, with the goal of overthrowing the
government. Thaksin himself suggested in a November 18 tweet
to supporters that he did not know how long he could "ask the
red shirts to be tolerant." Meanwhile, the Police Chief saga
(REF D) has settled into something approaching a stalemate,
with PM Abhisit's choice of Police General Prateep Tunprasert
in place as the interim Chief, and most parties apparently
satisfied with the status quo for now.


3. (C) Comment: PM Abhisit is arguably as well positioned
politically now as he has been at any other point since he
first assumed office last December, with Thaksin's missteps
having given Abhisit a more unified coalition and some
operating room to demonstrate his ability to run the country
effectively. Thanks to the near total collapse of the
Constitutional reform effort (REF C),and the resulting
absence of any obvious trigger on the horizon for a new round
of elections, the Democrat-led coalition for now appears to
be well positioned to remain in office for some time to come.
Thaksin simply will not go away quietly, however, with his
red-shirts preparing another major demonstration just around

the corner, using the rhetoric of "war" last heard in the
March-April protests which ended in violence, and publicly
committed to bringing down the government "before New Year's
Day." End Summary and Comment.

ABHISIT RIDING HIGH, FOR NOW
--------------


4. (C) In the wake of former PM Thaksin's highly publicized
visit to Cambodia and his interview with the (London) Times
Online which was interpreted by many as disparaging to the
King, PM Abhisit has enjoyed a surge in popularity (from 23
to 68 percent, according to one poll). The bounce was so
quick and unexpected that members of the PM's inner circle
initially gave brief consideration to the possibility of
dissolving Parliament and trying to "catch lightning in a
bottle" with snap elections. On November 12, Deputy
Secretary-General to the Prime Minister for Political Affairs
Isra Sunthornvut told us that Abhisit was so grateful for
Thaksin's political gaffes that he had jokingly suggested
sending him a thank you card. Isra added that although the
PM was thinking about calling for snap elections, the reality
was that even if he dissolved Parliament immediately, the
elections would not take place until mid to late January, by
which point Abhisit believed the political dynamic could have

BANGKOK 00002931 002.2 OF 003


changed entirely.


5. (C) When we met with Deputy PM Suthep's Assistant (and
step-son) Akanat Promphan on November 17, he told us that the
PM had decided not to dissolve Parliament in the near future;
Finance Minister Korn Chatikavanij reinforced this sense on
the margins of APEC on November 14 when he told reporters he
thought the government could remain in office another year.
Akanat told us that PM Abhisit had privately concluded his
surge in popularity was likely a temporary phenomenon, and
that the Democrat party's own prospects in the next election
would be dictated by its own track record and not Thaksin's
missteps.


6. (C) According to Akanat, Abhisit and the Democrats were
already in power and had no compelling incentive to call for
snap elections in order to secure a new mandate. The current
government already had a mandate, he said, and was determined
to use it to develop a governing record it could later run
on. Akanat told us that Abhisit was not in any hurry to call
for elections, and he too believed the government would last
for at least another year. Supachai Jaisamut, Phumjai Thai
MP and right-hand man for power broker Newin Chidchob, went
even further, telling us November 16 that he saw no reason
for the coalition to call elections in 2010; it could stay in
office for the rest of its term (2011).

LATEST RED RALLY: HOT RHETORIC, NEW TACTICS?
--------------


7. (C) On November 17, red-shirt core leader Jatuporn
Promphan announced the UDD's next big gambit, a so-called
"showdown rally" slated to begin November 29. Jatuporn
claimed publicly that the red-shirts expected to attract over
one million supporters for a demonstration with the explicit
goal of "overthrowing the government" by the New Year.
Jatuporn told the media that "they (the government) do not
deserve to celebrate the New Year. We will make this war as
short as possible." Jatuporn said that in the event the
government did not fold by December 3, the red-shirts would
disperse in order to observe the King's birthday on December
4 and 5, before re-assembling shortly thereafter.


8. (U) Not to be outdone, former Prime Minister Thaksin
posted comments to his Twitter page on November 17 in which
he bemoaned his inability to return to his homeland and
access his money, and complained that he had been stripped of
his royal decorations. Given all of the adversity he had
faced, as well the fact that his life had been threatened,
Thaksin closed by observing that he did not know "how long
(he could) ask the red shirts to be tolerant."


9. (C) Such red rhetoric from Jatuporn and Thaksin is
reminiscent of language used by red-shirts in the run-up to
the March-April red protests that ended in violence, but UDD
spokesperson Sean Boonpracong was somewhat more circumspect
about UDD plans when we asked him about Jatuporn's statement
November 18. According to Sean Boonpracong, UDD leaders had
not yet locked-in its plans for the big rally but would meet
November 20 to finalize planning and discuss the next steps.
He said there were a variety of details to be worked out, and
he personally did not believe the rally would be sufficient
to topple the government.


10. (C) Core red shirt leaders Veera Musikapong and Jaran
Ditapichai in a series of recent meetings with us have
suggested that the UDD may adopt new tactics at the next
rally, with the goal of throwing the government off balance
and rendering Internal Security Act (ISA) controls useless.
Veera and Jaran told us separately that the UDD was giving
serious consideration to assembling red shirt supporters in
several venues scattered throughout Bangkok. By dispersing
supporters strategically, as opposed to assembling in one
easily secured venue, the government would be forced to
consider invoking the Internal Security Act throughout all of

BANGKOK 00002931 003.2 OF 003


Bangkok, rather than just one district. This would represent
virgin territory for the government, and the RTG would have
to carefully consider whether applying the ISA more broadly
might represent a deal breaker for civil liberty groups
previously respectful of the RTG's need to resort to the ISA.
Both Veera and Jaran suggested such a move would invite
widespread criticism, potentially damage Thailand's
reputation overseas, and therefore strengthen the UDD's hand.

POLICE CHIEF UPDATE
--------------


11. (C) One of the most nettlesome issues for PM Abhisit has
settled into an apparent stalemate, ultimately to Abhisit's
favor. In the face of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn's
continued opposition to Abhisit's (and reportedly the
Queen's) choice of Police General Prateep Tunprasert as the
nation's top cop, Abhisit has decided to keep Prateep in the
interim Police Chief position indefinitely. Akanat told us
the decision amounted to "the least worst solution," adding
that Prateep would probably remain interim Chief until the
end of Abhisit's term in office. Though having Prateep
remain as interim Chief represented less than a total victory
for PM Abhisit, his refusal to buckle in the face of pressure
from the Crown Prince demonstrated the PM's mettle.


12. (C) PM Abhisit's creative solution to the Police Chief
problem has not satisfied all parties, however, as evidenced
by the fact that 10 of the 22 Police Commission members
decided to boycott the Commission's November 16 meeting.
Despite the absence of nearly half of the Commission, the
group nevertheless managed to approve a large reshuffle
involving 36 top police generals.
JOHN

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