SOUTHERN THAILAND: CHAVALIT'S "PATTANI CITY"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002844 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: SOUTHERN THAILAND: CHAVALIT'S "PATTANI CITY" PROPOSAL STIRS THE POT, WITH AN EYE TOWARDS ELECTIONS REF: A. BANGKOK 2746 (THAKSIN MOVES) ¶B. PHNOM PENH 815 (HUN SEN MANEUVERS OVER POSSIBLE THAKSIN VISIT) ¶C. BANGKOK 2792 (NAJIB WADES INTO SOUTHERN AUTONOMY BRIAR PATCH) BANGKOK 00002844 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM JAMES F. ENTWISTLE, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Opposition Puea Thai Party's new Chairman Chavalit Yongchaiyut's November 2 suggestion that a separate administrative unit be established for Thailand's insurgency-plagued southernmost provinces elicited immediate opposition from many quarters, from officials to political cartoonists. Government and Democrat Party stalwarts, with memories of Hun Sen's invitation to former PM Thaksin to move to Cambodia still fresh in their minds (Refs A-B),quickly dismissed Chavalit's proposal as unnecessary and divisive. It is not at all clear that Chavalit has the full support of his new party Puea Thai, however, as he pursues initiatives that have long been part of his personal agenda, not necessarily Puea Thai's. Several of our contacts remained deeply skeptical of the Pattani Municipality idea, pointing out that Chavalit's proposal lacked any details, and asserting that Chavalit,s motives were not aimed at resolving the conflict but were entirely political, as Puea Thai attempts to force new elections in the coming months, and the Deep South is viewed as a region very much up for grabs politically. ¶2. (C) COMMENT: Hot on the heels of Malaysian Prime Minister Najib's public statement that Bangkok should offer some form of autonomy to the South (REF C),Chavalit's trip to the south and proposal keeps public attention on an important issue which often receives less attention than it deserves. His intent in raising the issue is open to interpretation. While there is widespread consensus among activists, policy experts, and even some government officials like PM Abhisit that empowering local communities in the South is one essential element in ending the separatist insurgency, we agree with our contacts that Chavalit stirred the pot with the next election cycle foremost in mind. The three Deep South provinces are remarkably pluralistic politically, with MPs elected from four separate parties, as opposed to the Upper South, which is solidly in Democrat Party hands. Chavalit is likely using this opportunity to woo Malay Muslim politicians to the Puea Thai party, though it will be an uphill battle, given the deep unpopularity of Thaksin and his policies in the Deep South, particularly the lack of accountability for killings associated with 2003's War on Drugs and the Krue Se Mosque and Tak Bai incidents in 2004. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- "BIG CHIEW" LIGHTS ANOTHER FIRE -------------- ¶3. (U) Puea Thai Party chairman and former prime minister Chavalit Yongchaiyut proposed the creation an autonomous "Pattani City" to administer the three southern provinces of Narawathiwat, Pattani, and Yala on November 2, one day before making a trip to the Deep South to meet with 1200 activists. He subsequently proposed an amnesty for insurgents. Chavalit's south comments and trip came on the heels of his October visit to Cambodia and the subsequent controversy stemming from Prime Minister Hun Sen's invitation to provide safe haven for Thaksin (REFS A-B),and in the wake of Malaysian premier Najib Razak suggestions of autonomy for the region (REF C). ¶4. (SBU) Reaction to Chavalit's proposal was mixed, but on balance negative. Democrat officials slammed the recommendation as divisive. Editorial cartoonists had a field day lampooning "Big Chiew" alternatively as a traitor and a Malay sultan. For his part, PM Abhisit called on Chavalit via the media to clarify his proposal to avoid confusion and possible societal conflicts; Abhisit maintained that the government's proposal to create a new special BANGKOK 00002844 002.2 OF 003 administrative mechanism for the South would be most appropriate (NOTE: the military has blocked forward progress on the government's bill. END NOTE.) ¶5. (SBU) In contrast, Puea Thai MPs and several southern politicians with long associations with Chavalit via the Wadah faction publicly voiced their support. Den Tohmeena, a former senator from Pattani, said that it could lead to real change. Areepen Utarasin, Mattaphum Party MP for Narathiwat, similarly praised Chavalit for being brave enough to propose a potential solution to the southern violence. Puea Thai party spokesman Prompong Noppariot clarified that Chavalit's proposal would not lead to autonomy for the South, but rather set the table for a special administrative zone similar to what exists for the cities of Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Pattaya. ¶6. (C) Despite Chavalit,s recent high profile travel and commentary on behalf of Puea Thai, however, there is evidence to suggest he still has some work to do to shore up support within the party after fugitive former PM Thaksin arranged for Chavalit's appointment as Puea Thai "Chairman." Former Deputy Prime Minister and close Thaksin ally Sompong Amornvivat told us November 4 that at least half of the Puea Thai loyalists were not yet sold on the idea of Chavalit as the new voice and face of the party. According to Sompong, although Chavalit was a pretty good bet to get the nod as Prime Minister in the event of a Puea Thai election victory, there was still considerable skepticism within the party about Chavalit,s loyalty to the party and fitness for the job. Sompong, for one, signaled he was not fully supportive of Chavalit,s new role with the party. -------------- -------------- LOCAL REACTION: CONFUSING, LIKELY NO IMPACT FOR NOW -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Yala Governor Grisada Boonrach told us November 4 that most southerners did not clearly understand Chavalit's idea of self-rule under the "Nakorn Pattani" (greater Pattani municipality) label. In Yala Province, for example, Grisada said it would be almost impossible to give more power to locals, as almost 98 percent of all provincial and district administrative organizations were already chaired by local Malay Muslims. Nipon Narapitakkul, Vice-Governor of Narathiwat Province, likewise asserted to us separately November 4 that most Muslims in the South were confused about what Chavalit's idea would actually entail in practice. ¶8. (C) Until the Pattani City idea moved out of the formative stages into something approaching an actual plan, Nipon added, the insurgents would not be inclined to take a position one way or another, nor act to curtail the violence. Grisada added that because no one fully understood the insurgency,s real objectives, it was difficult to assess the extent to which any particular form of self-rule might reduce the violence. Prince of Songhla-Hat Yai University professor Zakee Pitakkumpol, a Thai Muslim, took a slightly more optimistic view, telling us the proposal could entice all sectors of the southern conflict to contemplate a viable solution. ¶9. (C) Professor Srisomphop Jitphiromsri, director of Deep South Watch, and Narathiwat journalist Waedao Arai suggested separately to us November 4 that Chavalit's proposal might encourage more discussion of how to address the southern situation, especially given the fact that both the Puea Thai and Mattaphum parties would likely incorporate it into their policy platforms during the next electoral campaign. They believed that the Democrat Party would be forced to come up with an alternative policy or plan to counter Chavalit's proposal. -------------- -------------- THE BIGGER, SHORT-TERM PICTURE: POLITICS IS LOCAL -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Most of our contacts agreed that the true purpose of BANGKOK 00002844 003.2 OF 003 Chavalit's proposal was to garner southern support for the Puea Thai party and make it a more attractive political outlet for influential southern Muslim politicians. Waedo and Governor Grisada both told us that Puea Thai leaders expect the Pattani City proposal will provide Puea Thai with some political advantage, but will not be enough to change the political landscape in the South dramatically. Professor Srisomphop and Waedao separately opined to us that the proposal would likely on balance also be a net positive for members of the Wadah faction. Wadah was long associated with Chavalit in the New Aspiration Party and Thai Rak Thai, but its MPs have since moved to form the core of the new Mattaphum Party, with former coup leader GEN Sonthi (a Thai Muslim) as likely party leader. ¶11. (SBU) For most of the past two decades, Wadah has battled the Democrat Party for political supremacy in the Deep South, usually holding the upper hand; the Democrats have long dominated the rest of the South. Because Wadah's association with Thaksin's controversial policies in 2003-4 badly damaged its standing in recent elections, however, the Deep South has become even more pluralistic. Narathiwat, the province most wracked by insurgent violence, is also one of the most politically pluralistic provinces in all of Thailand, with Chart Thai holding two seats, while the Democrat Party, Puea Paendin, and Mattaphum/Wadah each have one seat. Pattani's four constituency seats are split evenly between the Democrat Party and Puea Phaendin; the Democrats have two seats in Yala, with Puea Thai holding the other. ¶12. (C) Waedao Arai explained to us that the parties each have strong localized support bases and can guarantee electoral victories within their areas of influence; for instance Chart Thai's two MPs in Narathiwat come from a locally prominent political family that is a political rival of the Wadah faction. Waedao suggested the three Puea Paendin MPs in Pattani and Yala could possibly be coaxed to join Puea Thai, if the party makes a sufficiently attractive offer (NOTE: we are skeptical, since the primary Puea Paendin MP was arrested at Thaksin's orders in June 2003 and accused of being part of Jemaah Islamiyah; he was acquitted in a trial but left detention bitter at his mistreatment while in custody. END NOTE). JOHN