THAILAND'S SOUTHERN INSURGENCY: ABHISIT GOVERNMENT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 000283 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR PHU E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TH SUBJECT: THAILAND'S SOUTHERN INSURGENCY: ABHISIT GOVERNMENT RENEWS SECRET HDC-FACILITATED DISCUSSION CHANNEL REF: BANGKOK 125 (ABHISIT'S NEW PLAN) BANGKOK 00000283 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) Summary: The Abhisit government reopened the secret channel of discussions with representatives of southern insurgents facilitated by the Henri Dunant Centre (HDC) in late January, HDC Southeast Asian representative Michael Vatikiotis told PolCouns February 3. Vatikiotis said that Thai FM Kasit Piromya engaged HDC Chair Michael Griffiths in Geneva February 2 to underscore the seriousness of intent the new Thai government places on pursuing a genuine dialogue. Kasit said the RTG wanted the HDC to elicit from the insurgents a list of their top issues, would then prepare substantive responses, and thus hoped to achieve real progress towards a negotiated political settlement. Vatikiotis said he came to Thailand to meet with FM Kasit, former PM/Privy Counselor Surayud, possibly PM Abhisit, Princess Sirindhorn, and other players on the South. While not discounting the problems of a multitude of competing actors and agendas on the south, Vatikiotis suggested the new RTG approach might succeed where previous efforts had fallen short and asked whether the USG might helpfully encourage the RTG in the right direction, to stay focused on a single track and provide RTG representatives with a clear mandate. ¶2. (S) Comment: Vatikiotis' account is intriguing, and tracks with early public avowals by PM Abhisit to address the southern challenge head on (reftel). We see merit, at the appropriate time, in encouraging the RTG to back up helpful sounding rhetoric with serious intent. Whether the Abhisit government can invest sufficient political capital in the effort to make a peace process succeed, including fending off skeptics that likely will include party elder and Abhisit's personal mentor Chuan Leekpai, remains an open question. End Comment. Abhisit restores HDC channel talks -------------- ¶3. (S) The new Abhisit government restored the HDC-facilitated talks between representatives of the RTG and southern Malay Muslim insurgents in Jakarta the week of January 19, HDC Southeast Asia representative Vatikiotis told us February 3. Mark Thamthai and the NSC's Somchai Boonchu, restored to his previous role, met representatives of BRN-C and PULO with Vatikiotis' assistance. The Samak and Somchai government had let the channel lapse in 2008 under the influence of NSC Secretary General Surapol Puanaiyaka, an avowed opponent of the talks, who dismantled the NSC office overseeing the process. ¶4. (S) The Jakarta session proved productive, according to Vatikiotis, particularly after Thamthai and Somchai read the southern-related paragraph in the new government's policy statement, its second highest listed priority (below). The carefully constructed paragraph contained a number of key words and concepts which addressed insurgent concerns and, while stopping short of autonomy, offered the possibility for substantive progress. Thamthai also explained to the insurgents that he had received PM Abhisit's personal mandate to reengage and stressed that Abhisit was both head of the new government's committee on the south and had full powers to delegate and create subcommittees. ¶5. (U) Begin text from policy statement: "1.1.2 Set up a Southern Border Provinces Administering Office as a permanent organization to be responsible for resolving problems and developing the Southern Border Provinces, by adhering to the principle of reconciliation and the 'understand, reach out, develop' guidelines; apply a stringent and just judicial process to perpetrators; designate the Southern Border Provinces as special development zones which will receive support from low-interest soft loans, special tax preferences, and promotion of halal industries; and promote these areas as special development zones with flexibility and religious and cultural diversity." End Text. ¶6. (S) For their part, the insurgent representatives in BANGKOK 00000283 002.2 OF 003 Jakarta accepted the policy statement as a basis for moving forward but underscored the importance of RTG representatives having a clear mandate to conduct the discussions, not merely serve as messengers to Bangkok. At Vatikiotis' suggestion, the insurgent representatives sent a public signal via the media (The Nation newspaper) approving the government's new policy approach. ¶7. (SBU) As reported in the Nation January 24, Kasturi Makhota, the foreign affairs chief of the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) said that the policy "could lay the foundations for a political settlement of the conflict." A "new front" of separatist leaders had "agreed to form a special body to engage in dialogue with Thai government representatives." The statement also indicated: "it is our hope that after long years of struggle, which has cost the lives of many innocent people in the region, that at long last there can be a sustained process of dialogue based on principles of democracy, openness, and sincerity." Serious players new and old engage... -------------- ¶8. (S) Following up on the Jakarta meetings, according to Vatikiotis, PM Abhisit chaired a special NSC session dedicated to the south and asked Surapol why he had abolished the office running the secret channel. When Surapol replied that he was opposed to such dialogue, Kasit cut him off and said such a position was ridiculous and indefensible. Surapol would be gone by March, Vatikiotis predicted. ¶9. (S) FM Kasit met with HDC head Michael Griffiths in Geneva February 2 and impressed Griffiths with the seriousness with which the new government will approach the process, said Vatikiotis. Kasit told Griffiths that the RTG trusted HDC because the insurgents trusted HDC as a facilitator; he also asked Griffiths to keep the channel confidential. Kasit asked HDC to engage the insurgents to obtain a list of the issues they truly wished to discuss/resolve with the RTG; Kasit would then work to ensure the RTG had a pre-cooked substantive response so that the next round of meetings would achieve genuine substantive progress and lead to the next stage. Vatikiotis said HDC approved of this approach, which had worked well in other HDC-facilitated processes. ¶10. (S) In another heartening sign, former Interim PM Surayud Chulanont, who broke precedent by meeting with insurgents while in office but studiously avoided re-engaging after he returned to the Privy Council in February 2008, agreed to meet Vatikiotis to discuss the renewal of the secret channel February 4. Vatikiotis had identified Surayud's complete disengagement in 2008 as one of the main reasons why it had not been possible to maintain a productive process in 2008; his reengagement now was another hopeful sign. Vatikiotis will meet FM Kasit the same day to follow-up on Kasit's intentions for a more robust MFA role in the process, perhaps by Kasit himself. Vatikiotis was scheduled to meet with Princess Sirindhorn and MP Kraisak Choonhaven later February 3 and hoped to buttonhole PM Abhisit after a February 3 dinner to reconfirm (the pair exchanged SMSes last week) the essence of Abhisit's approach and underscore the need to move forward resolutely. ¶11. (S) The key to breaking the cycle of violence, Vatikiotis maintained, was for the RTG to reach agreement with the "movement" - the insurgents. They, in turn, could then appeal to the "ulema" - the local religious leaders who were respected in the communities - to give the signal that the violence must stop. The RTG wanted to engage the ulema directly, but a solution required going through the "movement" first, said Vatikiotis. A call from religious leaders would likely stop only 80% of the current violence, but the remaining 20% would then be delegitimized, and reduced to a manageable level. ...But old problems remain: multiple actors, channels -------------- -------------- ¶12. (S) Vatikiotis acknowledged the multiplicity of actors BANGKOK 00000283 003.2 OF 003 and possible channels for discussion remained key challenges to effective management of a successful dialogue process. Vatikiotis suggested perhaps the biggest hurdle for the Abhisit team came from within: Abhisit's mentor, former PM Chuan, who remained adamantly opposed to direct discussions with those "with guns" and had recently visited Malaysia to meet with Wan Kadir, a retired insurgent leader no longer involved with the active movement. The insurgents had identified Democrat MP Phirayot Rahimmula and his wife Dr. Chitchanok, both seen as close to Chuan, as obstacles to progress through negotiated dialogue. ¶13. (S) Other actors who Vatikiotis suspected might pursue independent agendas included PM Office deputy Secretary General and spokesman Panitan Wattanayagorn, who was from the south and maintained close ties with the military, and DPM Suthep Thaugsuban, not to mention the army, which was not yet on board. Vatikiotis was dismissive of both Indonesian and Malaysian efforts to get involved in "the negotiating game;" the matter needed to be addressed through direct discussions by the Thai parties involved. ¶14. (S) Vatikiotis suggested the USG consider weighing in with the RTG at a high level, with FM Kasit and/or PM Abhisit, offering encouragement for the energy and seriousness with which it had pledged it would pursue reconciliation in the south, but urging that it avoid a multi-track, multi-voice approach in favor of a unified message and clear mandate for the RTG representatives. JOHN