Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK2588
2009-10-09 00:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI POLICY TOWARDS BURMA: THAI OFFICIALS,

Tags:  PREL PHUM PGOV TH BM 
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PP RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #2588/01 2820033
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 090033Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8562
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7576
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 0053
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 5811
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5867
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1997
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0141
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7134
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002588 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TH BM
SUBJECT: THAI POLICY TOWARDS BURMA: THAI OFFICIALS,
ACTIVISTS, AND ACADEMICS DEBATE THAILAND'S NATIONAL
INTERESTS

REF: A. BANGKOK 2464 (PREVIEWING POLICY SHIRT)

B. BANGKOK 2003 (REACTION TO ASSK VERDICT)

C. BANGKOK 1219 (ASEAN STATEMENT ON ASSK ARREST)

D. BANGKOK 1202 (REACTION TO ASSK ARREST)

E. BANGKOK 517 (ASEAN SUMMIT)

F. BANGKOK 505 (ASEAN CIVIL SOCIETY DIALOGUE)

BANGKOK 00002588 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002588

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2019
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV TH BM
SUBJECT: THAI POLICY TOWARDS BURMA: THAI OFFICIALS,
ACTIVISTS, AND ACADEMICS DEBATE THAILAND'S NATIONAL
INTERESTS

REF: A. BANGKOK 2464 (PREVIEWING POLICY SHIRT)

B. BANGKOK 2003 (REACTION TO ASSK VERDICT)

C. BANGKOK 1219 (ASEAN STATEMENT ON ASSK ARREST)

D. BANGKOK 1202 (REACTION TO ASSK ARREST)

E. BANGKOK 517 (ASEAN SUMMIT)

F. BANGKOK 505 (ASEAN CIVIL SOCIETY DIALOGUE)

BANGKOK 00002588 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Pol Counselor George Kent, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Thai officials, academics, and activists
debated Thailand's position, role, and policy vis-a-vis its
problematic western neighbor Burma at Chulalongkorn
University's Institute of Strategic and International Studies
(ISIS) October 6. The speakers covered the wide array of
issues in the complex Thai-Burma relationship, agreed that
Thai national interests, not outside/western policy concerns,
should dictate Thai policy, and lamented the lack of a clear
strategy or mechanisms to achieve Thailand's interests.
However, they did not reach consensus on how to define
Thailand's national interest, given the mix of topics ranging
from Thailand's energy needs, Burma's upcoming 2010 election
process and outcomes, refugees, migrant workers, narcotics,
diseases, and small-scale conflict involving ethnic
minorities.


2. (C) COMMENT: Thailand bears a larger burden, as perhaps
the premier Burma "front line state," than any other country,
and the complex mix of factors in play makes effective,
strategic policy making difficult. The current Democrat
Party-led government, particularly both PM Abhisit and FM
Kasit, is more supportive of democratization efforts inside
Burma and has vigorously pushed the issues as ASEAN chair
(refs B-F). However, apart from activist politicians such as
Kraisak Choonhavan, there are few voices from normally
"progressive" academics in defining national interests more
inclusively. Despite the efforts of the moderator to focus
attention on stories of the Burmese-North Korean relationship
and possible efforts to develop a nuclear program, speakers
steered clear of the issue. Thai officials and commentators
are still weighing the impact of the U.S. policy shift;
seminar organizers distributed copies of EAP A/S Campbell's
on-the-record briefing, and testimony provided by other
commentators at the recent Burma policy hearing held by
Senator Jim Webb. End Summary and Comment.

Eye to 2010 Elections: MFA view
--------------


3. (SBU) Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) East Asian
Director General Kittiphong Na Ranong, who spoke last, trod

carefully given the public nature of the forum (Note: he was
more expansive in private with Charge the week prior, see ref

A. End note). Kittiphong highlighted the importance of the
U.S. policy shift and the potential Burmese response.
Speaking candidly, he stated that the ten ASEAN countries had
different interests and ideas on Burma, and it was tough to
find common ground - Thailand's task the past year as ASEAN
Chair. While national interests might not change, priorities
sometimes did. Regardless of one's perspective of the
upcoming 2010 elections, they would happen on the regime's
terms.


4. (SBU) The challenge the international community faced with
the 2010 process, according to Kittiphong, was not missing
the opportunity to help open space in Burma for the benefit
of all, to think of steps before and after which could
contribute to progress. How the process unfolded depended on
the steps the Burmese regime took, Aung San Suu Kyi's (ASSK)
positions, as well as the reactions of the U.S., China,
India, and ASEAN to developments. He recommended focusing on
capacity building, on education, technical training for
officials who would have to help improve
administration/governance of the country, and economic
development. Otherwise, the international community would be
faced with "old wine in new bottles."

Security, Energy, and National interests: NSC view
-------------- --------------

BANGKOK 00002588 002.2 OF 003




5. (SBU) NSC Director for the Bureau of Border Security
Affairs and Defense Bhornchart Bunnag described how the end
of the Cold War had changed the nature of security threats,
from military/defense to more comprehensive concepts and
transnational challenges. Thailand was the country most
affected by Burma's situation, Bhornchart contended, from
basic border security to migrants, displaced
persons(refugees),narcotics, and disease. He suggested the
guiding principles for policy should be pursuit of "good
neighbor" relations, particularly given the 2500 km
undemarcated border; ASEAN as an interactive mechanism for
common interests and collective responses to shared threats;
global fora/values, including the human rights and democracy
agenda first promoted by former PM Chuan in the 1990s; and
the influence of key external actors, principally the U.S.,
China, and India. Bhornchart expressed concern about the
situation in Shan state, the potential for the Burmese regime
to attack the Wa, and what the Chinese response might be.


6. (SBU) Bhornchart emphasized the growing importance that
energy security was playing between Thailand and Burma.
While the main focus for now was natural gas from the Yadana
field, Thailand's energy needs over the next decade could
only be met by hydroelectric power from the proposed Salween
dam in Burma and Laos, unless Thailand succeeded in launching
an expansive nuclear power generation program. Thailand's
dependency on Burma for energy, which he claimed was now at
20 percent, would likely increase.

The Democratic/Human Rights Factor: AIPMC/activist
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) Chair of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar
Caucus and ruling Democrat Party MP Kraisak Choonhavan took
issue with more narrowly defined definitions of national
interests. He emphasized that Thailand as a democracy needed
to stand firm in highlighting the importance of human rights,
whether it was monks being shot in the streets of Rangoon,
Shan and Karen women being raped in eastern Burma, ethnic
minority workers exploited in large pipeline/infrastructure
projects (the cachement area of the proposed Salween dam is
the territory in which the events covered in the "License to
Rape" report occurred, he stressed),or the large numbers of
refugees that cross the border into Thailand. Thailand had
stumbled early in the year with its handling of Rohingya boat
people, but PM Abhisit had shown in his response, as well as
his engagement of Burmese activists in the lead up to the
ASEAN Hua Hin Summit, that he was a true liberal democrat
willing to deal with these issues (refs E-F),in Kraisak's
view.


8. (SBU) Kraisak also highlighted divisions within ASEAN
over implementation of the ASEAN Charter, claiming Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia would support Burma, in the same way that
Hun Sen had joined with Burmese PM Thein Sein in refusing to
engage civil society reps at the ASEAN Hua Hin Summit.
Kraisak lamented the reality that only Indonesia was willing
to push for an effective Human Rights monitoring mechanism;
based on the watered down result, Kraisak argued that Burma
had more leverage/influence than any other country in ASEAN.
With other countries like China, India, and even Thailand
focused on resource extraction, whether energy, timber, or
fish, Burma would continue to be able to control/balance
relations with outside countries, limiting the impact of
pressure for change.

Rethinking the Thai-Burma Security Strategy
--------------


9. (SBU) Retired Deputy Permanent Secretary of the Ministry
of Defense and former head of the National Intelligence
Agency GEN Vaipot asserted that the Burmese military regime
valued unity above all else, and that the junta distrusted
Thailand due to the decades-old policy of using ethnic
proxies to control buffer/border areas, even if that policy
wound down starting in 1988. Gen. Vaipot suggested that
Thailand needed a new security approach to Burma, based on

BANGKOK 00002588 003.2 OF 003


preventive measures; consultation with NGOs; focusing on the
ASEAN Statement of moving forward with diversity; and dealing
with migrant labor and narcotics.

Historic Tipping Points and current concerns
--------------


10. (SBU) Director for the Institute of Asian Studies at
Chulalongkorn University Sunait described the historical
dimensions of Thai-Burma relations in the second half of the
20th century, identifying 1988 as a critical point of change
in the relationship. Before then, Burma had been more
dependent on Thailand for trade and addressing the powerful
armed ethnic groups in eastern Burma. After 1988, Burma
achieved more leverage, holding the keys to Thailand's
inability to decisively address the cross-border problems of
migrants, refugees, narcotics, and disease, as well as
addressing energy needs.


11. (SBU) Expounding on the current security climate, Dr.
Sunait lamented Thailand's inability to define its interests
vis-a-vis Burma as clearly as China and India had. Thailand
faced a dilemma in prioritizing issues within the complex
relationship, lacked confidence in pursuing national
interests that might be at variance with world views, and had
not formed effective mechanisms to drive policy forward in an
integrated manner, he concluded.
ENTWISTLE

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