AMBASSADOR MEETS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER; VIKTOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 002555

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PTER TH BM RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER; VIKTOR
BOUT, MAP THA PHUT CASES RAISED

REF: A. BANGKOK 2539 (PATH FORWARD ON CONSTITUTION)

B. BANGKOK 2455 (AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH ADVISOR)

C. BANGKOK 2402 (AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH PUEA THAI
LEADER)

D. BANGKOK 2125 (POLICE CHIEF BATTLE)

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR ERIC G. JOHN, REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
--------------


1. (C) Summary: On October 6, the Ambassador met with Deputy
Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban to discuss the latest
political developments in Thailand, including Secretary
General Niphon Promphan's recent resignation. Suthep
characterized the resignation decision as hard to explain and
expressed a reluctance to expand on an issue with clear
connections to the Crown Prince (Note: In a separate
conversation on October 5 with former Bangkok Governor and
Abhisit ally Apirak Kosayodhin, Apirak told the Ambassador
the resignation was not as serious for the Democrat party as
some have suggested. End Note.) On a related issue, Suthep
suggested the prolonged public battle over the Police Chief
position would come to a close and the resulting political
fallout contained within the next few months (REF D). Suthep
told the Ambassador that former PM Thaksin retained
c:yGt1^QuUU_Q
problems. Suthep believed the plaE4xQ[Z$t!QQnterfere with the courts, the RTG
would do everything
possible to ensure the appeals process ran smoothly and
abided by the letter of the law.


3. (C) Comment: Deputy Prime Minister Suthep has long had the
unenviable task of serving as the middle man between Prime
Minister Abhisit on one hand, and the Democrat party's
coalition partners on the other. Just as critically, Suthep
has also been responsible for healing wounds and balancing
interests within the Democrat party. Given those two
mandates, the Police Chief controversy was in many ways
Suthep's worst nightmare, pitting the PM and symbolic head of
the Democrat party simultaneously against the Democrat's most
important coalition partner (Phumjai Thai) and the Crown
Prince (represented by Secretary General and Deputy party
leader Niphon Promphan). Not surprisingly, Suthep was
reluctant to comment on his role in navigating this political
minefield, but when the Ambassador probed him on the topic,
his silence and uncomfortable body language spoke volumes.

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It was obvious that from Suthep's perspective, Prime Minister
Abhisit had made his stand on the Police Chief issue and now,
for better or for worse, Suthep would be charged with picking
up the pieces. End Summary and Comment.

POLICE CHIEF BATTLE
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador began the meeting by asking Suthep
about Niphon Promphan's resignation last week as
Secretary-General for Prime Minister Abhisit (Note: As
outlined in REF B, Niphon is a trusted advisor of Crown
Prince Vajiralongkorn and is widely believed to have resigned
because of complications related to his advocacy of Prince
Vajiralongkorn's candidate -- Police General Jumpol Manmai --
over PM Abhisit's choice of Police General Prateep. End
Note.) Suthep characterized the resignation decision as
difficult to explain and avoided any direct mention of Crown
Prince Vajiralongkorn's involvement in the matter. Hinting
at the sensitivities associated with the entire Police Chief
imbroglio and Niphon's subsequent resignation, Suthep offered
simply that he was prepared to work with anyone and implied
the issue was emblematic of deep rifts across the political
spectrum. The Police Chief issue -- as well as the attendant
political fallout associated with PM Abhisit's dogged support
for Police General Prateep -- would take a few months to
solve, but Suthep would work to resolve any problems.


5. (C) On October 5, in a separate conversation with former
Bangkok Governor and PM Abhisit stalwart Apirak Kosayodhin,
the Ambassador asked about the implications of Niphon's
resignation for the Democrat party. Apirat cheerfully told
the Ambassador the issue was not nearly as grave as had been
implied by the media, and that Niphon's resignation had not
seriously impacted party operations or morale.

THAKSIN
--------------


6. (C) Turning to former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, Suthep said
that Thaksin's proxies in Bangkok, including his sister
Yingluck Shinawatra, were still actively trying to pave the
way for his return to Thailand. Suthep did not see a viable
path forward for his return at this point, however, and noted
that Thaksin's goal of getting all of his money back and not
serving a day in jail was unrealistic. As a fugitive,
Thaksin's most serious problems were legal and he would have
to work on resolving them through judicial channels. Suthep
believed Thaksin viewed himself as above the law. Another
complicating factor was that many Thai citizens were also
deeply skeptical of Thaksin's political intentions, and
concerned that his return could damage the monarchy.

PUEA THAI
--------------


7. (C) On the subject of Thaksin's political vehicle Puea
Thai, the Ambassador asked for Suthep's assessment of former
PM GEN Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's decision to join the party.
Suthep said that he had given up trying to understand
Chavalit's decision making process a long time ago. Chavalit
had served as Prime Minister as one point, and then later
accepted a job as Deputy Prime Minister, a development he
characterized as unprecedented in Thai politics.


8. (C) Suthep agreed with the Ambassador's assessment that
Puea Thai lacked viable candidates to serve as the public
face for the party, and from that perspective, Puea Thai's
recruitment of Chavalit made sense. Suthep did not believe,
however, that Chavalit would have any success serving as a
mediator and attempting to bridge Thailand's political
divide. Suthep told the Ambassador that Chavalit was

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involved with the violence associated with the May 1992
protests known as "Black May." Chavalit was also involved
with the October 7, 2008 crackdown on "yellow-shirt"
protestors and therefore had very little credibility to serve
as a go-between.

RED-SHIRT RALLIES
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked Suthep about the anti-government
United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD),aka
the "red-shirts," and their plan to hold another protest in
Bangkok on October 17, as well as the potential for protests
in conjunction with the Asean Summit in Hua Hin from October
23-25. Suthep said that he was worried about the potential
for trouble on both occasions, but underscored the fact that
the RTG had learned its lesson from the violence that shook
Pattaya and Bangkok earlier this year. Suthep told the
Ambassador that in a cabinet meeting later in the day, he
would propose invoking the Internal Security Act (ISA) for
both events. In Bangkok, the ISA would apply only to the
area surrounding the planned protest (Dusit district),while
in Hua Hin the ISA would only affect select conference
locations. In both instances, the ISA would allow the
military to deploy troops and coordinate with law enforcement
authorities in order to maintain the peace. Suthep said that
the government had learned the hard way that many police
officers were red-shirt sympathizers and could not always be
trusted to carry out RTG commands.

THE CONSTITUTION
--------------


10. (C) Turning to the government coalition's recent decision
to move forward with six amendments to the Constitution (REF
A),Suthep described the process from this point on as
relatively straight forward. According to Suthep, the
coalition government had agreed to abide by the six proposed
recommended amendments forwarded by the Reconciliation
Committee for Political Reform and Constitutional Amendments.
Suthep said the government would not entertain Puea Thai's
proposal to put the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions side by side
in a public vote, but would instead hold a referendum which
would allow Thai voters to approve or disapprove of each of
the six proposed amendments on an individual basis. While
this approach would probably be opposed by both the red and
yellow shirts for different reasons, in Suthep's view, a
referendum along those lines made the most sense moving
forward.


11. (C) When the Ambassador asked Suthep how long he thought
the entire constitutional revision process might take from
start to finish, Suthep suggested it could be wrapped up in
nine to 12 months. At the end of that process the government
could then call for new elections. That said, Suthep
cautioned that if the political cleavages that were currently
hampering the Thai political process were not satisfactorily
addressed before that point, the government might be forced
to delay elections until a later date. The government would
have to make sure the country was ready for peaceful
elections.

DOW CHEMICAL
--------------


12. (C) The Ambassador expressed his concern with the impact
of a recent Central Administrative Court environmental ruling
which suspended all projects and activities in the Map Ta
Phut Industrial Estate area. The Court's decision grouped
Dow Chemical -- which had environmental standards that
exceeded those mandated by the RTG -- together with other
firms who had much more lax standards. The Ambassador noted

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that the decision jeopardized Dow's three billion dollar
investment in Map Ta Phut, including expansion plans now
underway. Several thousand Thai employees were involved with
expansion plans alone and their future was now uncertain.
Dow was also re-evaluating its investment in Thailand and the
Court's decision had implications throughout the American
investment community.


13. (C) Suthep said that the Prime Minister was surprised by
the verdict and he noted that the RTG had already appealed
it. Given Dow's strong environmental credentials, in
Suthep's view, the company should be allowed to proceed with
its plans. Suthep also wished to see the issue resolved aspQbstrong interest
in the Viktor Bout case. Following up
on the DCM's October 1 meeting with Suthep, the Ambassador
reiterated USG concern with the fact that unbeknownst to the
Office of the Attorney General's office, Bout and his lawyers
had recently met with the appeals judge. The Ambassador
noted that this lack of coordination and communication was
troubling, and expressed his hope that the RTG would make
every effort to ensure the appeals process abided by the
letter of the law. The Bout appeal verdict would have strong
implications for the bilateral relationship, and it was
critical to ensure the appeal was decided exclusively on the
merits of the case.


15. (C) Suthep said that he was surprised to learn that the
appeals judge had met with Bout's counsel without notifying
the OAG's office. Suthep vowed to look into the matter and
to provide the Embassy with all the relevant facts. While
the RTG could not intervene directly in a court matter, the
RTG also hoped the case would be overturned on appeal and
would make every effort to make sure the process stayed on
track.


JOHN