THAILAND: PREVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE BURMA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002464 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV BM TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: PREVIEWING THE RESULTS OF THE BURMA POLICY REVIEW REF: STATE 100518 BANGKOK 00002464 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Charge a.i. James F. Entwistle, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Charge previewed the results of our Burma policy review to MFA East Asian Director General Kittiphong na Ranong September 28, per reftel. Kittiphong probed U.S. thinking on how we planned to handle incremental next steps, expressed both doubt that the regime would take the first step and concern that the opportunity afforded by the 2010 election to give the opposition more space to operate might be missed, and suggested greater engagement with China in the wake of destabilizing developments in Shan state. We will also factor these developments into our ongoing Burma policy dialogue with local European Commission and EU country diplomats. End Summary. Burma Policy review - in both the U.S. and Thailand -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Charge and PolCouns engaged new DG for East Asia Kittiphong September 28 on reftel points after MFA PermSec Virasak Futrakul, long a leading voice on Thai policy towards Burma, suggested Kittiphong was the best interlocutor, "since he works closely with FM Kasit on Burma policy." The differences on Burma policy between Kasit and Virasak are widely known, with Kasit much more critical of the regime. With the recent arrival of Kittiphong and submission of Virasak's name to Japan for agrement, it is clear Kasit is putting a firmer stamp on policy formulation, with Virasak bowing out. Kittiphong told us September 21 that "there are only a few people in the MFA who actually oppose the regime in Naipyitaw; I happen to be one of them." Nevertheless, Kittiphong and Kasit both see 2010 as an opportunity. ¶3. (C) Kittiphong referenced FM Kasit's New York meetings with EAP A/S Campbell and NSC Senior Director Bader to highlight Thai understanding that there would be some sort of high-level U.S.-Burmese meeting in New York. Kittiphong asked if the rollout of our Burma policy review had been timed specifically for the day when Burmese PM Thein Sein addressed the UNGA in New York. Kittiphong said that if Thein Sein's UNGA comments were positive, our policy review rollout would have a proper context; if not, he feared any U.S. gesture might "reward no progress." ¶4. (C) Kittiphong asked how the U.S. planned to handle incremental steps, in particular how much we would condition on a release of Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK),which he judged would be "next to impossible" for the regime to make up front. Charge underscored the potential for smaller steps initially, on issues like counter-narcotics. Kittiphong urged us to think how ASSK's signal in favor of engagement could be used positively to achieve the goal of elections that would be freer and fairer, even though he shared the expectation that the elections might not be either. Those in favor of a more democratic Burma needed to maximize the opportunity the 2010 process afforded, he stressed. The U.S. was announcing its policy review results, and ASSK had written her letter to Burmese leaders; it was now up to the regime to respond to both openings, in his view. ¶5. (C) ASEAN itself was divided on what to do on Burma, Kittiphong noted. Gone was the time when all countries hid behind the principles of consensus and non-interference; Burma represented the first time there was such a clear division within ASEAN (note: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Indonesia endorsed a Chair call to Burma to release ASSK from house arrest; the other five did not). What was needed, in Kittiphong's view, was more capacity building, not just humanitarian assistance but investment in human resources, to give Burmese the ability to run their country more effectively. Outside training would expose Burmese to the world; countries supportive of a more democratic Burma should not wait until systemic change had occurred but start preparing Burmese now through training and exchanges. The China Factor - leveraging Beijing to pressure Naipyitaw BANGKOK 00002464 002.2 OF 002 -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) Kittiphong had confirmed to us September 21 that he had summoned the Chinese Ambassador in early September for a long discussion on Burma, admonishing him that the standard Chinese line that the situation in Burma was solely a domestic matter for the regime to address was "unacceptable" given recent developments in Shan State (note: we believe such a Thai diplomatic chastising of China over Burma policy is unprecedented. End Note). Kittiphong did not view recent reports that the Burmese regime may have ordered Chinese citizens to leave Burma as a negative development. In fact, he welcomed the potential for a Chinese policy backlash, if Beijing were to internalize the reality/Thai perspective that the situation in Burma represented a threat to regional stability, and thus should be addressed actively by the international community, including by Beijing. ENTWISTLE