Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK2401
2009-09-21 10:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT ON UNGA,

Tags:  PREL PGOV TH 
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FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
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INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 1940
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 7488
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 5811
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 9992
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7020
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002401 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT ON UNGA,
G20, THAI-US RELATIONS, AND DOMESTIC CHALLENGES

REF: BANGKOK 2355

BANGKOK 00002401 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002401 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR BADER E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 TAGS: PREL PGOV TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR ENGAGES PM ABHISIT ON UNGA, G20, THAI-US RELATIONS, AND DOMESTIC CHALLENGES REF: BANGKOK 2355 BANGKOK 00002401 001.2 OF 003 Classified By: Ambassador Eric G. John, reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Ambassador met PM Abhisit Vejajjiva at Government House September 18 to review a wide range of issues likely to arise during Abhisit's upcoming September 21-26 trip to NY and Pittsburgh for the UN General Assembly, the G20 Summit, and a Thai "business roadshow" outreach effort. With the global economy emerging from recession Abhisit suggested that efforts to reform the global financial system would sputter, as they had in the wake of the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis. Abhisit expressed support for holding the delayed U.S.-ASEAN Summit on the margins of the Singapore-hosted APEC Summit in November. At the UN, Abhisit looked forward to climate change discussions and would reaffirm Thai intent to deploy to Darfur as part of UNAMID; Ambassador urged Abhisit to support P5 1 efforts on Iran both publicly and privately. Bilaterally, Abhisit expressed disappointment at a U.S. Department of Labor report which he said smeared whole sectors of the Thai economy with the transgressions of a few firms (reftel). On domestic politics, PM Abhisit detailed his approach to amending the 2007 Constitution and appointing a new police chief in the face of sustained opposition. PM Abhisit appeared relaxed, projected confidence, cracked jokes, and acted not at all like a man under siege that conventional wisdom and most media coverage would suggest. End Summary and Comment. G20 and Systemic Financial Reform -------------- ¶2. (C) Ambassador previewed the Pittsburgh agenda. Abhisit suggested that the Finance Ministers' meetings suggested the G20 approach to the world financial crisis was akin to the early reaction to the Asia Financial Crisis in 1997/98 - some initial promising talks about new global financial infrastructure, which stall once the recovery begins, and the systemic overhaul is put aside, for better or worse. Abhisit said he had been personally skeptical from the start of the crisis last year that the discussions would lead to systemic changes, but the discussion was important nonetheless. APEC and US-ASEAN Summit -------------- ¶3. (C) Abhisit raised the issue of U.S. plans for holding the &#x
000A;delayed 30th anniversary U.S.-ASEAN summit, noting that he had talked to Philippines' President Gloria Magapal Arroyo prior to her U.S. trip this past summer about holding the US-ASEAN summit on the margins of APEC. Abhisit said he had the sense that Arroyo/Philippines wanted the Summit in the U.S.; she had returned expressing concern that outrage over Burma/ASSK's arrest could postpone such a meeting. Abhisit personally believed that holding the Summit during the President's APEC trip in November made the most sense. Ambassador affirmed that the U.S. valued relations with ASEAN and would be consulting with the Philippines as dialogue partner, Thailand as ASEAN Chair, and Singapore as APEC host how to make something work. Abhisit replied: "we can work together to sort it out on our side." UNGA agenda: Climate Change, Iran, Darfur -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Abhisit raised the upcoming UN SYG Ban-hosted meetings on Climate Change, pointing towards the meetings in Copenhagen in December. Many countries were anxious that an agreement be reached in Copenhagen. Abhisit noted he would open the Bangkok preparatory meetings September 28 immediately after returning from his U.S. trip. ¶5. (C) Ambassador highlighted the importance of world leaders using UNGA to endorse the P5 1 process on Iran and its nuclear program. He urged Abhisit also to use behind the scenes meetings on the margins to bolster the effort; Abhisit nodded, and replied, "Right." ¶6. (C) Abhisit mentioned the ongoing Thai plans to send a contingent to Darfur as part of UNAMID, indicating that the RTG had just secured financing for the mission. He expressed hope that there would not be additional technical issues that BANGKOK 00002401 002.2 OF 003 would prevent the Thai deployment. Business roadshow/outreach -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Abhisit characterized his outreach to business audiences - U.S. ASEAN Business Council (USABC),investors, and fund managers - as a major trip priority. He also planned to ring the closing bell of the NYSE September 22, do a CNBC interview on the floor, talk to Newsweek/Washington Post, and perhaps the NYTimes. Ambassador described the hour-long conference call he had conducted with 40 USABC members September 17 to preview issues the U.S. business community would raise with Abhisit in NY. He noted that Abhisit's U.S. business and media interlocutors would have moved beyond the honeymoon period of six months ago and look for action and accomplishments, not just verbal commitments or use of "recovering from political turmoil" as a temporizing excuse. ¶8. (C) First and foremost, Ambassador explained, were customs/excise concerns. Abhisit nodded and said: "right." He later acknowledged problems remained, and stated that Finance Minister Korn and Trade representative Kiat were aware of the issues, attempting to resolve them. Second on the list were IPR concerns, Ambassador continued. There was understanding of the progress made this year by the Abhisit government's more concerted efforts, but media/creative firms still had ongoing serious concerns about piracy, and the pharmaceutical sector about rumors of compulsory licensing. Abhisit responded by emphasizing IPR efforts under his administration, including the "Creative Thailand" campaign which highlighted the benefits to Thailand, putting the two countries' interests on the same side of the issue. Ambassador expressed our desire to find ways the U.S. could support the Creative Thailand campaign. DOL forced labor report "disappointing" -------------- ¶9. (C) Abhisit raised the recent DOL report on forced/child labor, adding, "we are very disappointed" because whole industries in Thailand were smeared with the transgressions of a few offenders (ref A). Abhisit stressed that the RTG did not tolerate such actions and had moved to correct transgressions when identified. Abhisit asked Ambassador to convey to Washington the RTG's commitment to sort out problems. Domestic issues: Constitutional amendments and police chiefs -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) Abhisit noted he had wrapped up the parliamentary debate on possible changes to the constitution around midnight the previous evening, September 17, with no more than 10 opposition MPs remaining in the chamber. Noting that opposition fully expected him to try to draw out the process of constitutional changes, Abhisit claimed that he had surprised them with a different proposal: have the whips of the government, opposition, and senate sit down after his return from the US, thrash out agreed upon draft amendments in the six areas the parliamentary joint committee had recommended, and put the proposals to a national referendum. If the proposals received public approval, he would move ahead with an amended election law and new elections. The first stage - draft and referendum - could take 3-4 months. Amending the election law and moving into new elections would take a similar amount of time. The immediate reaction of the opposition seemed positive, though Abhisit added "we'll see what they think after 10 days." ¶11. (C) On the DISCORD within the coalition government over appointing a new police chief, Abhisit smiled and replied: "No problem. There's only one candidate. It will just take time to sort out." (Note: his coalition partner Phumjai Thai, his party Secretary General Suthep, and the Crown Prince all support a different candidate. The Secretary General of the PM's office, Niphol Promphan, has separate responsibilities supporting the Crown Prince, and in the case of the police chief, has supported the Crown Prince's choice over Abhisit's. When Abhisit made this comment, Niphol looked up BANGKOK 00002401 003.4 OF 003 at the ceiling with wry smile on his face, letting out a pained laugh). JOHN

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