Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09BANGKOK2289
2009-09-09 10:03:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI DOMESTIC POLITICAL ROUNDUP: ABHISIT,S

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM TH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 002289 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI DOMESTIC POLITICAL ROUNDUP: ABHISIT,S
POLITICAL CHALLENGES, POLICE CHIEF UPDATE, RED-SHIRTS ON
9/19

REF: A. BANGKOK 2260 (QUASHING THAKSIN PARDON SUGGESTIONS)

B. BANGKOK 2180 (RED SHIRTS ARE COMING)

C. BANGKOK 2125 (ABHISIT LOSES POLICE BATTLE)

D. BANGKOK 1491 (BELWETHER BY-ELECTION)

BANGKOK 00002289 001.2 OF 005


Classified By: AMBASSADOR ERIC G. JOHN, REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D).

SUMMARY AND COMMENT
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BANGKOK 002289 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/08/2019 TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM TH SUBJECT: THAI DOMESTIC POLITICAL ROUNDUP: ABHISIT,S POLITICAL CHALLENGES, POLICE CHIEF UPDATE, RED-SHIRTS ON 9/19 REF: A. BANGKOK 2260 (QUASHING THAKSIN PARDON SUGGESTIONS) ¶B. BANGKOK 2180 (RED SHIRTS ARE COMING) ¶C. BANGKOK 2125 (ABHISIT LOSES POLICE BATTLE) ¶D. BANGKOK 1491 (BELWETHER BY-ELECTION) BANGKOK 00002289 001.2 OF 005 Classified By: AMBASSADOR ERIC G. JOHN, REASON: 1.4 (B) AND (D). SUMMARY AND COMMENT -------------- ¶1. (C) Above and beyond the challenges associated with steering Thailand out of the economic morass, PM Abhisit continues to grapple with a seemingly endless litany of political problems both inside and outside his party, including in-fighting with Deputy PM Suthep. Questions about possible election timing remain unresolved, with growing evidence building that the Democrats and Phumjai Thai will try to delay elections for at least another six months. Hoping to accelerate that timeline, the "red-shirts" announced they would hold their next protest on September 19, a particularly auspicious date in red-shirt land as it marks the third anniversary of the 2006 coup that toppled Thaksin. Meanwhile, Thaksin was reported to be in good health, while Deputy PM Suthep's hard charging pace has apparently begun to take its toll. Rumors of a burgeoning Puea Thai-Democrat alliance appear to be fanciful, however, and reports of Yingluck Shinawatra's growing influence within Puea Thai likely overstated. On an upbeat note, the PM's attempt to push through his candidate for Police Chief may have taken a positive turn with a rumor that the Queen has trumped the Crown Prince's objections and backed Abhisit's nominee. ¶2. (C) Comment: PM Abhisit finds himself in a precarious political position. Not only must he contend with the constant drumbeat of criticism from Puea Thai and the ever present specter of "red-shirt" protests on one side, but he also faces growing pressure from within his own party and his coalition partners. We are struck by the fact that his "allies" in the coalition -- Phumjai Thai -- dismiss him as a lightweight in private and mock him in public, while his colleagues in the Democrat party are becoming increasingly bold and assertive in their own public critiques of his performance. ¶3. (C) Comment, cont: That said, PM Abhisit remains the only politician i
n Thailand with favorability ratings that approach those of ex-PM Thaksin. In fact, Abhisit is in many ways the glue that holds this fragile house of political cards together, and those complaining lack other viable options. Whether his political partners wish to acknowledge it or not, without his popularity, the government would be hard pressed to fend off calls for an election much longer. With Abhisit as the public face of the administration and the 2010 budget to be implemented, we suspect the administration will be able to last at least another six or seven months before calling for new elections. If Abhisit survives another seven months in office, he will have served approximately 15 months total, a term that is roughly average by pre- and post-Thaksin era PM standards. End Summary and Comment. COALITION DYSFUNCTION, NOT FATAL (YET) -------------- ¶4. (C) Tensions continue to persist in the political marriage of convenience between Prime Minister Abhisit's Democrat party and coalition partner Phumjai Thai, according to multiple mission contacts. Deputy Government Spokesman and Phumjai Thai stalwart Suphachai Jaismut claimed to us September 3 that PM Abhisit was responsible for most of the inter-party dysfunction, dismissing him repeatedly as "a young man," who (only) "speaks well." According to Suphachai, Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban served as the real brains behind the Democrat party operation and routinely had to run interference for Abhisit and fix his mistakes. Revealingly, Suphachai also referred to Phumjai BANGKOK 00002289 002.2 OF 005 Thai at one point in the conversation as "the only party in the coalition that matters." (Note: The Democrat party has 171 seats in Parliament while Phumjai Thai -- the junior coalition partner -- holds just 32 seats.) ¶5. (C) Suphachai's assessment of coalition tensions with PM Abhisit tracked with what journalist Suranand Vejjajiva (PM Abhisit's cousin, but political opponent) told us on August ¶28. Suranand predicted that PM Abhisit's indifference to coalition maintenance would eventually come back to haunt him. He suggested that his cousin was interested in practicing a "new brand of politics" and said that the PM believed that maintaining relations with Phumjai Thai was essentially beneath him. According to Suranand, the PM had all but given up on any pretense of harmony with Phumjai Thai; he argued that, by sub-contracting coalition maintenance to the Deputy PM, Abhisit had weakened himself politically and made powerful enemies in the process. ¶6. (C) Former Deputy Prime Minister and close Thaksin ally Sompong Amornvivat gleefully confirmed the wide-spread rumors of Democrat-Phumjai Thai tensions, telling us September 3 that he could easily envision a scenario in which the Puea Thai party and Phumjai Thai would coalesce again following the next round of elections, thereby relegating the Democrats to the political wilderness. (Note: Phumjai Thai and the Thaksin-affiliated Puea Thai predecessor -- the People's Power Party (PPP) -- were partners in the last government. End Note.) ¶7. (C) According to Sompong, PM Abhisit was likely taken aback by the greed and rapaciousness of PhumjaQThai's appointees in the Ministry of the Interior: Minister (and Party leader) Chavarat Charnvirakul; and recently appointed Permanent Secretary Manit Wattanasen, seen as close to Phumjai Thai de facto leader Newin Chidchob. Sompong told us that Chavarat and Manit had instructed Phumjai Thai lackeys at the provincial level to pocket 25 percent of all Interior Ministry funds designated for developmental purposes, a staggering percentage even by Thai standards. PROBLEMS WITHIN PM'S OWN PARTY -------------- ¶8. (C) Abhisit's political problems do not end with coalition management headaches and constant sparring with the opposition, as reported in Refs C and D. The PM has had to deal with friendly fire from within his own party, particularly from powerbroker party Secretary General, Deputy PM Suthep. The two have been at odds on a range of issues, including the approach on dealing with the south, and both have had to fight the widespread perception that Suthep has worked to undercut several aspects of the PM's agenda. When we asked Deputy PM Suthep's Special Assistant Akanat Promphan (Suthep's step-son) on September 1 about relations between the two, Akanat's reflexive -- and very revealing -- response was: "they are still talking." CORRUPTION COMMISSION DECISION TOPPLES POLICE CHIEF -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) On September 8, the National Counter Corruption Commission (NCCC) brought formal criminal charges against Police Commissioner Patcharawat Wongsuwon for his role in the October 7, 2008 crackdown on People's Alliance for Democracy protestors (aka "the yellow-shirts); also charged were then PM Somchai, then DPM Chavalit, and then Bangkok Police Chief Suchart Mueankaew. PM Abhisit reacted to the NCCC announcement September 9 by transferring Patcharawat -- who was set to retire at the end of the month in any case -- to the Prime Minister's office. PM Abhisit then appointed Deputy Police Chief Thanee Somboonsap to serve out the remainder of Patcharawat's term; Thanee will also retire at the end of the month and is therefore not eligible to replace him on a permanent basis. The decision likely will add an even greater sense of urgency to the PM's efforts to BANGKOK 00002289 003.2 OF 005 designate Patcharawat's eventual successor (REF C). POLICE CHIEF IMBROGLIO -- DOES QUEEN TRUMP PRINCE? -------------- -------------- ¶10. (C) The simmering feud over the National Police Chief position continues to exacerbate the bad blood between the Democrats and Phumjai Thai and expose the Abhisit-Suthep fissures. Though PM Abhisit routinely asserts that he will forward Police General Prateep Tunprasert's name for consideration again as the nation's top cop, there are indications that Phumjai Thai will not easily fall in line. This time, however, they are looking to hide behind the apparent desire of Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn to see Police General Jumpol Manmai appointed Chief (Note: It is widely believed former PM Thaksin, while in office, used Jumpol as a bag man to deliver funds skimmed from the state lottery to the Crown Prince's office to fund his lifestyle. End Note.) ¶11. (C) Phumjai Thai's Supachai coyly told us that Phumjai Thai would "support whomever Suthep and Niphol do." The Crown Prince, currently in Germany, had recently summoned Niphol Promphan, who handles his finances but is also a Democrat MP and Secretary General of PM Abhisit's office, to Germany to receive instructions to support Jumpol's candidacy, according to a wide array of contacts and press reports. (Note: Phumjai Thai Party Leader Charawat's son Anutin, the Chair of construction giant Sino-Thai, is also seen as very close to the Crown Prince, as a "friend" and financier. End Note.) ¶12. (C) Intriguingly, the Crown Prince may not be the only member of the Palace interested in shaping the race for the Police Chief position. Deputy Democrat party leader Kraisak Choonhaven told us September 5 that he had appealed to several influential members in court circles to have Queen Sikrit trump the Crown Prince's support for Jumpol. The Queen had conveyed her support to Abhisit for Prateep, Kraisak claimed; Supachai acknowledged to us September 4 that they had heard the Queen may indeed be backing Prateep. According to Kraisak, with the Queen's support in hand, Abhisit would be able to push Police General Prateep through at the next Royal Thai Police Office Board. Niphol's overt promotion of the Crown Prince's desires was dangerous for Niphol and the party, Kraisak fumed. ELECTION TIMING: NOT SOON -------------- ¶13. (C) For all the inter-party discord between the Democrats and Phumjai Thai, there does appear to be at least one point on which they agree: the longer the delay before elections the better. Suthep aide Akanat told us that the Democrats would try to delay elections as long as possible; they needed time to allow their reforms and initiatives to take root, as well as to develop a governing record they could be proud of. Up to this point, Akanat added, the Democrats had been pre-occupied primarily with jumping from one disaster to the next. Now that the triage phase of their stint in office had ended, the government could begin to carry out its agenda. According to Akanat, Deputy PM Suthep believed that the Democrats needed at least another six to seven months before they would be ready for elections. If elections were held tomorrow, Akanat believed the Democrats would fare poorly. ¶14. (C) Supachai told us that Phumjai Thai's calculations mirrored those of the Democrats. Phumjai Thai wanted time to spend the new budget funds, revise the constitution, and develop a strong governing record. Supachai freely admitted that Phumjai Thai would do its part to delay elections until the last possible moment, conceding that Phumjai Thai was enjoying its current political positioning and would gain nothing from re-shuffling the deck. When we asked whether Phumjai's delay strategy was partially influenced by the party's lackluster performance in recent by-elections (REF D),Supachai purported to be unfazed by the results and BANGKOK 00002289 004.2 OF 005 confident in the party's prospects going forward. ¶15. (C) Meanwhile, the Prime Minister has given conflicting public signals on the election timing issue. Following the August 20 setback on the Police Chief vote, PM Abhisit publicly claimed that he was ready to call an election at any moment. On other occasions, he has been far more circumspect, arguing that Thailand would not be ready for elections until the economy was stabilized, all parties were satisfied with the electoral ground rules, and the security situation had improved. Most of our contacts believe the PM will do his best to delay elections as long as possible as he is well aware that dissolving Parliament would benefit Puea Thai more than anyone else. Puea Thai contacts, for their part, have all told us they would like to see elections as soon as possible. RED-SHIRT RALLY -------------- ¶16. (C) According to media reports and contacts within the anti-government United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD),the "red-shirts" will stage their next big rally on September 19. UDD leader Vira Musikapong has announced that the red-shirts plan to assemble in the Royal Plaza area of Bangkok in the afternoon, before marching to former PM Prem Tinsulanonda's house (adjacent to the Royal Plaza) and then finally dissolving early the next morning. The red-shirts had initially planned to stage a protest on August 30 (REF B),but later re-scheduled it for September 19, the third anniversary of the 2006 coup that toppled former PM Thaksin. As was the case in the lead-up to the planned August 30 rally, the government has signaled that it intends to invoke the Internal Security Act in conjunction with the September 19 rally. THAKSIN FIT AS A FIDDLE - WHAT ABOUT SUTHEP? -------------- ¶17. (C) Contrary to the widespread rumors about former Prime Minister Thaksin's deteriorating health (some speculate he has had prostate cancer),Sompong claimed to us that Thaksin is in fact in excellent shape. Sompong reported that Thaksin had no health concerns and was as energetic and active as ever. Sompong said he visits Thaksin in Dubai an average of twice a month and has never seen any evidence of a health concern. ¶18. (C) On the other hand, Deputy PM Suthep has begun to show signs of the stress associated with juggling his job as Deputy and role as Democrat party heavyweight, his aide Akanat confided. Between the intractable battle with the red-shirts, the discord within the Democrat party, coalition fence mending, and dealing with problems in southern Thailand, Suthep had been operating on overdrive since the beginning of the year. Making matters worse, Akanat said that Suthep refused to take any days off to rest and worked late into the night almost every day. As a result, Suthep was looking increasingly haggard and unhealthy, and his family was urging him to dial back his unsustainable pace. Akanat worried aloud about the possibility of serious health problems in the near future if Suthep did not heed the advice. OPPOSITES UNLIKELY TO ATTRACT -------------- ¶19. (C) Last week there was wide spread media speculation about the possibility of an imminent deal between the Democrat party and Puea Thai (REF A). Our contacts uniformly dismissed this as far fetched. According to Sompong, though Puea Thai leaders maintained a more or less constant dialogue with the Democrat party leadership, because "we all know each other," there was almost no chance the two parties could bury their differences and work together as part of a governing coalition. Sompong noted that such a proposal would be met BANGKOK 00002289 005.2 OF 005 by widespread rebellion within the Puea Thai party ranks as the average PuQ Thai party member had been conditioned to view the Democrats as enemies. As a result, it would be much easier to work together with any other party, including Phumjai Thai. YINGLUCK OUT OF LUCK? -------------- ¶20. (C) When we asked Sompong about the apparent upward trajectory of Thaksin's youngest sister -- Yingluck Shinawatra -- within the Pheu Thai party ranks, he told us he did not envision a big role for her in the party. (Note: When we met with Yingluck last month at Pheu Thai party headquarters, she was joined by former Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama, who repeatedly referred to her as a rising party star. End Note.) According to Sompong, Thaksin himself was not eager to raise her profile within the party, and was more focused on finding ways to keep his own hand active in politics. According to Sompong, Yingluck had no experience in politics and didn't even have a formal job in the party as of yet. Other contacts, including Suranand Vejjajiva, were similarly dismissive of her political prospects, noting that in some ways she had the worst of both worlds: the burden of inheriting reflexive animosity from influential circles because of her name, coupled with none of the charisma and charm that allowed her brother to develop a groundswell of support. JOHN

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